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Abstract
Opportunistic networks (OppNets) refer to a number of wireless nodes opportunis-
tically communicating with each other in a form of “Store-Carry-Forward”. This
occurs when nodes come into contact with each other without proper network in-
frastructure. OppNets use wireless technologies, such as IEEE 802.11, WiMAX,
Bluetooth and other short range radio communication and find applications in do-
mains such as disaster management, wildlife tracking and rural communication. In
OppNets, there is no end-to-end connection between the source and the destination
nodes with frequent partitions and long delays being common.
Security is a major challenge in Opportunistic Networks (OppNets) because of their
characteristics, such as open medium, dynamic topology, no centralized management
and absent clear lines of defence. Packet dropping attacks are one of the major
security threats in OppNets since neither source nodes nor destination nodes can
have the knowledge of where or when the packet will be dropped. This attack is
one of the most difficult denial of service (DoS) attacks to detect and can lead to
degradation of network performance and obstruction of the propagation and delivery
of sensitive data.
In this thesis, we have identified a novel attack in OppNets, a special type of packet
dropping attack where the malicious node(s) drops one or more packets (not all the
packets) and then injects new fake packets instead. We name this novel attack as
the Catabolism attack and propose a novel attack detection and traceback approach
against this attack referred to as the Anabolism defence. As part of the Anabolism
defence approach we have proposed three techniques: time-based, Merkle tree based
and Hash chain based techniques for attack detection and malicious node(s) trace-
x
List of Figures
back. We provide mathematical models that show our novel detection and traceback
mechanisms to be very effective and detailed simulation results show our defence
mechanisms to achieve a very high accuracy and detection rate.
xi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Opportunistic networks (OppNets) refer to a number of wireless nodes opportunis-
tically communicating with each other in the form of “Store-Carry-Forward” when
they come into contact with each other without proper network infrastructure.
OppNets aim to establish reliable connectivity where there is no end-to-end connec-
tion between a source and destination node. The nodes in OppNets usually have
high mobility, low density, limited power, short radio range, and are often subject to
different kinds of attacks by malicious nodes. Due to these characteristics, OppNets
present significant research challenges.
With the proliferation of wireless mobile devices, OppNets are being used in a wide
variety of areas including disaster recovery, military deployment, and wildlife. Opp-
Nets encompass different technologies, such as ad hoc Networks, wireless sensor
networks, peer-to-peer (P2P) systems, grid networks and delay tolerant networks
(DTN). However, unlike DTNs, routing in OppNets must be opportunistic. In DTNs,
when a message is to be sent, an existing end to end route is first investigated; if
none is found, the message is then sent opportunistically. Whereas in OppNets, the
message is always sent opportunistically, and an existing end to end path is never
identified. OppNets work by exploiting human relationships and interactions with
various mobile devices/users to build strong and secure protocols.
Researchers have studied the characteristics of OppNets such as their contact du-
ration times [3], mobility [4], storage-delay, and energy-delay [5] as these charac-
teristics affect the overall network performance and routing protocols. One of the
routing challenges in OppNets is the high mobility of nodes and the work in [3]
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focused on and observed the inter-contact time and contact duration between two
nodes transmitting opportunistically in order to determine the capacity of the op-
portunistic network, such as the amount of data that can be transferred between
two nodes during their contact times. The authors discovered that the distribution
of inter-contact time over a large time range can be approximated to a power-law.
Under power-law conditions, redundant transmissions could be used to significantly
improve transmission schemes that usually perform badly.
Routing in OppNets is a challenging problem, due to features such as frequent parti-
tions, long delays and no end-to-end path from source to destination. Many protocols
have been developed to accommodate these features. Generally, replication-based
protocols have higher delivery rates and lower delays over forwarding-based proto-
cols because of the multiple copies in the network. However, the cost incurred on
network resources from replication-based protocols is higher than the cost incurred
from forwarding-based protocols. Hybrid protocols inherit some features from both
replication and forwarding families to come up with new protocols that have better
performance in term of delivery rate, delays and cost. Researchers are yet to reach
agreement on the best routing approach for OppNets.
1.1 Motivation
As outlined earlier, OppNets are dependent on other nodes for successful packet/-
data delivery. Consequently, packet dropping attack is one of the major security
threats in OppNets. It can be classified as a denial of service attack (DoS) where
one or more malicious nodes drop all or some of the packets. This attack is one
of the most difficult DoS attacks to detect since neither the source node nor the
destination node has the knowledge of where or when the packet will be dropped.
Packet dropping can degrade the performance of the network and may obstruct the
propagation of sensitive data. It is a significant challenge to deal with such an attack
since the unreliable wireless communication and resource limitations can result in
communication failure and result in the wrong prediction about the presence of a
packet dropping attack. Moreover, a node’s resources, such as energy and bandwidth
can be the real reasons behind packet dropping. A power shortage or communication
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failure such as physical damage can make a node unavailable. It may be difficult to
recognize whether packets were dropped due to a security attack or for non-security
reasons. Further, Dropping packets can lead to an increase in the number of packet
retransmissions, transfer time, response time and network overhead. However, there
is no ambiguity about the malicious behaviour if the node drops some legitimate
packets and then injects fake packets to replace them. In this case, the malicious
node obviously has enough resources to do this.
Existing packet dropping defence mechanisms, such as the multipath routing-based
mechanisms[6][7][8],reputation- based mechanism[9], data provenance-based mecha-
nism [10], acknowledgement-based mechanisms [11][1], are inefficient as in OppNets
we have no end to end connections and usually have no alternative paths from the
sender to the destination or vice versa. Network coding-based mechanisms[2] are
also inefficient as the destination nodes are required to have a copy of all neighbours
packets/messages so it can decode its message, which is difficult to achieve in Opp-
Nets. Watchdog and pathrater mechanisms[12][13][14] are inefficient for detecting
this type of attack as the detection idea is based on the calculation of the total
number of transmitted/received packets. Encryption techniques [15] are inefficient
as well, as we require the use of a secret key which is difficult to manage in OppNets
since we have no centralized management.
1.2 Research Objective
Packet dropping attack is one of the major security threats in OppNets since neither
source nodes nor destination nodes have the knowledge of where or when the packet
will be dropped. In the Catabolism attack malicious nodes selectively drop some
packets (not all the packets) and instead of them inject fake packets in order to
maintain the original total number of packets originated from the sender node. In this
case, the malicious node obviously has enough resources to carry out this malicious
behaviour. Developing solid techniques for detecting the Catabolism attack and then
tracing back to the malicious nodes that triggered this attack are the main research
objectives in this thesis.
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1.3 Research Problems
When one or more malicious nodes selectively drop some legitimate packets and inject
fake packets as replacement then the existing packet dropping mechanisms will be
inefficient for detecting this attack and identifying the malicious nodes. Therefore,
we can summarize this problem as below:
• How to accurately detect this attack, stop fake packet propagation and trace-
back to the malicious nodes using the available packet information without
presetting the OppNets nodes?
• How to accurately detect this attack, stop fake packet propagation and trace-
back to the malicious nodes even when the malicious node has the ability to
change/modify the entire content of the packets?
• How can the efficiency of fake packet detection and malicious node traceback
be increased to suit the energy needs of resource-constrained networks even
when the malicious node has the ability to change/modify the entire contents
of the packets?
1.4 Contributions
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to identify this type of attack
and to propose a detection and malicious node traceback mechanism. The main
contributions of this work are:
1. To identify a novel attack in OppNets (Catabolism Attack) where malicious
nodes drop some packets and then inject fake packets instead.
2. To propose an efficient defence mechanism (Anabolism Defence) where the
malicious nodes can check the received packets to detect the attack, and then
traceback and identify the malicious nodes that triggered this attack.
We have developed different traceback mechanisms to deal with this attack, including
the:
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• Time-based technique: This technique relies on the packet creation time (PCT)
of each packet and the contact time between nodes. There are two phases in
this technique. The first phase is to find the fake packets that has different
creation time, and the second phase is to find the malicious nodes by comparing
that fake creation time with the nodes contact times so we can identify the
malicious nodes. Destination nodes can run this technique to detect this attack
and traceback the malicious nodes. To improve this mechanism, we further
calibrate this technique so any legitimate node can run it to detect the attack,
stop fake packet propagation and then detect the malicious nodes.
• Merkle tree technique: This technique relies on the Merkle tree hashing tech-
niques where the sender node uses Merkle tree techniques to calculate the
message/packets root value and then include it in each packet. Legitimate
nodes compare the existing Merkle root values in each packet to detect the
attack and then traceback the malicious nodes.
• Hash chain technique: This technique relies on the hash chain mechanism where
the sender node hashes all the packets in a chaining manner and then includes
these hashes in each packet. Legitimate nodes check the existing hashes values
in each packets to detect the attack and then traceback the malicious nodes.
1.5 Overview of the Thesis Organization
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a broad description about the early research and history of oppor-
tunistic networks and then an overview of the available OppNets routing protocols
and their classification including replication-based, forwarding-based and hybrid-
based protocols. An evaluation study has been done on six routing protocols (Epi-
demic, PRoPHET, MaxProp, Spray and Wait, Direct Delivery and First Contact)
in terms of complexity, and scalability. We also discuss secure routing techniques
in OppNets and different defence mechanisms against various types of attacks like
Blackhole, Wormhole, Dropping and Sybil attacks. Anti-localization techniques,
Selfishness, Trust and the impact of the intrusion detection systems on OppNets are
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also discussed.
In Chapter 3, we present a novel attack and traceback mechanism against a special
type of packet dropping attack where the malicious nodes selectively drop some
packets (not all the packets) and instead of them inject fake packets so it can maintain
the original total number of packets originated from the sender node. We call this
novel attack a Catabolism attack and we call our novel traceback mechanism against
this attack Anabolism defence. In Chapter 3, we propose a time-based technique for
detecting this attack and traceback to the malicious nodes.
In Chapter 4, we present our Merkle tree based technique for attack detection and
traceback the malicious nodes. This techniques is a node-based technique and re-
quires a sender node to construct a Merkle tree and then include the Merkle root
value in each packet header before forwarding these packets to the destinations.
In Chapter 5, we present our hash chain-based technique. This technique is also
a node-based mechanism and required the sender node to construct a hash chain
based on the packets content and then include appropriate chain values into packet
headers.
In Chapter 6 we conclude our thesis by summarizing the major work we have done
and the major contributions and we provided possible avenues for future research.
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Literature Review
OppNets began with applications like ZebraNet [16], a wireless mobile sensor network
used for tracking animals in wildlife areas, with sensors operating as peer-to-peer net-
works once attached to the animals’ necks. Each sensor has a GPS, memory, wireless
transceiver, and a CPU. The sensors exchange data with a mobile base station using
flooding-based techniques where nodes send data to the base station and if the data
is delivered successfully it is deleted. If not, data is passed to a neighbour node
with a higher probability of reaching the destination based on the node’s historical
communication record. In ZebraNet, storage, bandwidth, and energy tradeoffs were
taken into account to achieve a better performance. However, ZebraNet assumes
the same speed and direction for node movements. Another project was CenWits
[17], a search and rescue system, used in emergency situations in wild areas where
hikers, skiers, or climbers carry small Radio Frequency (RF) sensors with them on
their journey. Each sensor has a unique ID and a GPS receiver. When any two sen-
sors come in to their communication range, they exchange their presence as witness
information along with the witness information for all other sensors they have met.
By using this information, they can find the movement path and various locations
of the sensors. In addition, access points are fixed in different known locations and
are connected to servers through satellites. These access points are used to collect
information on sensors that are on the same communication range. CenWits can
be used in more scenarios than ZebraNet [16] because their sensors are assumed to
move in different directions at different speeds. Each sensor is assigned to a specific
group to eliminate the problem of battery life and memory as sensors don’t need to
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be awake all the time. A further advantage is by using the four-phase hand-shake
protocol technique in which sensors transmit only as much as the other sensors are
willing to receive.
The underwater sensor network project [18] has sensing and mobility features, where
nodes communicate with each other using acoustic modems. This project was de-
veloped for different water environments like lakes, rivers, and oceans. Nodes use
TDMA protocols for communication to schedule messages, and use 3D distribution
localization algorithms for network self-localization without the need for an external
clock source like a GPS. A robot is used to retrieve the data from the nodes by
traveling around and downloading the nodes information, and then relocating the
sensor nodes. Another underwater networks project in [19] fixes radio frequency an-
tennas on whales to transmit data to SWIM stations, SWIM stations communicate
with other SWIM stations or satellites. All data collected during one day can be
encapsulated into one packet, and whales or SWIM stations can potentially reject
packets they have already received as each packet has a different identifier. Each
packet also has a time stamp with its creation time and time to live (TTL). Packets
are discarded from the whales’ tags once their TTL expires. No synchronization
between whales is needed as the local clock is used to maintain timing. TurtleNet
[20] is another project for turtle tracking.
In [21], one of the real-world mobility traces undertaken by the study was the op-
portunity of data transfers between wireless devices carried by users. Haggle project
[22] is an open-source architecture for OppNets. The haggle system consists of a sin-
gle event queue and a set of managers that create and act on various system events
such as new neighbour discovery or incoming data from the local applications or the
network. A study on the storage-delay and energy-delay tradeoffs in frequently dis-
connected paths between the source and the destination nodes has been completed in
[5]. In this study nodes store the message and carry it till they reach the destination,
or forward the message to another intermediate node who then forwards it to the
destination node.
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2.1 Overview on Routing Protocols in OppNets
Routing protocols in OppNets is based on the idea of “Store-Carry-Forward” as there
is no end-to-end connection between sources and destinations. Routing protocols in
OppNets can be classified in different ways [23]. To structure our discussion in this
work we classify them into three broad families: Replication, forwarding, and hybrid
as in Figure 2.1. We describe each of them below providing examples for each family.
Figure 2.1: OppNets family tree
2.1.1 Replication Family
Replication based protocols work on the principle of duplicating the message on the
network. So at any given time there is more than one copy of the message on the
network. This kind of protocol achieves good delivery rates but can waste network
resources. The replication family can be further classified based on the use of flooding
or coding techniques.
2.1.1.1 Flooding Technique
Replication based protocols can be based on flooding techniques [24][25] aiming
to replicate multiple copies of a message in the network. Epidemic routing [24]
is a flooding based protocol. When two nodes are in range, the node with the
smaller identifier begins sending its summary vector to the node with the larger
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identifier, including a table of messages on the node’s buffer. After the summary
vector exchange, each node can determine if the other node has new unseen messages.
The nodes can request the global unique ID of unseen messages as long as they have
enough buffer space (nodes forward messages with fixed probability). Nodes receive
and carry messages even if there is no path to the destination at that time. Epidemic
routing uses a simple FIFO (first in first out) scheme for managing node buffers.
When the buffer is full, and the node is no longer able to store new messages, the
node discards the first message that has remained the longest time in the buffer.
Epidemic routing is used as a benchmark to compare other protocols as Epidemic
routing achieves 100% message delivery but with a maximum amount of resources
used and the highest congestion.
Broadcasting messages using flooding techniques like Epidemic routing [24] is one of
the reasons for the increase in network overhead, causing redundancy, contention, and
collision. Authors in [26] proposed a number of techniques to reduce the broadcasting
of messages by presenting five schemes, the Probabilistic Scheme, Counter-Based
Scheme, Distance-Based Scheme, Location-Based Scheme, and the Cluster-Based
Scheme.
Spray and Wait [25] technique has two phases; in the first phase, the source node
“sprays” a predefined number of copies to the network, and then in the “wait” phase
the nodes perform direct delivery to the destination.
History Based Prediction Routing (HBPR) protocol [27] utilizes the behavioural
information of the nodes to find the best next node for routing. HBPR selects
the next hop for the message based on three parameters; the stability of nodes’
movements, prediction of the direction of future movement using Markov predictors
and the perpendicular distance of the neighbouring nodes from the line of sight of the
source and destination. HBPR performs better than the Epidemic routing protocol
in terms of the number of messages delivered and the network overhead ratio.
Agent-based MORP [28] protocol aims to increase the throughput rate and save node
energy in DTNs and OppNets. The agent node minimizes the retransmissions in the
network by monitoring the Successful Packet Transmission-Reception rate. Agent-
based MORP uses the stateless approach, where the forwarding nodes are divided
into probable relay regions and the routing paths are established on demand. Agent-
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based MORP can decrease the load from the source node and establishes a link
between member nodes in the network.
2.1.1.2 Coding Technique
Replication protocols can also use coding techniques [29] [30] [31] [32] to improve
the throughput, efficiency and scalability of the networks. Network Coding (NC)
and Erasure Coding (EC) can be used as efficient techniques to encode the original
packets into a data stream of encoded packets. Original packets are reconstructed
when the destination node obtains a certain number of encoded packets. NC allows
the intermediate node to encode the received packets and uses a small size of encoded
blocks to achieve high delivery rates, while EC allows the source node to only encode
the packets and the messages together to achieve a large size of encoded blocks with
high transmission rates and a low overhead ratio [29]. In [30], EC is used to design a
forwarding algorithm. Constant overhead and best/worst case delay performance can
be maintained even when a large number of intermediate nodes are used. Messages
are encoded into small blocks on the senders side, and then send to a two hop relay
till they reach the destination. A reconstruction process occurs at the destination to
obtain the portion from the encoded small blocks.
Hybrid Erasure Code (H-EC) routing techniques [31] is a modification on the work
of [30]. H-EC has the strength of EC based routing techniques where the encoded
block is duplicated then transmitted to the next hop. The original block forwarding
is similar to the techniques used in [30], while the copied block is forwarded to the
remainder of the nodes encountered after the original block is sent out.
Performance of network coding is analyzed in [32] using the Epidemic routing proto-
col [24], for both coding and replication based routing techniques. Epidemic routing
and coding based techniques achieve lower overhead rates than epidemic and repli-
cation based techniques.
ORWAR [33] is a quota-based replication protocol and is one of the resource efficient
routing protocols in DTNs where messages are classified into three priority classes;
low, medium, or high. Message utilities are assigned based on these three priorities;
1 for low, 2 for medium, and 3 for high. A message is ranked based on the ratio
of message utility and message size which is called the per bit utility metric. The
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number of retransmissions can be reduced by calculating the maximum transmittable
message size (Smax), by using the data transfer rate, and contact time window. Also,
the contact time window can be calculated by using the context of mobile nodes
(speed, direction of movement, and radio range). When two nodes are on the same
contact range they forward half of the message copies and keep the rest. Messages
are deleted from the lower buffer queue where the queue should include information
such as the sizes and the utilities of messages.
2.1.2 Forwarding Family
In the forwarding family, messages are forwarded from node to node after select-
ing the best node as the next hop in the routing process. Sender nodes transmit
a single copy of the messages rather than replicating it. As a result, forwarding-
based protocols waste less network resources but the delivery rates are lower than
replication-based protocols. The forwarding family of protocols can be further clas-
sified as basic, prediction-based, time-based, buffer management-based and social
relationship-based techniques.
2.1.2.1 Basic Technique
In the forwarding family, the most basic and simple routing protocols are Direct
Delivery (DD) [34], Direct Transmission [35] and First Contact (FC) [36]. DD only
uses one hop instead of a number of hops, meaning the source node directly forwards
its message to the destination node. Grossglauser et al., [34] proposes a two hop
relaying scheme where if possible, nodes directly replicate the generated message
to the destination node or to a randomly selected intermediate node. In FC, the
message is forwarded to any next hop node if this node has not previously carried
this message and is directly deleted from the buffer of the sender node.
The Direct Transmission scheme [35] is one of the simplest possible routing protocols
where a message is directly transmitted from the source to the destination node.
If the source is not close to the destination, it holds the message until it moves
close enough to deliver the message to the destination. Direct Transmission adopts
the forwarding/single copy routing technique. The strength of this technique is its
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minimum overhead cost on the network as there is only one transmission per message.
However, this technique has the highest expected delays in delivery.
In the First Contact algorithm (FC) [36], the message is forwarded to the next
hop randomly. The message stays in the buffer and gets forwarded when the node
carrying it encounters the first node it meets even when it has zero knowledge about
it.
2.1.2.2 Prediction Technique
Forwarding-based protocols might also use prediction [35] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42]
to get information about the best intermediate nodes that can forward the message.
Seek and Focus [35] is a prediction-based protocol and has two phases. The first
phase is the seek phase where the sender performs random forwarding to neighbour
nodes with parameter P . The second phase is the focus phase where the forwarding
is based on the utility of the neighbour node which is based on the recent encounter
time. A node is selected to be the next hop when its utility value is more than the
threshold. A timer is also used in Seek and Focus to switch from the focus to the
seek phase.
The Spray and Focus protocol [37] also has two phases. Based on a summary vector
and forwarding tokens, the spray phase begins by spraying a predefined number of
copies into the network. In the focus phase, each relay node uses a utility based
scheme to forward its copy to another more suitable relay node. Based on a set of
timers, such as the timers to record the age of the last encounter that records the
time since two nodes previously met, a forwarding decision is made. The node will
not forward any message to another node unless the utility of that node is greater
than its own utility plus the utility threshold.
Similar to the Seek and Focus and the Spray and Focus protocol, the scheme in [38],
also has two phases. In the first phase, the source node sprays half of its message
copies and keeps the other half for itself. When there is only one copy left on the
node’s buffer, the node switches to direct transmission or utility-based routing, which
is the second phase. The second phase is when the decision to forward is based on
the age of last encounter timers. Node A forwards its message to the intermediate
node B destined to node D, if and only if UB(D) > (UA(D) +Uth), where UB and
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UA are the utility of nodes A and B respectively and Uth (utility threshold) is a
parameter of the algorithm.
In Predict and Spread (PreS) [39] a Markov chain is used for the node mobility
pattern model and also for obtaining the social characteristics of nodes. PreS uses
an adapted binary spraying scheme for designing a multi-copy routing protocol. PreS
is based on the assumption that nodes usually move around main venues. Therefore
on a campus network, nodes usually move around classrooms, cafeterias, and labs.
Nodes can exchange messages only if they are on the same main venue. However,
node connections between different venues is not considered.
The Context-aware Adaptive Routing (CAR) protocol [40] uses the Kalman filter
base prediction technique and utility theory for selecting the next hop. In CAR, the
delivery probability of a node is periodically calculated by the node itself based on its
own context information such as the mobility of the node, and battery level. Nodes
broadcast their delivery probabilities and routing information to all reachable nodes
through DSDV (Dynamic Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector) synchronous rout-
ing. Through synchronous routing, CAR selects the next hop among the reachable
neighbour nodes by forwarding the message to the node with the highest chance of
delivering the message to its destination.
The work in [41] uses the location information of nodes to present a mobile trace
based routing protocol. The next hop is selected based on its direction. Each node
has its own trace file containing regularity in movement. By using this trace file the
direction of nodes can be predicted, and then the best hop towards the destination
node can be selected. Each node informs other nodes of its presence by sending out a
beacon message sporadically containing a node ID, node location, and a timestamp.
However, declaring the location to the malicious node can cause a serious threat.
To alleviate large scale problems, geographical routing is proposed by the EASE
(Exponential Age SEarch) algorithm [42]. A node’s routing decisions can be based
on the destination’s geographical coordinate, with each node maintaining a table
of time and location of the last encountered node. The forwarding decision to the
intermediate node will be based on the time and location of the last encounter with
the destination, and any packet information such as the number of nodes the packet
came through.
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2.1.2.3 Time Technique
Forwarding-based protocols can also use time varying shortest path-based techniques
[36] [43] [44]. In [36] four routing algorithms are proposed based on such techniques,
Minimum Expected Delay (MED), Earliest Delivery (ED), Earliest Delivery with
Local Queue (EDLQ), and Earliest Delivery with All Queues (EDAQ). In MED,
the overhead cost of the next hop is calculated as the sum of the average waiting
time, propagation delay, transmission delay, and the proactive routing approach is
used for message routing. In ED, Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm is used for
path calculation at the source node without consideration to the intermediate node
buffer size, even though messages might be dropped with a limited buffer. In EDLQ,
the next hop delay is calculated using local queue occupancy and the route can be
recalculated in each hop. In EDAQ, instantaneous queue sizes can be calculated
using the queuing oracle. The source node can calculate the best route for the
message, and the capacity for all nodes on that path are reserved at the time of
message to ensure adequate time for message movement and accurate prediction of
queuing in the network.
A prediction of the future link uptime is proposed in the Delay Tolerant Link State
Routing (DTLSR) protocol [43]. Each node has a view of the network state by
maintaining a graph and using Dijkstra’s algorithm to select the shortest route for
the message. Each node should belong to an administration area, with the link state
protocol instance only working in this area. Farther, each administrator area has
endpoint identifiers used as communication gateways.
In DTN Hierarchical Routing (DHR) [44], the contact information between nodes is
combined to achieve an aggregation level. Nodes above this level can maintain infor-
mation about the time invariant hierarchical network, and the nodes below this level
maintain information about time variance based on the shortest path construction.
2.1.2.4 Buffer Management Technique
Some forwarding-based protocols use buffer management and congestion control
based techniques [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] to improve performance because nodes have
finite storage and may carry messages for a long time. The message can be forwarded
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to other nodes on the network, with the node receiving the message either accepting
or rejecting the message if it doesn’t have enough buffer space. Nodes may place
certain restrictions on the total number of messages and size of message on their
buffers, and may discard some messages from the buffer after some time to free up
buffer space.
In TTL Based Routing (TBR) [45], each node has a priority list or schedule for the
messages that will be forwarded/dropped on its buffer based on the message’s TTL,
hop count, message replication count, and message size. This mechanism efficiently
utilizes node buffers where each node maintains a list of delivered messages. The
destination node inserts the ID of a delivered message into the delivered list, and
when nodes meet each other, acknowledgment messages are exchanged including the
list of delivered messages. According to the list, delivered messages will be deleted
from their buffers. Messages with an earlier deadline have priority to be forwarded
or delivered. This type of protocol, or TTL based protocols aim to enhance message
delivery rates.
In [46], a method for calculating the number of message copies in a certain time
by maintaining a list in each node is proposed. A new cache management strategy
is also proposed based on message priority. Message priority is defined based on
message properties, such as the number of messages copies, elapsed time, and TTL.
An Enhanced Buffer Management Policy (EBMP) was proposed in [47] to maximize
the delivery of messages and reduce delivery delay. The utility value of each message
can be calculated by using message properties such as the number of copies of each
message in the network, message age, and the remaining TTL of each message.
In [48], the message joint scheduling and dropping mechanism is proposed to optimize
average delivery rates and average delivery delays. The theory of encounter-based
message dissemination is used where each node in the network maintains a list of
encountered nodes and the state of each message is carried by these nodes as a
function of time. Nodes send the list of the updated messages since the last exchange,
and after some time all nodes will get the same history of global network information.
However, this work is based on the assumption that all messages have the same size.
In [49], a study of the prioritization schemes of messages is done using real measure-
ments. Because of the path explosion phenomenon, the authors claim that techniques
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of assigning high priority to messages with a low delegation number, and a lower pri-
ority for a high delegation number, performs better in terms of balancing delivery
rates, delay, and network overhead.
Resource availability [50] [51] is one of the essential services that should be provided
in OppNets. In [50], a novel schema has been proposed for data caching by choosing
some nodes that can be easily accessed by other nodes on the network. These
Network Central Location (NCL) nodes are chosen based on their central location
to store data and to make it available to the requester’s node. A probabilistic
selection metric is used to select the best node to be the NCL, with a coordination
strategy between them to improve the trade off between caching overhead and data
accessibility.
A new resource location algorithm has been proposed in [51] where the individuality
of OppNets is taken into account by employing the caching of resource meta data
and proactive resource announcements to improve the discovery rate. Any kind of
supply, aid, function or task can be physical resources and the nodes periodically
advertise themselves and their resources. A message dissemination mechanism has
been proposed for resource location based on existing OppNets routing protocols
(Epidemic routing, and Spray and Wait).
2.1.2.5 Social Relationship Technique
Some forwarding based protocols use social relationship information [52] [53] [54]
[55] [56] [57] for selecting the best next hop. Context Information Prediction for
Routing in OppNets (CiPRO) [52] is a routing protocol that uses relationship infor-
mation. When two or more nodes are on the same transmission range, the sender
sends a control message Hm to all the first hop neighbours containing hashed value
(evidence/value) pairs which is the node’s profile that contains information about
the node itself, such as name, residence address, workplace, nationality and hobbies.
The first hop neighbours then compare their hashed values with the received hashed
value to calculate the encounter probability with the destination. Following this,
they broadcast their Hm to the other first hop neighbours so they can also calculate
their encounter probability with the destination and then return it to the first hop
node. This node then selects the higher probability value from its neighbours and
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returns it to the sender, who will use this information to send the message content.
PROPICMAN [53] is a social context-based routing protocol for intermittently con-
nected mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs). PROPICMAN has the ability to route
with no knowledge about the neighbours. In PROPICMAN, nodes do not need to
send their information to other neighbours for routing issues. Instead, the sender
selects the best neighbour based on the highest message probability to reach the
destination. The sender achieves this probability by sending the message header
to two hop neighbours containing some information that the sender knows about
the destination. According to this information, the neighbour will calculate their
delivery probability by predicting its mobility based on the behaviour of repeating
patterns at different times during the day, week, and month. This means each node
can compute the delivery probability and build its own profile, which is an instan-
tiation of a common set of evidence/values. Any node then receiving the header
will compare the hashed pairs of evidence/values with its own value so it knows the
highest delivery probability and share it in a hidden format. Also, the content of
the message is designed to be hidden so none of the intermediate nodes can read it,
except the destination.
PeopleRank [54] is similar to Google’s mechanism of PageRank. Higher weight is
given to nodes if they are socially connected to other important nodes on the network.
When two nodes meet each other they exchange their current PeopleRank values and
the number of social graph neighbours they have, they then update their PeopleRank
values. Therefore, the more the nodes meet each other, the more their rank value
increases.
BUBBLE Rap [55] is a social-based forwarding algorithm. In this protocol, context
information is the social communities that nodes belong to. Each node belongs to at
least one community with local and global ranking across the whole system. Based on
the patterns of contacts between nodes, the communities are automatically defined
and labeled. When a source node wants to send a message to the destination node, it
begins looking for nodes belonging to the same community as the destination node.
If such nodes are not found, it will try to forward the message to sociable nodes
which have more chances of meeting with the community of the destination node.
SimBet [56] uses the concept of centrality/similarity to calculate the centrality of
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nodes, which is the structural importance of the node. SimBet uses three methods to
achieve centrality of nodes (Freeman’s degree, closeness, and betweenness measures).
SimBet utility is calculated based on these values for each node,
SimBetUtiln(d) = αSimUtiln(d) + βBetUtiln , where SimUtiln(d) is a similarity utility,
βBetUtiln is a betweenness utility and α, β are tunable parameters where α + β
= 1. According to this utility, a bridge node will be selected between a group of
nodes to connect with the bridge of neighbour nodes to the destination. At the end
only bridge nodes will be used for communication. However, SimBet prevents its
forwarding behaviour if the utility metrics of encountered nodes are equal.
FRESH [57] is based on the idea that the node that I met 5 minutes ago is probably
closer to me than the node I met 5 hours ago. In FRESH, nodes maintain a record
of all nodes recently encountered. Nodes forward their messages to neighbouring or
intermediate nodes if these nodes have encountered the destination more recently
than the node itself and so on, until the message reaches its destination.
2.1.3 Hybrid Family
In hybrid family, the protocols aim to combine both the forwarding and replication
based mechanisms to develop new and powerful protocols. The hybrid family of pro-
tocols includes schemes such as Utility Replication [58][59][60][61][62][63], Improved
Spray and Wait [25][64][65], Improved Epidemic [66] and Coding techniques [67][68].
2.1.3.1 Utility Replication Techniques
Hybrid protocols can use the utility replication based idea to select the best neigh-
bour. [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] [63].
The main idea of the delegation forwarding algorithm [58], is the assumption that
each node has an associated quality metric. If a node encounters another node with
a quality metric higher than other nodes they have seen, it will transmit the message
to the encountered node. However, this will add overhead on the network as the
node may have to carry this message for a long time.
PRoPHET [59] is similar to Epidemic routing [24]. Nodes exchange summary vectors
when they meet each other, and this contains delivery predictability values which are
built in each node. If the node has previously visited a specific location several times
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before, then it will most likely revisit that location again. This delivery predictability
ages with time and has a transitive property. After exchanging summary vectors, the
source node transfers messages to other nodes if the delivery predictability of other
nodes is higher. PRoPHET achieves good delivery rates with less network overhead.
Modified PRoPHET is proposed in [60] where average delivery predictabilities are
used instead of delivery predictabilities to solve the problem of jitter. In PRoPHET,
the delivery predictabilities increase when two nodes regularly encounter each other,
and decrease if these nodes have no chance of encountering each other due to network
disruption. If these nodes encounter each other again after some time, then delivery
predictabilities return to the previous value. This results in a routing jitter problem.
RAPID [61], uses a utility function to assign a utility value to each packet. Packet
utility value is based on the average delay metric. RAPID first replicates packets
with the highest increase in utility. There are four steps in RAPID. The first is
the initialization step which involves the exchange of metadata to help estimate
packet utilities. In the second step, the direct delivery step, packets are intended for
immediate transmission to neighbour nodes. In the third step, packets are replicated
according to a marginal utility. The RAPID protocol ends in the fourth and final
termination step, when contacts are broken or all packets are replicated.
In DTC [62], the sender node selects the next hop node based on the node utility
value that is computed by using a number of variables, such as most frequently
noticed, future plans, power and rediscovery intervals.
PREP [63], which stands for PRioritized Epidemic, is a variant of Epidemic routing.
PREP aims to fix the area where Epidemic routing was weak. When the load on
the network increases, Epidemic routing starts to drop messages to accommodate
storage or bandwidth, thus affecting delivery rates. Therefore, PREP aims to de-
termine which messages to drop and which to transmit, and it does this using a
message prioritizing scheme and hence, the name PRioritized Epidemic. It works
by prioritizing messages based on their current overhead costs to a destination, and
their expiry time. It then uses this priority information to determine the messages
that should be discarded or transmitted. Upon an encounter, messages closest to
their destinations are assigned a higher priority over messages which are farthest
from their destinations. When nodes encounter each other, messages with higher
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priorities are transmitted, while messages with low priorities are dropped because
they have to work harder to reach their destinations.
2.1.3.2 Improved Spray and Wait Technique
Hybrid protocols that utilize and improve the Spray and Wait protocol [25] for
selecting the best neighbour, such as HiBOp [64] and EBR [65] have been proposed.
HiBOp [64] is based on the Spray and Wait protocol where the source node sprays a
number of message copies with a utility forwarding approach using context informa-
tion. HiBOp calculates the delivery potential of nodes and looks for nodes that have
an increasing match with the known context attributes of the destination. A high
match means a high similarity between nodes and destination contexts, consequently,
the message is handed to the destination’s community.
EBR [65] aims to control and limit the flooding of messages. EBR is similar to the
Spray and Wait protocol, only that it uses previous contact history in the spray
phase to spray messages in the network. Messages are forwarded to nodes with a
high encounter rate. EBR implements security measures against a black hole denial
of service attack.
2.1.3.3 Improved Epidemic Technique
Improved Epidemic protocols such as MaxProp [66] also lay within the hybrid family.
The core idea of MaxProp is to prioritize both the schedule of packets transmitted
and dropped as MaxProp assumes limited storage and bandwidth. Each node has
a vector of the total number of nodes in the network so when two nodes meet they
exchange their vectors and then use these vectors to estimate the shortest path to
the destination node. These priorities are based on the likelihood of path to peers
and are also based on a number of complementary mechanisms including historical
data, hop count, acknowledgments, a head start for new packets, and any lists of
previous intermediary nodes. MaxProp uses broadcasted acknowledgments to update
the encountered nodes about the delivered messages so they can delete them from
their buffers.
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2.1.3.4 Coding Technique
Hybrid protocols can also use coding techniques to select the next best hop from
neighbour nodes [67]. The main idea of network coding is to reduce network overhead.
This is a process of allowing and encouraging intermediate nodes to mix data in the
network so they can send out packets with linear combination of information received
earlier. Tuples of encoding vectors and information vectors received will be stored
and checked on the node’s buffer, and the node will then find the packets originally
intended for it. Source vectors are grouped to generations in order to limit the size
of the matrix stored on the nodes buffers. In addition, there will be one matrix
per generation and it is required that combined packets should be from the same
generation. Hash functions are used by nodes in order to determine which generation
to insert in a given packet.
The RED algorithm [68] is based on erasure coding and encounter prediction tech-
niques. RED has two parts; the data transmission part which is responsible for the
decision of when and where to forward data based on delivery probabilities. The
second part is message management which is responsible for the optimal erasure
coding parameters based on its delivery probability to accomplish the required data
delivery rates while reducing network overhead.
2.2 OppNets Routing Protocols Summary
Tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 provide a summary of the important characteristics
of routing protocols in OppNets based on their families. These characteristics have
been drawn from the research undertaken by respective authors. Characteristics
include routing techniques, storage, bandwidth, metrics, buffer management policy,
complexity, and scalability. In regards to scalability and complexity, the values are
based on the work of the authors. For example, if the scalability or complexity
is low, this means the authors have tested their protocol under low scalability or
complexity. This excludes Epidemic routing, PRoPHET, MaxProp, Spray and Wait,
Direct Delivery and First Contact protocols where the values for these are based on
our evaluation results in real simulation scenarios that will be outlined in Section
2.4.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Routing Protocols in OppNets- Replication Family
Protocol Routing Technique Storage Bandwidth Metrics Buffer policy Complexity Scalability
Epidemic routing [24] Flooding Limited Not Mentioned Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
FIFO Medium Medium
Spray and Wait [25] Flooding Unlimited Unlimited Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
Not mentioned Medium Medium
HBPR [27] Flooding Limited Not Mentioned Delivery Rate
Overhead ratio
Not mentioned Medium Medium
Agent-based MORP [28] Flooding Limited Not Mentioned Throughput Rate
Energy levels
Not mentioned Medium Medium
Network Coding [29] Coding Unlimited Limited Delivery Rate
Overhead
Not mentioned High Low
Erasure Coding [30] Coding Unlimited Not Mentioned Data rate
Data latency
Data Overhead
Not Mentioned Medium Low
H-EC [31] Coding Limited Not Mentioned Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
Not Mentioned Medium Low
ORWAR [33] Coding Limited Unlimited Delivery Rate
Latency
Overhead
Priority Medium Low
Table 2.2: Summary of Routing Protocols in OppNets- Hybrid Family
Protocol Routing Technique Storage Bandwidth Metrics Buffer policy Complexity Scalability
PRoPHET [59] Utility Replication Limited Not Mentioned Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
FIFO Medium Medium
Modified PRoPHET [60] Utility Replication Limited Not Mentioned Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
FIFO Low Medium
RAPID [61] Utility Replication Limited Limited Delivery Delay Utility function Medium Medium
DTC [62] Utility Replication Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Not Mentioned
PREP [63] Utility Replication Limited Limited Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
Priority Medium Medium
HiBOp [64] Improved Spray and Wait Limited Not Mentioned Buffer occupation
Message Loss
Overhead, Delay
FIFO High Low
EBR [65] Improved Spray and Wait Limited Limited Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
Network Overhead
Buffer size Medium High
MaxProp [66] Improved Epidemic Limited Limited Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
Network Overhead
Buffer size Medium Medium
Network Coding [67] Coding Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Delivery Ratio
Overhead
Packet Delay
Not Mentioned Medium Low
RED [68] Coding Limited Limited Delivery Ratio
Overhead
Delivery Delay
Buffer size Low Low
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Table 2.3: Summary of Routing Protocols in OppNets- Forwarding Family-1
Protocol Routing Technique Storage Bandwidth Metrics Buffer policy Complexity Scalability
Direct Delivery (DD) [34] Basic Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Throughput
Packet Delivery
Not Mentioned Medium Low
Direct Transmission [35] Basic Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Network Overhead Not Mentioned Low Low
First Contact (FC)[36] Basic Limited Limited Average Delay
Delivery Rate
Storage limitation Medium Low
Seek and Focus [35] Prediction Not mentioned Not mentioned Delivery Delay
Delivery Rate
Not Mentioned Medium High
Spray and Focus [37] Prediction Limited Limited Delivery Delay
Delivery Rate
TTL expiration Medium Low
Algorithm in [38] Prediction Unlimited Unlimited Delivery Delay
Transmissions
Not Mentioned Medium Low
PreS [39] Prediction Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Delivery Ratio
Delivery Latency
Not Mentioned Low Medium
CAR [40] Prediction Limited Not Mentioned Delivery Ratio
Delivery Delay
Buffer overflow High Low
Algorithm in [41] Prediction Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Delivery Ratio
Overhead
Not Mentioned Low Low
EASE [42] Prediction Unlimited Unlimited Network Overhead Not Mentioned Low High
MED [36] Time Limited Limited Average Delay
Delivery Rate
Storage limitation High Low
ED [36] Time Limited Limited Average Delay
Delivery Rate
Storage limitation High Low
EDLQ [36] Time Limited Limited Average Delay
Delivery Rate
Storage limitation High Low
EDAQ [36] Time Limited Limited Average Delay
Delivery Rate
Storage limitation High Low
DTLSR [36] Time Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Message Completion
Delivery Delay
Not Mentioned Low Low
DHR[44] Time Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Delay ratio
Hop count
Overhead
Not Mentioned Low Low
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Table 2.4: Summary of Routing Protocols in OppNets- Forwarding Family-2
TBR[45] Buffer Management Limited Not Mentioned Delay ratio
Median Latency
Overhead
TTL, hop count,
replication count
and size
High Low
Algorithm in [46] Buffer Management Unlimited Unlimited Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
Overhead
Priority High Low
EBMP [47] Buffer Management Limited Not Mentioned Messages delivery
Delay
Hop count
Utility value Low Low
Algorithm in [48] Buffer Management Limited Limited Delivery Rate History Medium Low
Algorithm in [49] Buffer Management Limited Unlimited Success Rate
Delay
Network Overhead
Priority High Low
TBR[45] Buffer Management Limited Not Mentioned Delay ratio
Median Latency
Overhead
TTL, Hop count
Replication
and Size
High Low
Algorithm in [46] Buffer Management Unlimited Unlimited Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
Overhead
Priority High Low
EBMP [47] Buffer Management Limited Not Mentioned Messages delivery
Delay
Hop count
Utility value Low Low
Algorithm in [48] Buffer Management Limited Limited Delivery Rate History Medium Low
Algorithm in [49] Buffer Management Limited Unlimited Success Rate
Network Overhead
Delay
Priority High Low
CiPRO [52] Social Relationship Unlimited Unlimited Overhead and Delay Not Mentioned Medium Low
PROPICMAN [53] Social Relationship Unlimited Unlimited Overhead and Delay Not Mentioned Medium Low
PeopleRank [54] Social Relationship Not Mentioned Not mentioned Delivery Rate
Network Overhead
Not Mentioned Medium Low
Bubble Rap [55] Social Relationship Not Mentioned Not Mentioned Delivery Rate
Network Overhead
Delete once received Medium Low
SimBet [56] Social Relationship Unlimited Unlimited Delivery Rate
Delivery Delay
Network Overhead
Not mentioned High Medium
FRESH [57] Social Relationship Unlimited Unlimited Latency
Overhead
Network Overhead
Not mentioned Low High
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2.3 Evaluating Routing Protocols in OppNets
We have evaluated six OppNets routing protocols - Epidemic routing[24], PRoPHET
[59], MaxProp [66], Spray and Wait [25], Direct Delivery [34] and First Contact [36]
in terms of complexity, scalability, and limitation of the node’s type. In these evalu-
ations, complexity defines how efficiently the protocol functions when the overhead
on the network increases, and scalability is the ability of the protocol to scale and
deal with the network as it grows and as the number of nodes increases.
2.3.1 Metrics Used for Evaluation
Metrics used to evaluate these six routing protocols in OppNets are:
1. Delivery Rate: The ratio of the number of successfully delivered messages to
the total number of messages generated.
2. Delivery Delay: The average duration between the time a message is generated
at the source and the time the message or its copy is received at the destination.
3. Overhead ratio: The number of copies per generated message in the network.
High performance often means a high delivery rate and low delivery delay, while
maintaining a low network overhead [69].
2.3.2 Framework of Evaluation
We have employed three scenarios for the purpose of this evaluation. Below is an
overview of each scenario:
• Scenario 1 aims to test the complexity of the 6 protocols. For this scenario,
overhead is added to the network by increasing the message sizes and reducing
the intervals of message generation. Based on the results of scenario 1, proto-
cols were rated depending on their ability to deal with complexity. We divided
the delivery rate and delivery delay scales to three ranges (low, medium and
high) starting from the minimum to the maximum value. By comparing a
protocol’s performance in each simulation run to these ranges we can classify
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the behaviour of the protocols; then protocols can be rated with either high,
medium, or low complexity.
• Scenario 2 aims to test the scalability of the 6 protocols. They will be tested
by increasing the number of nodes and network area. Based on the results
of scenario 2, protocols were rated depending on their ability to deal with
scalability. We divided the delivery rate, delivery delay and overhead ratio
scales to three ranges (low, medium and high) starting from the minimum to the
maximum value. By comparing protocol’s performance in each simulation run
to these ranges we can classify the behaviour of the protocols; then protocols
can be rated with either high, medium, or low scalability.
• Scenario 3 aims to test if results differ by using single group types as opposed
to multiple group types. The scenario will be tested on 4 different node groups,
one composed of pedestrians only, cars only, trams only, and one group with
all 3 types.
2.3.3 Simulation Settings
To perform the above scenarios we used the ONE simulator [70]. The following
settings apply to all scenarios, however any specific changes in the settings will be
outlined for each individual scenario in the following section.
The simulation is designed to last for 12 hours, with 0.1 seconds of update inter-
vals. Bluetooth is chosen for connectivity with a transmit range of 10 meters, and
a transmit speed of 2 Mbps. Each point on the graph represents the average of
30 simulation runs. There are 18 active nodes composed of cars and pedestrians.
Pedestrians and cars have up to 10 MB of RAM for storage. Pedestrians move at
random speeds between 0.5 and 1.5 m/sec, with cars only driving on roads and mov-
ing at speeds between 10 − 60 Km/hr, and wait times of 0 − 120 secs. Map based
movement is used for pedestrians and cars, with a network area of 4500m2×3400m2.
Nodes move randomly on roads and walkways with a movement warm-up of 1000
seconds. Further, there are 3 groups of trams, with 2 trams in each group. Since
trams have bigger buffers in their communication devices, their buffers have up to
60 MB of RAM. Map route movement is used for trams to follow a constructed tram
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line. Trams drive at speeds of 7− 10 m/sec with a wait time of 10− 30 secs at each
configured stop. In addition to the Bluetooth interface, a group of trams uses the
high speed interface with a transmit range of 1000 meters and a transmit speed of
10 Mbps.
Messages are generated every 15 to 25 seconds per node, with message sizes between
250 Kb and 950 Kb, and a message time to live of 3 hours.
2.3.4 Simulation Results
The simulation settings outlined in the previous section will be used for each scenario,
however specific changes will be made to reflect what each scenario aims to achieve.
2.3.4.1 Scenario 1
Scenario 1 is designed to test the impact of delivery rates and delivery delays by
increasing the size of messages; with one new message generated every 15 to 25
seconds. A simulation was run 30 times for each protocol as follows: small sized
messages (10KB to 20KB), medium sized messages (50KB to 700KB), and large
sized messages (900KB to 3MB).
Based on the data collected from the simulation reports for scenario 1, the graphs in
Figure 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, show the delivery rates, delivery delays and overhead ratio
for the 3 message sizes.
In Figure 2.2, with small message sizes, the delivery rates were higher for Epidemic
routing, Spray and Wait and MaxProp, and lower for PRoPHET, Direct Delivery,
and First Contact. With medium sized messages, the delivery rates dropped to
almost half for all protocols, where MaxProp had the highest delivery rates. With
large sized messages, delivery rates were low for the 6 protocols.
In Figure 2.3, delivery delays were lower with small sized messages, and higher for
all protocols with both medium and large sized messages. The delivery delay of large
sized messages was higher than small and medium sized messages because there were
hardly any messages delivered for large sized messages.
Figure 2.4, shows the overhead ratio of the six protocols, Epidemic routing and
PRoPHET incur a high network overhead as they are flooding the network with
multiple message copies. MaxProp, Direct Delivery and Spray and Wait incur a low
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Figure 2.2: Scenario 1: Delivery rates
network overhead as they do not flood the network with multiple message copies.
First Contact incurs a medium network overhead because the message is forwarded
to the next hop randomly and stays on the buffer till it gets forwarded when the
node carrying it encounters the first node it meets even when it has zero knowledge
about it.
From the results of scenario 1, delivery rates decreased as message sizes increased and
the intervals of message generation decreased. With large sized messages, delivery
rates dropped to almost 0 for all 6 protocols. This is because the buffer space of
nodes is continuously consumed, and the need to drop messages to free buffer space is
required. To evaluate each protocol in terms of complexity, we divided the delivery
rate scale to three ranges, Low (starting from 0 to 0.33), Medium (starting from
0.34 to 0.66) and High (starting from 0.67 to 1). The Epidemic routing protocol for
example, performed 0.85 (High) in the small message size, 0.91 (High) on the medium
message size and 0.91 (High) in the large message size, so Epidemic routing achieved
three High values in delivery rate. In terms of delivery delay, Epidemic routing
achieved two Medium and one Low. Overall, Epidemic routing has the following
ranges: 3-High, 2-Medium and 1-Low. So, the average behaviour of the Epidemic
routing protocol will be Medium in term of complexity. Based on these calculations
and the behaviour of the protocols (Epidemic [24], PRoPHET [59], MaxProp [66],
Spray and Wait [25], Direct Delivery [34] and First Contact [36]) we can say, these 6
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Figure 2.3: Scenario 1: Delivery delay
protocols were rated at the medium level in terms of dealing with network complexity.
2.3.4.2 Scenario 2
Scenario 2 was designed to last 6 hours with the update interval increased to 1
second. Scenario 2 was made to test the impact of delivery rates, delivery delays,
and overhead ratio by varying the number of nodes with a network area of 8500m2×
7400m2 (almost double) for the 6 protocols. The simulation was run 30 times for each
protocol as follows: Small (306 nodes composed of 200 pedestrians, 100 cars, and 6
trams), medium (909 nodes composed of 600 pedestrians, 300 cars, and 9 trams),
and large (1812 nodes composed of 1200 pedestrians, 600 cars, and 12 trams).
Based on the data collected from simulation reports, Figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 show
the delivery rates, delivery delays and overhead ratio of the 3 different number of
nodes and an increase in the network size as outlined in scenario 2.
In Figure 2.5, as the number of nodes increases in the network, the delivery rates also
increases for all protocols. They increase for Epidemic routing, PRoPHET, Spray
and Wait, MaxProp, First Contact and Direct Delivery. With an increasing number
of nodes, chances for messages to reach their destinations are higher as each sender
can find an intermediate node faster to hand the message towards the destination
and sometimes the sender can meet the destination node directly. In Figure 2.6,
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Figure 2.4: Scenario 1: Overhead ratio
Figure 2.5: Scenario 2: Delivery rates
as the number of nodes increases in the network, the delivery delay decreased for
Epidemic routing, PRoPHET and MaxProp as all of them use the epidemic principle
for choosing intermediate nodes. Delivery delay is increased for Spray and Wait
(in medium scalability), Direct Delivery, and First Contact as the network area is
increased in this scenario to almost double so the chance of meeting the destination
will be less.
In Figure 2.7, as the number of nodes increases in the network, the overhead ratio
increases for Epidemic routing and PRoPHET as the network is flooded with multiple
message copies. Overhead ratio remains very low for MaxProp, Direct Delivery and
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Figure 2.6: Scenario 2: Delivery delay
Figure 2.7: Scenario 2: Overhead ratio
Spray and Wait as they do not flood the network with multiple message copies.
The network overhead for First Contact slightly increased for medium and large
scalability because the message is forwarded to the next hop randomly. The message
stays on the buffer and gets forwarded when the node carrying it encounters the first
node it meets even when it has zero knowledge about it.
Based on these results, as the network size increase in terms of area and number of
nodes, Epidemic routing and PRoPHET maintain high delivery rates with a decrease
in delivery delays. However, an increase in the network overhead was also observed,
and so we rated them with medium scalability. Although MaxProp and Spray and
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Wait did not achieve delivery rates as high as Epidemic routing or PRoPHET, it
incurred a very low network overhead, so we rated them with medium scalability.
First Contact and Direct Delivery achieved small delivery rates with high delivery
delays, and a high network overhead for First Contact so we rated them with low
scalability.
2.3.4.3 Scenario 3
This scenario aims to test if results differ by using single group types as opposed
to multiple group types. As a result we can discover which type of nodes improves
connectivity in OppNets. In this scenario, the simulation was run as follows: Nodes
were composed of 100 pedestrians, 50 cars and 9 trams; nodes were composed of only
100 pedestrians; nodes were composed of only 50 cars; and nodes were composed of
only 9 trams.
Based on the data collected from the simulation reports, Figures 2.8, 2.9, and 2.10
show the delivery rates, delivery delays, and network overhead of the 4 node groups
as outlined in scenario 3.
Figure 2.8: Scenario 3: Delivery rates
From the 3 Figures, we can see that trams have the highest delivery rates with the
lowest delivery delays and network overhead for all 6 protocols. This is most likely
due to the longer contact times trams have, the large buffers, and the high speed
interface that 3 out of 9 trams use in addition to the Bluetooth interface. There-
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Figure 2.9: Scenario 3: Delivery delay
Figure 2.10: Scenario 3: Overhead ratio
fore, trams can carry and exchange information faster, and improve connectivity in
OppNets.
2.4 Security and Trust in OppNets
Security can be defined as the process, provisioning and management of ensuring the
confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, access control, availability, and authenti-
cation of network systems. Confidentiality, is to protect any sent data by making it
unreadable by other nodes except the destination node. As data passes through an
open medium or different intermediate nodes until reaching destination, encryption
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can be used to protect data in OppNets. Integrity, is to protect data from modi-
fications, dropping, or re-sending to an alternative destination through a malicious
attack. Non-repudiation is the protection from malicious nodes that deny sent data
using signatures for sent data. Access control, is to control the system from unau-
thorized access to network resources by malicious users. Availability, is to ensure
network resources are available to legitimate users. Authentication, is the process of
detecting the impersonation by identifying legitimate users from malicious users or
nodes. However, in OppNets authentication will be difficult to implement compared
to infrastructure based networks as there is no central management or authority.
OppNets can be vulnerable to different types of attack. We can classify these attacks
as internal and external attacks [71][72] [73], where internal attacks come from nodes
inside the domain or part of the network. These kinds of attacks have a high impact
on the network since malicious nodes can gain privileges to access network resources.
External attacks come from nodes outside the network or they are nodes that don’t
belong to the domain of the network. The impact of this type of attack is less
than internal attacks because nodes have less information about network resources.
Different types of attacks can affect routing in OppNets, such as Wormhole attacks,
Blackhole attacks, Selfish attacks, Sybil attacks and Selective Dropping attacks.
Attack descriptions and the mechanism used to defend against them is detailed
below.
2.4.1 Defence against Wormhole Attacks
The idea of a Wormhole attack [74] is that malicious nodes record packets at specific
location on the network and “tunnel” to other locations on the network and retrans-
mit them from that location. Malicious nodes claim a short path in the network
to certain destinations so they can attract traffic or other nodes. The packet leash
technique [75] has been proposed as a defence against Wormhole Attacks. Some
information can be added to packets to restrict the maximum allowed transmission
distance. Geographical leashes and temporal leashes can be used, with the receiver of
the packet ideally within a certain distance from the sender in geographical leashes.
In temporal leashes the packet should have an upper bound on its lifetime so it can
restrict the maximum distance travelled. However, this kind of technique needs se-
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cure and tight time synchronization. A method for detecting and isolating Wormhole
attacks was proposed in [76]. This is a modification of the AODV protocol where the
source node sends a route request to a destination and receives all available routes
with the number of hops. These routes are used later as a reference for each other in
order to find malicious nodes. The proposed method works in three steps, by using
route redundancy, routes aggregation and calculating the round-trip time (RTT) for
all listed routes. In order to detect any malicious nodes and isolate them we do
a comparison between RTT and the number of hops for all routes. However, this
method will not be efficient in OppNets because there is no end to end connection
and it is difficult to find more than one route to the destination.
2.4.2 Defence against Blackhole Attacks
In Blackhole attacks, malicious nodes silently drop or discard all or some of the re-
ceived packets all of the time or some of the time. Malicious nodes can advertise
themselves as having a valid route to some of the popular destinations on the net-
work. In [77], a defence against Blackhole attacks was proposed, where an attacker
can fake its contact history with some popular destinations and raise its value of
delivery likelihood to the maximum value. The idea of an “encounter ticket" (ET) is
proposed as evidence of the encounters of nodes. However, a malicious node can still
fake its contact history with a destination by a one-time tailgate attack, where the
malicious node collects redundant ETs by tailgating the destination once, then mov-
ing around the data source to intercept the data. However, even with the author’s
technique of ignoring redundant ETs generated within a short interval, it may not
work efficiently in case of a multi-tailgate attack, where an attacker moves in and
out of the connection range with the destination. This technique can only detect an
attacker when claiming non-existent encounters and cannot handle packet dropping
in a Blackhole attack. In [78], malicious nodes bloat their competency of meeting
a destination node so it can intercept data from other senders. A watchdog mech-
anism was proposed to monitor the behaviour of neighbour nodes with the absence
of an end to end connection. In this mechanism, a watchdog with a positive feed-
back message (PFM) is used to inform the sender that the next hop will truthfully
forward data to other nodes. When node A sends the message to node B, node A
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will monitor the forwarding behaviour of node B in terms of evidence of the PFM
created by other nodes like node C which received a message from node B. It will
then generate a PFM and send it to node A telling it that B successfully forwarded
the message. If node A does not get this PFM, then node B will be registered as
suspicious till the PFM arrives and the trust/reputation system is built according to
this mechanism. In this case, each node will have a trust value record for other nodes
and they will exchange this value when they meet each other to make an indirect
reputation plus a direct reputation. This trust value is derived and integrated with
the probability of meeting the destination to achieve a final evaluated forwarding
competency for a node. However, a PFM is sent using epidemic routing. Therefore,
it adds more overhead on the network. A method of securing the packet delivery
history of contact between nodes is proposed in [79]. Nodes can detect Blackhole
attacks by checking these records. In case of an encounter between two nodes, both
nodes record the number of exchanged packets between them and use their private
key to create a secure record. Neighbour nodes can do sanity checks by checking the
historic packet records of other nodes, thus detecting more Blackhole attacks. Each
node has a private key (RK) and public key (PK) pairs, with each node owning the
public keys of other nodes. However, the method of manually pre-loading all keys
into the nodes during a network setup phase or using a key distribution scheme can
be difficult to apply in OppNets.
2.4.3 Defence against Dropping and Selective Dropping Attacks
In normal network operation, packets can be dropped according to predefined rules
such as resource limitation as in [9] where a packet dropping policy, dropping mech-
anism and performance analysis is proposed according to the packet’s weight. This
weight is calculated based on inter-contact time between nodes. However, in drop-
ping attacks or selective dropping attacks, malicious nodes drop all or some of their
received packets. It is difficult to detect an attacker since both source and destination
do not know when or where the dropping takes place and also since the malicious
node is part of the network domain. Acknowledgement based mechanisms can be
used for detecting packet dropping attacks [80], [11]. These mechanisms are based on
the authenticated acknowledgment from the intermediate nodes and the destination
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within a specific time period. Source or destinations can detect a malicious node.
In [2], a mitigation scheme to evaluate the impact of a selective packet dropping
attack is proposed by using network coding. In this scheme, the destination node
should measure the delivery ratio and return it to the sender. The sender starts to
dynamically adjust the redundancy factor to mitigate against the degradation in the
delivery ratio caused by the attack. Theoretical analysis and simulations show the
impact of packet dropping on routing performance. The impact of non-cooperative
action, like selfishness or message non-forwarding in the routing performance reduces
the delivery cost, while the behaviour of dropping messages increases the delivery
cost. The work in [1] is a proposed mechanism for detecting packet dropping attacks,
where intermediate nodes acknowledge the reception of the packets. Source nodes use
this acknowledgment to construct a Merkle tree and then compare the value of the
tree root with precalculated values. If these values are equal then there is no packet
dropping in that path; otherwise there is packets dropping. However, this technique
can detect the path with a malicious node and then look for alternative paths for
retransmission. Thus, this technique results in network overhead. This technique
also cannot detect the exact malicious node in the path. In E-HSAM (Enhanced
Highly Secured Approach against Attacks on MANETs) [6], a security improvement
mechanism is proposed where packets that go through a path with a malicious node
are redirected to alternative paths. However, this variety is not always available in
OppNets as there is no end to end connection and no alternative paths available all
the time.
Authors in [81] proposed a packet dropping detection mechanism based on cooper-
ative participation at the network-bootstrapping phase. Alternative routing is used
for avoiding malicious nodes or a non-trusted path. However, this solution leads to
network overhead.
The impacts of TCP packet dropping attacks and detection methods is explored
in [82]. Three dropping mechanisms are investigated; Periodic packet dropping
(PerPD), Retransmission packet dropping (RetPD) and Random packet dropping
(RanPD). Statistical based analysis is (TDSAM) used for the detection of this kind
of attacks. However, only a detection technique is proposed in this work without
any defence mechanism.
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Authors in [10], proposed a detection mechanism for the packet dropping attack
based on data provenance to identify malicious nodes. The characteristics of the
watermarking-based secure provenance transmission mechanism and the inter-packet
timing characteristics are exploited to achieve this goal. There are three stages for
this technique: detect lost packets using the distribution of the inter-packet delays,
identify the presence of the attack by comparing the empirical average packet loss
rate with the natural packet loss rate of the data flow path and identify the malicious
path or link and then isolate it by transmitting more provenance information along
with the sensor data. However, this techniques is not very accurate since it does not
detect the exact malicious node in the entire path or link.
In [12], two techniques were used to improve throughput - watchdog and pathrater.
In the watchdog stage, a sender node detects the misbehaving node by overhearing
the neighbour node and comparing its message transmission with the saved copy
on its buffer and checks whether it’s matching. If matched, then the node is not
malicious and the message copy on the buffer is deleted. If nothing is heard for a
certain time, the watchdog will increment the failure tally of that neighbour node. If
that tally exceeds the threshold value, this node will be recorded as a misbehaving
node. Each node running the pathrater phase determines the best path with the
highest metric by combining the information from watchdog with the link reliability
data, then calculates the best path. According to the information from watchdog and
pathrater each node will build a rating table for other known nodes on the network so
it can be used in future transmissions. However, the watchdog technique is not that
efficient if there are ambiguous collisions, receiver collisions, limited transmission
power, false misbehaviour or collusion.
TBDSR [14] is an enhancement of the Dynamic Source Routing protocol where
each node maintains a trust table of opinion toward other nodes with categories
of either belief, disbelief or uncertainty. At the beginning stage of the network
each node has the default opinion (uncertain) toward other nodes but after some
successful or failed transmissions between nodes this opinion changes gradually to
either belief or disbelief. Nodes can also exchange trust information about each other
then use a trust combination algorithm to calculate new opinions by combining all
the recommendations.
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The work in [83] has used the same idea of watchdog mechanism. A node can act as
a monitor node if it can overhear the radio signal of two nodes on the same routing
path, and oversees the data transmission that comes from these two nodes. When
these two nodes send packets to each other, the monitoring path node backs up the
data packets, and then oversees the transmission behaviour of the receiver node. If
the receiver node truly sends out the packet to other nodes, then the monitor node
removes the packet from its buffer. When the monitor node finds out the packets
has been stored in its buffer over a threshold time, it attempts try to find alternative
path to the destination and retransmit the data packet.
To solve the weakness of watchdog, ExWatchdog was proposed [13], to enhance the
intrusion detecting system for discovering malicious nodes. ExWatchdog has the
ability to detect malicious nodes that partitions the network by falsely reporting
other node as malicious. Each node builds a table with the number of received
packets and the number of forwarded packets. When a node receives a report about
a misbehaving node, the source of communication starts to send a message to the
destination to check if the number of received and forwarded packets are equal.
If they are equal, the node that reported the other node as malicious is actually
malicious and if not equal, the report is correct.
In [84], a trust establishment scheme is proposed to expand the consistency for
packet forwarding in presence of malicious nodes. Nodes are used first hand and
recommendation information is used to collect an opinion about other nodes. The
Bayesian approach is used to build a trust scheme. And the trust value of this
approach is calculated based on the assumption of probability distribution.
The authors in [85] have proposed a reputation-based mechanism for detecting packet
dropping attacks. This mechanism uses direct observation and indirect or second
hand information to calculate a full reputation weight. Nodes can be excluded from
the network if they have a low reputation weight. To prevent fault tolerance, the
authors use a reputation system based on history information of nodes. To improve
the performance, fuzzy logic is used to achieve a more precise detection accuracy.
In [15], a mechanism for detecting and tracing packet dropping in malicious nodes
with selfish or black hole behaviour was proposed. Nodes are required to keep a
record of the packets sent and received during data exchange when they come into
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contact with each other and verify the confidentiality by using the initiators public
key. An encryption algorithm is used to detect the malicious nodes during the data
exchange.
2.4.4 Defence against Selfish Attack
Selfish nodes may use network services, but refuse to cooperate with other nodes.
For example, selfish nodes may not forward or route messages due to the limitation
of battery life or resource consumption. Defence against this type of attack can be
classified as barter-based and credit-based. In [86], a barter-based mechanism to
stimulate selfish nodes to cooperate is proposed. This system consists of two parts;
a reputation system and a virtual payment or rewarding scheme part. When two
nodes are on the same transmission range they start sending a description of their
messages on the buffer. They can then agree on which messages will be exchanged,
with each message sent one by one from each side in preference order (primary/sec-
ondary message). If one side cheats, the transaction is directly disrupted and the
worst scenario will be the deferment of one message. After each message interac-
tion the nodes receive a score and they accumulate these scores to obtain their total
score at the end (this part represents the rewarding schema). Game theory is used
to achieve this barter based mechanism where the nodes are divided between two
players; “Crowd” player, represents the majority of nodes and “Deviator” player, rep-
resents a small group that deviates from the behaviour of normal nodes. However,
this techniques relies on the assumption that selected subsets of messages must be
the same size and connection time should be enough to exchange all agreed messages
which is not practical. Also, there is no clear picture of the network behaviour in
case a node has no messages or fewer messages than the second side. In MobiCent
[87], a Credit-Based Incentive System is proposed. Each node, client / receiver pays
for message delivery using a payment scheme involving two algorithms. The first is
a payment set selection algorithm which decides the relays to be paid. The second
algorithm is a payment calculation algorithm which decides how much should be
paid to each selected relay and how much the client should be charged. As a result,
nodes will forward packets without adding phantom links or waste any contact op-
portunity unless the reward is not sufficient or it is the decision of an underlying
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routing protocol. This technique, however, is not that strong because the sender can
flood the network as he is not involved in the payment schema. This kind of strategy
is not effective if the majority of nodes have selfish behaviour.
2.4.5 Defence against Sybil Attacks
A Sybil attack is the ability of a malicious node to create a number of fake IDs while
dropping received packets. In a Sybil attack, it is difficult to identify the real node
causing the packet dropping since malicious nodes use different IDs to communicate
with neighbours. In [88], a definition and taxonomy to the Sybil attack is proposed,
showing the types of defence such as the resource testing as an old technique, and
a new technique including radio resource testing, verification of key sets for random
key predistribution, registration, position verification and code attestation.
In [89], a defence against Sybil attacks in opportunistic networks is proposed. Key
management is presented to enable the bootstrapping of local, topology-dependent
security associations between nodes besides discovery of the neighbourhood topol-
ogy by using pseudonym certificates and encapsulated signatures. There are two
phases for key management. The first when nodes generate a public/private key
pair and then sends the public key to the identity manager server so it can be used
to generate unique pseudonyms and a certificate for each node. The second phase
is where opportunistic communication and the security associations bootstrapping
occur. However, using an identity manager server is not practical in OppNets due
to mobility of the nodes and opportunistic connections.
Another defence against a Sybil attack is proposed in [90] by the design of a reputation-
based system - explicit and implicit social trust establishment. This trust relies on
two factors. The first is contact quality between nodes and the trustworthiness of the
nodes’ opinions. To establish social trust, nodes combine explicit and implicit social
trust where explicit social trust is built from “Friend Ties” whenever they meet via
secure pairing. A friend list is built in each encounter and then saved in a friendship
graph. Implicit social trust is built from contact time and relies on the familiarity
and the similarity of the nodes. Familiarity means the accumulated contact time
and similarity means the degree of familiarity for the two nodes match.
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2.4.6 Anti-Localization Techniques
Detection of node’s location can be a serious threat by tracking path and movement
of nodes in OppNets. One of the techniques used to hide the location of nodes is
ALAR (Anti Localization Anonymous Routing) [91]. ALAR uses good techniques to
protect a sender’s location privacy by dividing the message to a number of encrypted
segments and sending each one of these to a different neighbour. The decryption key
is kept on the last segment so the receiver doesn’t know the message content unless
he receives all the segments. ALAR achieves the minimization of a sender’s location
privacy and maximizes message delivery. The weakness of this technique is that
routing performance is influenced by the setting of the number of segments and the
number of neighbours or receivers. Additionally, the routing performance is degraded
in terms of delivery ratio and delivery latency as the two parameters increase. In
[92], any node should be a member of at least one group and each group has a set of
nodes. Public/private key-pair is assigned to each group, and nodes are distributed
randomly to groups. Each node maintains a keychain of a public/private key pair,
plus a copy of all other nodes and groups of public keys. It also maintains the
private key of its group, where each node uses group public keys to encrypt messages
for other groups, and uses the groups private keys to decrypt messages for groups of
which it is a part of. TPS (Threshold Pivot Scheme) use a secret sharing technique to
divide the message, which is considered a secret, into multiple shares, then sends the
secret to the destination through a number of independent paths. In this scenario,
the author protects the content of the message from individual intermediary nodes.
The sender encrypts the message with a receiver’s public key and seals both the
message and receiver’s address before sending them. While the message travels
through the network, each node checks whether to decrypt it. If yes, then this node
is the message destination and the message can be reconstructed. However, with
a Sybil attack, multiple pseudonymous nodes can copy, create and then intercept
a sufficient number of shares. In [93] the authors have reviewed the application of
k-anonymity for Location based Services (LBS) and its recent advancements. They
have recognized three perspectives for the applicability of k-anonymity for LBS: the
application of k-anonymity based on the architecture, based on the algorithms for
anonymization, and based on the types of k-anonymity (according to the different
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query processing techniques). Hence, the review has been done within the framework
of these perspectives. This review can arm the privacy providers with the latest
techniques and possible modifications in their present techniques.
2.5 Security Solutions Based on Intrusion Detection Sys-
tem
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) can be a good technique for increasing secu-
rity in OppNets. In [94], a ferry-based intrusion detection and mitigation (FBIDM)
scheme was proposed. In FBIDM, special nodes called “Ferries” are used to collect
information from other nodes by passing them in fixed routes and stopping at a
fixed stop points. “Secret” encrypted messages are broadcast by ferry nodes so any
genuine node can understand or decode it and then start sharing information like
encounter and delivery predictability with other nodes. Ferry nodes then compare
this information to decipher any malicious nodes and inform the genuine nodes to
update their blacklist. Mutual correlation detection scheme (MUTON) [95] is a de-
tection scheme based on the same idea as FBIDM [94] but with the modification
of taking transitive properties into consideration. In MUTON, special nodes called
“Ferries” are used to collect information from other nodes by passing them in fixed
routes and stop in fixed stop points. “Secret” encrypted message are broadcast by
ferry nodes so any genuine node can understand or decode the message and start
sharing information like Delivery Encounter Table (DET), Delivery Probability Ta-
ble (DPT), and Transitive Information Table (TIT) with other nodes. DET and
DPT are inherited from FBIDM, and a MUTON created TIT table is used to record
transitive information. In FBIDM, a cross-checking of delivery probabilities between
two nodes is used to detect malicious node. However, for the duration of the detec-
tion process MUTON uses associations inherited from consecutive encounter events
between nodes and calculates the sanity of the node based only on the information on
that node. The intrusion detection system in [96] uses the same techniques as used in
wired networks where nodes observe traffic sent by one hop neighbours and compares
the observed values of some metrics, such as the unconditional packet dropping ratio
and selective random packet dropping ratio with original values observed from the
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past to detect anomalous behaviours. This intrusion detection system means nodes
will be in promiscuous mode and will process all monitored packets, thus it is energy
consuming. Additionally, there can be an insufficient number of neighbours that can
be used as monitoring nodes in sparsely connected networks.
2.6 Trust Management Evaluation
In order to evaluate the trustworthiness of other nodes in OppNets, a trust manage-
ment model [97] [98] [99] [100] [101] [102] [103] [104] [105] can be an efficient solution
to increase the security levels of the network. In [97], a trust model was built to
evaluate the forwarding behaviour of neighbour nodes and the model was applied
to opportunistic routing in ad hoc networks. From this work, [97] proposed the
minimum cost routing algorithm (MCOR). The MCOR framework has three layers;
trust management, trusted opportunistic forwarding model, and trusted minimum
cost opportunistic routing. The upper layer is used for the initialization of trust re-
lationships, trust recommendations, trust computations, trust judgments, and trust
updating. The middle layer is used for selecting the effective forwarder with the
least cost distance to the destination from the trusted neighbour forwarding list.
The bottom layer contains the trusted forwarding list and trusted minimum cost
opportunistic routing. Probe packets are used to evaluate links delivery probabili-
ties between nodes and passive acknowledgement modes used by nodes so they can
observe the forwarding behaviour of their neighbours. Each node observes its neigh-
bour’s behaviour by comparing their trust degree value with a threshold value. Then
the node initializes the cost of trusted opportunistic routes and updates the trusted
forwarding list in all nodes. Nodes with trust degree values less than the threshold
are considered as malicious nodes.
In [98], a framework is presented to quantitatively measure trust, model trust prop-
agation, and defend trust evaluation systems against malicious attacks. The idea is
each node maintains a trust record, and when the source node needs to find a route
to the destination it first tries to find as many routes to the destination as it can.
The source node then tries to find the packet-forwarding trustworthiness of nodes on
these routes from its own trust record or through recommendations. At the end, the
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source node will select the trustworthy route to the destination and then updates
the trust records based on its monitoring of the route quality. This trust record is
also used for detecting malicious nodes. However, these methods are not efficient in
OppNets as there is no end to end connection and its difficult to find more than one
route to the destination.
In [99], a quantitative measure and a model trust propagation information theoretic
framework is presented by two trust models, entropy-based model and probability-
based model. We can establish trust relationships in two ways. One through direct
observations and the second through recommendations from other nodes. Uncer-
tainty is used to represent trust, and entropy is used to measure uncertainty. In the
entropy-based trust model, node B monitors the behaviour of node C then makes a
recommendation to node A. In the probability-based model, the probability values
of trust relationships are used to calculate concatenation and multipath trust prop-
agation. When a sender wants to establish a route to the destination, it should find
multiple routes to the destination. The sender should then try to find the trustwor-
thiness of the routes from its own trust record or through the recommendations. The
sender chooses the trustworthy route to transmit the message and updates the trust
records based on the monitoring of route quality. The trust records can also be used
for detecting malicious nodes.
In [100], a trust management model is built in two parts; a “subjective trust eval-
uation model” part where nodes are evaluated using an analytic hierarchy process
theory and fuzzy logic rules, and a “trusted routing model” part where new fuzzy
trusted dynamic source routing (FTDSR) protocol is proposed to avoid malicious
nodes. Three types of trust values are used by FTDSR; the historical trust value,
current trust value, and the path trust value. In FTDSR, the source node checks
the local routing cache before sending it to the destination. If path trust value is
less than the requirement for data packet transmission, the sender initiates a route
discovery process to the destination. Discovered route entries will be created and
inserted into the routing cache of the sender, with the sender selecting the smallest
hop count path in qualified routes. In case of an equal hop count, then maximum
path trusts will be selected. The forwarding node can detect malicious nodes in the
route discovery process according to its local trust record list. Each node maintains
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a black list for malicious nodes so it will not forward or send messages to malicious
nodes. However malicious nodes can receive the broadcast from other nodes and can
track nodes locations. Malicious nodes also can move to another subnetwork as a
newcomer with a new trust value.
Building a trust management system based on ontology or structural frameworks to
organize information is proposed in [101]. A reputation system is used to classify
users reliability by collecting direct and indirect information about other users. The
reputation system uses a range of values or classes to evaluate other nodes. These
values or classes are very untrustworthy, untrustworthy, no opinion, trustworthy, and
very trustworthy.
In [102], trust management in OppNets is proposed to deal with the mechanism
of trust evaluation, collection, and propagation. The semantic Web solution called
COTTON is proposed to provide an architectural basis for representing trust and
trust management for handling the ability of discovery tasks. COmposite Trust and
Trust management in Opportunistic Networks (COTTON) uses a semantic service
discovery process by applying this process on seed nodes in two steps. The first step
is the Helper Registry step that stores a list of all identified services. The second step
is the Helper Advertisement step which defines the abilities and services provided
by a foreign node and a helper or seed node. The seed node and distributed control
center nodes which are a subset of the seed nodes take care of overall operations
in OppNets. The two nodes integrate with each other by downloading a copy of
the current ontology and the helper registration from control center nodes to the
new joined helper. The matchmaking agent is also deployed on the helper. In
this case, nodes check and monitor each other and send feedback to control center
nodes for integration and classification to build a reputation database for nodes.
This reputation is sent back to all nodes in an epidemic way. According to that,
classification nodes will or won’t be invited to join the network as a helper. However,
using an epidemic way to send feedback will increase the network overhead.
Secure MANET Routing with Trust Intrigue (SMRTI) is a reputation-based trust
model proposed in [103]. Evidence of trustworthiness is captured in three ways;
direct interactions with neighbour nodes, observing interactions of neighbours and
through recommendations from other nodes. Direct Reputation is based on the
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captured and quantified evidence from one-to-one interactions of nodes. In Observed
Reputation, evidence is captured from the interactions of the nodes from neighbours.
Recommended Reputation is derived from the route of packets. A reputation rating
will be created for each node by quantifying the captured evidences. According to
this rating, nodes will be classified as malicious or not. However, in an opportunistic
network we cannot totally rely on this technique because we might not be able to
see other nodes due to the mobility and the absence of the end to end connection.
In [104], a modification to the existing routing metric ETX has been proposed called
E2TX where trustworthiness and ETX are integrated. By using E2TX, a new op-
portunistic routing design called TOR has been proposed, with the initial value of
trust set to 0.5 for newly joined nodes. Probe packets are then sent between nodes
so they calculate the link quality metric and then a combined metric E2TX will be
derived by each node. Source nodes will collect all of these E2TX of its neighbour
nodes and calculate the prioritization for selecting the relay node after which the
trust value is updated. The trust value for a neighbour node should be more than
the threshold value, otherwise it will be recorded as a malicious node. However, this
technique may not be efficient in the case of malicious nodes selectively dropping
packets.
User’s risk assessment in opportunistic encounters when they share their information
is discussed in [105]. By using the definition of privacy rules, the trust relation
can be built by users so they can refuse or accept other user’s request. Ontology
called PrOHand (Privacy Ontology For Handover) is proposed to define a trust
management system by defining a common vocabulary for a community of researchers
and for software agents that need information about privacy policies in a wireless and
ubiquitous environment. In SOHand (Service Oriented Handover), service providers
and users are responsible for managing privacy policies. Three types of privacy
agreements are defined in SOHand; User-Provider Agreements, Provider-Provider
Agreements and User-User Agreements. A direct and indirect reputation system
is used by users to evaluate the behaviour of others. However, to design a secure
system we should not rely on the ability of users as some users do not realise the
value of risk and some malicious nodes have the ability to easily cheat others.
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2.7 Trust Strategies in OppNets
Trust strategies in OppNets can be built based on Social, Reputation and history
information as shown in Table 2.5 . A combination of all the previous strategies can
be used as well. Trust is especially difficult when mobile users find themselves in
a new surrounding without established trust or reputation available. The first time
a node meets with another node, it doesn’t trust it. But the second time it meets
the same node, how does it know if it should trust it or not? On what basis is a
new node accepted into the network?. Trust can be established in 2 ways: Direct
trust - sometimes called first hand trust - established through direct observations
of other node’s behaviour from past records, and indirect trust - sometimes called
second hand trust - established through trust propagation from recommendations
from other nodes. In a network, when node A wants to send a message to node
B, node A has 3 choices: Node A fully trusts node B and is sure that node B will
perform its job as required, node A doesn’t fully trust node B and is not sure if
node B will perform the job, node A does not trust node B. How does node A make
the choice?. Trust is important to authenticate a node’s identity and avoid mali-
cious nodes. Methodologies used to measure trust include but are not limited to,
rating experiences, reputation models, recommendations, past experiences, word of
mouth, weighting, probability, encounter based trust, voting methods, cluster based
methods, honey bee mating, beacon nodes, public key cryptography, digital signa-
tures, Bayesian networks, chain optimization, social networks, iterative algorithms,
acknowledgments, watchdog monitoring nodes, neural networks, game theory, fuzzy
logic, confident and core, swarm intelligence, and directed and undirected graph.
2.7.1 Social-Based Trust Strategies
Social network information is used to build trust systems. In [106], a study and
analysis of the trade-off between trust and success delivery rates in OppNets was
proposed by adopting a real-trace driven approach. Number of trust social based
filters including common interests, common friends and the distance in the social
graph were applied on an epidemic protocol to achieve a reasonable trade-off between
trust and the success rate by achieving more than a 35% success rate compared to
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Table 2.5: A comparison of trust strategies
Strategies Techniques Methodology Advantage Disadvantage Suitability with OppNets
Social-Based Filters [106] Common interests Fair trade-off between
trust and success rate
Filters can be break Suitable
Opinion [107] Trust and recommendation Good protection and
scalability
Needs recommendations Not suitable
Chain optimization [108] Stochastic Petri net technique Identify the optimal
length of trust chain
Rely on the path length Not suitable
Friendship, Familiarity
and similarity [90]
Explicit and implicit trust Doesn’t need end
to end connection
Needs larger encounter duration Suitable
Position [109] Nodes position Good Blackhole
attacks defence
Weak techniques with mobility Suitable with limitation
Markov model [110] Level factor and conïnˇA˛dence Good accuracy rate Not working with
uncommon information
Suitable with limitation
Reputation-Based Bayesian [111] Reputation and trust rating Addressing lying nodes Needs recommendations Suitable
Watchdog [112] Direct and indirect observation Periodically evaluate
other nodes
Nodes should be on
the same transmission range
Note suitable
Acknowledgments [113] Reputation building Reputation expire
with the age
Sender needs destination feedback Suitable with limitation
Ontology [101] Similarities and differences Consider direct and
indirect reputation
Not consider trust changing Suitable with limitation
CertiïnˇA˛cates (CA) [114] trustworthiness Dealing with ofïnˇC´ine and
online stages
Malicious nodes can fake CA Suitable with limitation
Fuzzy Recommendation [115] Packet forwarding patterns Direct and indirect
trust calculation
Nodes should be on
the same transmission range
Not suitable
Activity [116] Cooperation, honesty, and similarities Direct and indirect
trust calculation
Inactive nodes have less opportunities Suitable
History-Based Filters [117] Encounter Frequency, Duration,
Location and Behaviour
Good accuracy rate Nodes misbehaviour is not considered Suitable
Trusted authority [118] Nodes interactions history Good accuracy rate History records can be fake Not suitable
an untrusted environment where 10% of the nodes refused to cooperate because of
the absence of trust. However, it is difficult to rely on these filters for trust criteria
since malicious nodes can break these filters.
IRONMAN [119] is an incentive mechanism to detect and punish selfish nodes in
OppNets using social network information. IRONMAN works when the sender node
sends a message to the destination node through an intermediate node. The sender
node has the expectation the intermediate node will pass this message to the des-
tination. To verify that, when a sender meets its destination he will check if he
received the message from the intermediate node. If not, he knows the intermediate
node was selfish by withholding the message, and then he will decrement that nodes
rating. Similarly, if this intermediate node passes the message to the destination,
he will have a rating increment. When two nodes meet each other, they prove their
encounter ticket, then store their local rating of encounters so they can use it to cal-
culate their node trust score by adding the local rating to the foreign rating. When
receiving messages, nodes check the trust score of the sender whether it is more or
less than the threshold. If less, the receiver discards the message if the selfish node
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is the source of that message and informs the sender it has been detected as a selfish
node. The receiver also lets the selfish node know it and will not accept the message
till it reaches the threshold score, and gives her a chance to do this by passing her
message forward to the destination so it can improve her rating score. This method
does not punish nodes that are given messages to forward. It only punishes nodes
that do not pass on a message to a destination.
In [107], the authors use social networks to propose a trust model. When a peer
in the network wants to work with an unknown peer, it first asks its friends for an
opinion. When a malicious peer is found in the network, friends inform each other
to eliminate the malicious peer from the network. Probability is used to define trust
and recommendation values. The trust value is how much 2 peers trust each other,
and the recommendation value is how much a peer friend recommends a peer to
other peers. The more positive recommendations a peer gets, the higher its trust
value increments. The network starts with legitimate peers and new peers can only
join the network when there is an existing peer in the network that can recommend
it. This condition helps prevent malicious peers from joining the network from the
beginning.
The authors in [120] also use social networks to build a trust based model. The model
is designed to help a peer find a trusted peer to share information with. Before a
peer can trust another peer for the first time, it starts with the propagation stage
where it collects proofs of trust from other nodes who trust that peer, and based
on the collected proofs, it calculates the trust value of that peer. In this case, the
peer uses indirect trust to calculate the trust value of another peer. Next time it
meets the same peer, it can calculate the trust value using proofs from direct trust.
The model uses a trust-aware propagation algorithm (which implements the Markov
process) which includes direct trust, indirect trust, and path trust. Based on those 3
factors, a peer’s trust value dynamically changes. Because of this dynamic feature,
the model cannot keep a fixed record of mutual trust or prevent future betrayal.
In [108], a model with trust chain optimization based on the stochastic Petri net
technique (bipartite graph) and social networks is used to measure the trust and
social values of multiple nodes in a path. When nodes evaluate each other’s trust
they combine social trust with QoS trust to compute the total trust value of a node.
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Social trust is measured from direct and indirect trust derived socially from own
experiences with other nodes, or the reputation of the node in the social network.
QoS trust is measured from a node’s ability to provide good services and conduct
positive interactions with other nodes in the network. When trust is measured in
a path, its distance and number of nodes affects the computed trust, where longer
chains of nodes in a path weakens the trust value of a path.
In [121], and prior in [122], an encounter based trust management model for DTNs
to deal with both malicious and selfish misbehaving nodes is proposed. They use
both social trust and traditional Quality of Service (QoS). They use the properties of
healthiness and unselfishness to measure the social trust of a node, and the properties
of connectivity and energy to measure the trust value of an encountered node. These
4 factors are composed to make a trust metric to assess the trust of each node in
a DTN. The trust metric is affected by direct trust information such as encounter
events, and indirect trust information such as recommendations.
In [90], secure routing in OppNets relies on social trust between users by designing
a systems using explicit and implicit trust. Explicit trust is built from the level of
friendship among friends meeting each other. Implicit trust relies on the familiarity
(encounter duration) and the similarity (extent to which 2 familiar nodes stayed in
the same location) of nodes, the larger the encounter duration, the more trust that
peer gains, implicit trust helps in determining if a node is legitimate or not.
Another social-based trust system is presented in [109] where nodes in the network
are grouped based on their social position in the network. Each group is assigned a
value that indicates the importance of the group in the social network. The destina-
tion receives the message forwarded to it from the source node through intermediate
nodes, it uses the number of hops to measure the trust value of each intermedi-
ate node. The trust value of nodes that participated in forwarding the message is
updated.
The authors in [123] present a peer to peer trust model, PStrust that uses probability
and statistics. The system aims to solve the limitations of the classical trust models
(Eigentrust and Peertrust) in which the global trust value is not precisely calculated
and does not reflect the real trust value of a peer. Peers return feedback once a
transaction is completed. If the peer is legitimate, it gives honest feedback. If the
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peer is not legitimate, it gives false feedback. PStrust addresses the issue (which is
not addressed in Eigentrust and Peertrust) of a malicious node that once gains a high
trust by providing a good service in the network, starts to give false feedback about
other peers. The system relies on honest feedback and hypothesis testing is used to
eliminate false feedback. In real large complicated networks it might be difficult to
put PStrust in practice for a couple of reasons, one of which is the complexity of
storing the global value of trust.
In [124], the authors use probability to estimate the trust value of nodes sending hon-
est information to other nodes. The authors develop a model that utilizes legitimate
nodes in the network. Legitimate nodes trust values are exchanged in the network,
until the trust value of legitimate nodes is spread in the network. Initially, each node
in the network is assigned a fixed trust value. Nodes then start to exchange informa-
tion. When a node receives the correct information from another node, it updates
the trust value of the other node. To confirm a trust value of a node, a node may
request from a node information that it already has and can compare with, making
this request a couple of times it can confirm that the node is indeed honest. Each
node in the network keeps a small list of well-behaved nodes. Nodes with trust value
meeting the required threshold go into the good list. Nodes can then share their
small list of well-behaved nodes until each node has a large list of the well behaved
nodes in the network.
The work in [110], improves the Markov model by proposing a new algorithm and
using probability that computes indirect trust using the level factor and confidence
to measure the trust value. Where the level factor states that the more intermediate
nodes in a path, the longer trust has to transfer, and so the weaker it becomes. And
confidence is what a node believes about the truthfulness of information it receives
from other nodes. The algorithm relies on the transmission history of peer nodes, but
is not designed to work with cases where information between nodes is not common
or not gathered.
In [125], to help a node protect itself from pollution attacks, each node in the P2P
system computes a trust value for other nodes in the network based on direct and
indirect trust. The trust values of peers in the network is stored in each peer locally.
When calculating the trust value for a targeted peer, the peer collects recommenda-
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tions from a group of other peers that had a direct interaction with the targeted peer
and the enquiring peer. The peer then sums the values of the collected recommen-
dations with its own direct trust with the targeted peer, it then uses the resulting
weighted sum as the trust value for the targeted node, and based on the value, it
decides whether it will trust it or not. The trust value is updated in relation to how
recent a transaction is, new transactions gain more weight than older ones. This
model deals with lots of parameters that change differently according to individual
peers and their needs. In a real P2P network, a more standardized model might fit
better.
To motivate peers to cooperate in P2P networks, a trust-based incentive system
is proposed in [126] that aims in dividing a large network into smaller networks
where nodes are allocated to different categories depending on the content a node
is interested in. Each category has one super node and many regular nodes. In a
category, the trust value of the super node is the sum of the ratings of each regular
node in the category. In a category, the trust value of regular nodes in a category
is computed from direct and indirect trust (recommendations from other peers in
the same category). Super nodes communicate, keep, and manage records of the
trust values of regular nodes in a category. If the trust value of a super node in a
category decrease below the required threshold, the super node will be removed from
the group, and another reliable super node takes the lead. To maintain a true trust
value, recommendations from other nodes are revised before updating a node’s trust
value. Inactive nodes are removed from the category they belong to.
The authors in [127] use swarm intelligence to help find trusted routes in ad hoc
networks. The concept of swarm intelligence can be applied in ad hoc networks by
collecting behaviours from nodes interacting with each other and with the network.
In the proposed system, every node has an embedded trust agent that assigns a
trust value for all the nodes it interacted with in the network. Nodes exchange this
value between each other to help each other find a trusted path/route. A node that
experiences an interaction with a malicious node assigns a low trust value to the
malicious node. Nodes avoid interacting with the malicious node when receiving
a low trust value for the malicious node. The level of trust in a route increases or
decreases depending on the number and authenticity of packets that were transferred
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in the given path.
The model in [128] aims on detecting a malicious node using cluster-based analysis.
Using auto regression, nodes forecast the trust value of other nodes in the network
where past experiences affect the current trust value of a node. Direct and indirect
trust are then united by the cluster head to measure the trust value using a prob-
abilistic model. Trust values are checked for their accuracy using the Proportional
Integral Derivative (PID) controller. Nodes resulting with a low trust value will
not be trusted, thus a secure route can be formed by avoiding interactions between
legitimate and malicious nodes.
Using distributed trust based on public key cryptography, the model in [129] uses a
probabilistic method to deal with problems involved with initial trust establishment
in networks. At the initial stage of the network and with the help of a secret dealer
(could be a service provider), nodes are supplied with adequate amount of trust
enough to get them started in the network, nodes trust their secret dealer. After
this stage, the network becomes ad hoc and any central tasks such as the secret dealer
ends here. Nodes then create direct trust when meeting each other by viewing each
other’s certificates and validating them by looking for a trusted route between each
other. At this stage, each node is self-organized, and becomes responsible to issue
public certificates for other nodes. Having the secret dealer simplifies the process of
establishing trust in this model, however, in decentralized networks, implementing
the centralized secret dealer at the start of the network might not be feasible.
The authors in [130] construct a model that simplifies, modifies and extends the
TCP/IP protocol to better fit the features of ad hoc networks. Because UDP is con-
nectionless and requires the least protocol mechanism, data transmission is carried
through the UDP protocol. The trust model uses the protocol data unit (PDU) and
service data unit (SDU) to transmit the data to another node. The trust system
incorporates 4 modules: The metric, data, storage, and behaviour modules. The
metric module is used to measure the trustworthiness of other nodes. The data
module gathers feedback from nodes regarding their trust level towards other nodes.
The storage module is used to record nodes data which may be shared with the
metric module. The behaviour module uses the metric module to help nodes decide
whether it is safe to interact with other nodes or not. These 4 modules are used to
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enhance the functionality of the whole system.
The model in [131] uses context to enhance a Bayesian network trust model in ad
hoc networks. To improve trust in a network, the authors specify that context
is composed of a group of facilities that are publicly available to all nodes in the
network. For a node to choose the most suitable utility, it uses past records with a
given utility provider, and then makes its choice. Trust is defined in their model as
the probability of a utility provider to satisfactory provide a utility to the node that
requested its utility. This trust is measured using direct and indirect experiences
between a node and the chosen utility provider. A Bayesian network is created
for each utility’s measured trust from direct and indirect trust. The authors use
context information to make conditions that may affect the outcome of an interaction
experience between 2 nodes, these conditions aim for improving the trust evaluation
process. To recognise an experience, the model uses context information which
includes: The node, the utility, the service provided by the utility, and the date of
the interaction. The Bayesian network sorts these experiences based on their creation
date.
A dynamic trust model in [132] uses trust to defend ad hoc networks from packet
dropping attacks. At the initial stage of the network, a node trusts its surrounding
nodes and updates the trust value according to their behaviour. Behaviour that
decreases the trust value of a node includes: Dropping a packet, not forwarding a
packet to the destination, not starting a route discovery phase. The trust value of a
node increases when it forwards the packets in a route targeting the destination.
A clustering based model based on a honey bee mating algorithm is used in [133].
The proposed model is designed to address the energy consumed by nodes to increase
the lifetime of a node. Nodes are grouped in clusters, and each cluster is assigned
a cluster head. The cluster head is chosen based on the pre-requisites of having the
highest energy, and has no records of malicious behaviour. The cluster head must
provide services such as managing the cluster that was assigned to it, and forwarding
data to other clusters and base stations. These extra services that the cluster head
must provide over a normal node, increases the energy consumed by cluster heads
over normal nodes. Other factors that increases the energy consumption of a cluster
head is the distance of a cluster to a base station, and the size of the cluster. The
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further the distance of the cluster from a base station, and the larger the cluster,
the more energy a cluster head consumes. The proposed model puts these factors
into consideration, and tries to balance the load of the cluster head in the network.
To increase the lifetime of the network, when the energy level of a cluster head falls
below the required threshold, a pre-elected cluster head takes the position of the
previous cluster head. The trust value of nodes is calculated based on direct and
indirect trust of nodes inside each cluster. The trust value of nodes increases with
successful transactions, and decreases with unsuccessful ones.
Another cluster based approach in [134] is used in conjunction with fuzzy rules to
make appropriate routing decisions in a WSN. To maintain trust in the network,
nodes are grouped to form clusters and a key management design is used. The
network starts with grouping nodes to form clusters. Each cluster in the network
has an active cluster head that is in charge of forwarding data to other cluster heads
or to a base station, the cluster head does these routing decisions based on applied
fuzzy rules. Similar to the P2P technique in [126], if the cluster head’s services
starts to drop below the required threshold, then it will be replaced with another
potential cluster head. The potential cluster head should be active in the network
and is chosen based on its ability to provide services in the network such as its rate
in delivering, transmitting, and receiving packets. Each cluster head in each cluster
is assigned a master key and is in charge of maintaining this key. The master key
is public to nodes in the same cluster, the key is used to communicate with base
stations and other cluster. The trust level of nodes in the network is monitored
based on their ability to deliver data to base stations.
The authors in [135] present a novel trust management framework that builds trust
among nodes using 3 levels of trust - subjective or direct trust, objective or indirect
trust, and recommended trust for unfamiliar nodes. Each node in the network main-
tains a local trust list that records the 3 levels of trust for nodes in the network. Each
node can establish direct trust towards another node using its direct past experiences
with a node, if it never had a past experience with a node it can seek feedback from
trusted neighbours towards their trust to a node, and past performance ability of a
node to perform reliably in the network. Indirect trust is built from the reputation of
a node as viewed by other nodes in the network that had previous interactions with
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the node, and a node’s reputation in regards to its ability in preventing malicious
behaviour. Nodes build recommended trust for unfamiliar nodes in the network by
using both direct and indirect trust.
In [136], the authors present an algorithm that evaluates the trust value of a node
based on the security, mobility, and reliability attributes of a node in a WSN network.
The algorithm performs 2 steps, in step 1, it starts by calculating the initial trust
value of a node which is also called the indirect trust. When node A wants to interact
with node B, A calculates the trust value of B using its own past experiences with
node B and using the feedback from other nodes in the network that had interactions
with node B. If A finds that the calculated trust of node B is above threshold, it
interacts with node B. If not, then step 2 of the algorithm is conducted, which
involves calculating the direct trust. To calculate the direct trust value of a node,
node A first evaluates node B’s first model, the security model. If the trust value
of the security model is within the threshold range, it interacts with node B, if not,
node A evaluates node B’s second model, the mobility model. If the trust value of
the mobility model is within the threshold range, it interacts with node B, if not,
node A evaluates node B’s third model, the reliability model. If the trust value of
the reliability model is within the threshold range, it interacts with node B, if not,
node A calculates the overall trust by adding the indirect trust it calculated in step
1, and the direct trust it calculated in step 2. If the result is above the required
threshold, node A interacts with node B, if not, it disagrees to interact with node
B. The algorithm has not been evaluated, as it has not been tested in a simulator.
2.7.2 Reputation-Based Trust Strategies
The reputation of the nodes can be used for building a system of trust. In [111], a
robust reputation system for detecting the misbehaviour of nodes has been proposed
using a modified Bayesian estimation approach. Each node on the network maintains
a reputation rating, which represents the opinion of each node toward other nodes and
a trust rating that represents the opinion of nodes about the honesty of other nodes.
First-hand observations and second-hand reputation records from other nodes are
used if other nodes have reliably been trustworthy or when nodes pass the deviation
test. Nodes use their own rating to sporadically classify other nodes according to
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two criteria, normal/misbehaving and trustworthy/untrustworthy. The Bayesian
approach is used to accomplish both classifications, address lying nodes and detect
false reports.
In CONFIDANT (Cooperation Of Nodes, Fairness in Dynamic Ad Hoc Networks)
[112], a reputation based system is proposed. A watchdog mechanism is used to col-
lect direct information where nodes direct, observe or monitor their neighbour and
detects the misbehaviour of nodes, such as packet dropping, modification, fabrica-
tion, or timing misbehaviour. Nodes do this by comparing the message transmission
of their neighbour with the message copied on its buffer. Nodes also gather second-
hand information from other neighbour nodes and deal with false ratings. Nodes
classify other nodes as misbehaving or normal using a Bayesian estimation probabil-
ity. So, misbehaving nodes can be isolated from the network. Pathrater is used to
select the best path according to direct and second hand information. CONFIDANT
periodically reduces the ratings of nodes according to the observation. By doing this,
nodes cannot exploit previous behaviour, and it is useful to allow redemption of iso-
lated nodes no longer misbehaving.
CORE (Collaborative Reputation) [137] is a mechanism for stimulating node coop-
eration and can be resistant to a denial of service attack. CORE has a watchdog
component for monitoring and a reputation mechanism that differentiates between
subjective reputation (observations), indirect reputation (positive reports by oth-
ers), and functional reputation (task-specific behaviour). These reputations are then
weighted for a combined reputation value. According to this value, the neighbour
node evaluates whether the node is cooperating, and if not, the node is gradually
isolated from the network. This mechanism can be integrated with any network func-
tion such as route discovery, packet forwarding, location and packet management.
Other nodes will not provide this service to a node with a reputation less than the
threshold value.
NRMDM (Novel Reputation based Mechanism to Detect the Misbehaving) [138]
is a reputation based mechanism for monitoring and detecting selfish nodes. It
consists of four components, Monitoring, Reputation System, Path Manager and
Witness Module. When a node send a message to a neighbour node it keeps a copy
of this message in its cache, and monitors the behaviour of the neighbour node.
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The node checks whether the neighbour forwards the message and compares the
forwarded message with the cache copy. If the messages match, it means the packet
was successfully sent and directly removed from the cache. If the message does
not match, then it means the neighbour node modified the packet. The reputation
system then starts calculating the new rating and exchanges the new rate with other
neighbour nodes. According to this node’s reputation values, the path manager will
choose the best path to send the message. The Witness module monitors accidental
dropped packets and reports to the Monitoring Module before it is considered as
malicious node.
In [113], a reputation based routing protocol technique is proposed for blackholes at-
tacks where nodes maintain a local reputation for each node. In the next forwarding,
the node selects the best neighbour according to the reputations of the nodes. The
reputation mechanism depends on three elements; Acknowledgments, Node Lists and
Aging. This protocol deals especially with sinkhole attacks, where a malicious node
can send wrong routing information to attract messages and then drop all or some of
them. When a node has a low reputation value the possibility it will be a malicious
node is very high. Therefore, the likelihood it will be the chosen as the next hop
will be very low. When the message reaches its destination, an acknowledgment
message is sent to the sender and then the sender increases the reputation value of
the forwarding nodes and so on. Reputation has age, so it periodically ages or its age
decreases as some nodes may be selfish for a long time for reasons such as battery
life or resources consumption.
SReD (Secure Reputation-Based Dynamic) [139] was designed mainly to mitigate
three kinds of attacks; Black hole, Denial of Service (DoS) and Wormhole attacks.
SReD is a linkstate-based and multi-path routing protocol using a dynamic window
technique to switch between reputation and probabilistic routing generation modes.
These models are: each node conserves two parameters in a dynamic window size (w)
with a median value at the initial stage, and the trust of neighbouring nodes (ta).
By comparing these two parameters, we can guess the security quality. If ta > w, the
local network is secure and the sender will use the reputation-based routing mode.
Otherwise, the local environment is insecure so the sender will use the probabilistic
routing generation mode. Note the value of w is always updated using the increase
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and decrease functions. SReD depends on the trust evaluation of the neighbours of
other nodes, which is based on trusted hardware in each node. The highest trusted
node is chosen as the next hop.
MobiGame [140] is one of the first incentive protocols that uses a reputation based
scheme in DTN to defend against selfish attacks. Game theory is used in MobiGame
to design cost and reward parameters. Each node can maintain its own relay evidence
in the local buffer so it will show its reputation on demand. There are four phases in
MobiGame to generate system parameters. These are, System initialization phase,
Bundle setup phase, Bundle forwarding phase and Reward clearance phase. The
last two phases responsible for the calculations on the source node side to identify
whether the message reaches its destination. However, MobiGame needs an Oﬄine
System Manager (OSM) for key distribution at system initialization and each node
must register with the OSM so it can obtain a public key certificate and parameters
before joining any networks.
In [141], the authors list the most popular ways to calculate trust and reputation:
• The weighted average method: Used by the most classical trust models Eigen-
trust and PeerTrust. The weight of the chosen factors such as direct trust and
recommended trust are calculated using multiplication and summation.
• Probability methods: Trust and reputation are calculated using probability
and statistics, such as the Bayesian method.
• The fuzzy reasoning method: Trust and reputation are defined at different
levels starting from an unknown node to a very trustworthy node.
Eigentrust [142], one of the most classical trust models is a reputation system that
uses transitivity of trust to assign a unique global trust value for each node based on
its interactions with other nodes in the network. Before a node attempts to down-
load content from another node, it checks the global trust value of the node. To
calculate the global trust value for node A, ratings from all nodes that worked with
node A are required. This process is demanding and time consuming, as updating
the global trust value for a node requires lots of input from a large number of other
nodes. Peertrust [143] is another classical model that uses reputation to build a trust
framework. Trust is computed from a number of parameters: recommendations from
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other nodes based on the services they provide, total number of interactions a node
completes, credibility of recommendations from other nodes, context of the interac-
tions, and the context of the community such as creating incentives to encourage
recommendations. PeerTrust works with many parameters and metrics making it
difficult to apply with a large number of nodes in the network.
The work in [144] uses game strategies to design a trust framework called GaTMo.
The framework uses individual trust for each node, and the system’s trust (reputa-
tion) for each node in the network. The use of game theory is a strategy used to make
a decision in a given situation. It involves the use of mathematical functions such as
probability, statistics and algebra. There are a number of strategies to choose from
when choosing candidates in a network: Tit for tat, self-trust, and dynamic trust.
In tit for tat strategy, when peer A wants to deal with peer B, it uses the same pre-
vious action of peer B with peer A. If peer B was cooperative in their last meeting,
then peer A implements the same action and becomes cooperative. If peer B was
not cooperative, then peer A does not cooperate with peer B. In self-trust, peer A
decides to cooperate with peer B based on its own personal experience. In dynamic
trust, peer A uses its personal trust and the system’s overall trust for peer B, and
then makes its choice. A monitoring node is also used in the GaTMo framework, the
node monitors other peers in the network and records their behaviour. Peers with
unacceptable behaviours are eliminated from the network.
A reputation aggregation method is used in [145] to solve issues with malicious peers
who send malicious content at times, and honest content at other times. The method
works by assigning a provisional trust value to peers in the network. When a peer
receives malicious content from another peer it lowers the direct trust value of the
peer that sent it malicious content. The proposed system then allows the receiving
peer to spread the new updated trust value of the malicious peer to other peers
which lowers the reputation of this malicious peer. This process happens every time
a peer receives malicious content from another peer and this attempts to keep the
reputation level of peers updated at all times. Before nodes decide to trust a peer,
they rely on the reputation or global value of the peer.
The model in [146] minimizes the influence of malfunctioned or malicious nodes in a
WSN using reputation. Reputation is built among nodes from the confidence level
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that nodes have towards each other. A high confidence level, means high trust. Data
flows between nodes that have a high confidence interim, as the level of confidence
starts to fall, the system directs the data flow to other nodes that have a high
confidence interim, this technique helps in reducing energy consumed by nodes in
the network. Nodes collect direct and indirect experiences with other nodes to build
a trust value and a confidence interim for them. An experience record of a node
could be sensing data, forwarding or receiving data, or creating an experience record
for another node. To collect direct experiences, nodes evaluate their neighbours by
monitoring the communications performed by them and record these communications
as experiences in an experience record. Nodes use these experience records to assign a
trust value for other nods. Nodes then weigh the experiences it collected for a node to
calculate its confidence interim. To collect indirect experiences, a node first evaluates
the accuracy of its next hop neighbour node in recording experiences. It starts by
monitoring the experiences associated with its neighbour node, it then compares
those experiences with its own experiences, if the differences are small, then it means
its neighbour node is accurately recording its experiences, and can be trusted and
weighs the trust value to calculate its neighbour’s confidence interim. The model
addresses the trustworthiness of nodes in a WSN, but not the trustworthiness of
the data that flows in them. The model doesn’t consider the broadcasting of trust
values, which is useful in strengthening the reputation of a system.
A communal reputation and an individual trust based model in a WSN is presented in
[147]. The model builds reputation from trust formed by feedback from nodes about
each other. To build trust in the network the model uses voting and implements
the watchdog mechanism [12] where each node monitors its neighbour. Each node
issues a trust vote for other nodes, and records their trust vote in a trust table. The
node issues a trust vote by first monitoring the node it transmitted the message
to, it watches to see if it keeps the integrity of the message while forwarding it. It
then compares the message upon successful transmission and checks if the message
forwarded is an exact copy of the original. It records a positive vote for the node that
forwarded the message without any changes to the message, otherwise, it records a
negative vote for the node in its trust table. Each node in the network does this
process, by monitoring nodes they forward messages to, and then voting positively
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or negatively, and then updating and recording the trust value based on their vote
in their trust table. Positive votes (result from successful message delivery) increase
the trust value of a node, and negative votes decrease the trust value of a node.
If a node’s trust value falls below the required threshold, it will be notified and
reported as malicious to other nodes to bring awareness regarding this malicious
node. Once this awareness reaches the cluster head through multiple nodes, it isolates
the malicious node from the cluster by informing the nodes in the cluster to abandon
any messages from the reported malicious node. In addition to the trust table that
each node maintains in the network, each node also maintains a reputation table
that includes the evaluated reputation values for all other nodes in the network.
Each node builds the reputation table from its own trust table and other node’s
trust tables which are broadcasted occasionally in a cluster. Nodes broadcast their
reputation tables as well, when nodes receive other node’s reputation tables, they use
the evaluated trust values of nodes to update their own reputation table by averaging
the total values of each node’s reputation value.
A malicious node detection model using graph based iterative trust and reputation
methods is introduced in [148]. Nodes in the network use past experiences to evaluate
the trust value of other nodes. Nodes are either service providers where they provide
a service, or are service consumers where they use the services provided by service
providers. After an interaction, service consumers rate the service provider of whom
they used a service from. Using the rate values and after examining them for their
level of honesty, a reputation system is built for nodes in the network. These ratings
are recorded in a table and are used by the iterative detection mechanism to keep
the reputation of all nodes in the system updated regularly, where nodes with a low
reputation are removed from the network. The gathered tables of each node in the
network are then used to create a bipartite graph.
A reputation system is proposed in [113] where every node locally assigns a reputa-
tion value to nodes it interacts with and uses this reputation value in the future by
choosing nodes with a high reputation to forward its message to. The integrity of
messages are protected using digital signatures. Each node maintains the reputation
of other nodes using acknowledgments from the destination, a nodes list, and aging.
When a source sends a message to a certain destination through intermediate nodes,
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the destination sends an acknowledgment back to the source once it receives the mes-
sage. When the acknowledgment arrives at the source, it updates the reputation of
the intermediate nodes. Every message contains the list of nodes that contributed in
passing the message to the destination, and upon receiving the message, it updates
the reputation value of the nodes that forwarded the message. Also, the reputation
of a node is affected by aging, in which if it stops interacting with nodes, its repu-
tation value decreases. Because the reputation system is built locally among nodes,
this technique reduces the overhead cost of having to maintain a reputation system
globally.
A trust model based on ontologies is proposed in [101]. Using reputation, the ontol-
ogy classifies nodes in the network according to their trustworthiness in the network.
A node uses its past experiences with a target node to evaluate its direct reputation
value, and uses recommendations from other nodes towards a target node to evaluate
its indirect reputation value. Direct and indirect reputation are both combined and
then used as a decision parameter for nodes to look at before trusting other nodes.
The model does not consider trust changes according to a node’s location, and this
is a relevant feature in OppNets.
A trust-based framework in [78] evaluates a node’s capability to distribute data based
on a node’s reputation using watchdog monitoring nodes and the Positive Feedback
Message (PFM). The authors design a Watchdog mechanism that fits with OppNets
where there is no end to end path. When a source node wants to forward a message,
it searches for nodes with a high reputation then forwards the message and monitors
the behaviour of the node that got a forward of the message. When the node delivers
the message to the destination, the destination forms a positive feedback message
(PFM) which requests to increase the reputation of all the nodes that delivered the
message. When the source node receives the PFM from the destination, it updates
the reputation of the nodes listed in the PFM. The watchdog keeps track of the
number of PFM’s nodes as they encounter and forward messages with each other.
Nodes that don’t have a PFM returned to the sender for their attempt to forward a
message don’t prove their good forwarding behaviour. The collected PFMs are used
to create a reputation system of nodes in the network to help improve the future
data forwarding where nodes send their messages to nodes with a higher reputation.
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The source node receives the PFM from the destination through epidemic routing,
and the advantage of doing this is to speed up the process of updating the reputation
of nodes, but it also increases the overhead cost on the network.
In [149] the authors present a trust model that uses basic trust followed with applica-
tion trust. Basic trust forms as initial trust is established, the model allows 2 nodes
to exchange their credentials when they meet for the first time. The credentials of
any node in the network contains symmetrically encrypted features about the node.
These credentials are decrypted using a secret key that is exchanged between 2 nodes
when they meet. Nodes can choose which features in their credentials to share with
other nodes. Once basic trust is formed, application trust formation is followed. Ap-
plication trust is measured based on the node’s context, roles are assigned to nodes
based on their application trust which changes when a node’s context changes.
Another model in [114] uses certificates to evaluate the trustworthiness of a trust
value, and the node’s ID. The model has two stages, oﬄine and online. In the oﬄine
stage, the certificate, called Attribute Certificate (AC), is issued by a node to its
neighbour, the certificate contains the neighbour’s evaluated trust, and the issued
AC is also stored in the issuing node as well. Every node in the network issues an
AC for their neighbours. In the online stage, when a node wants to send a message
to a specific destination, it constructs paths to the destination. It then requests ACs
from nodes that belong to the paths it constructed, it validates the ACs. Using the
validated ACs it measures the trust value of each route, paths with fewer hop counts
have higher trust, and then chooses the most trustworthy route to send its message.
In [150], a trust based Quality of Service (QoS) model is introduced. The model
measures trust from direct trust and indirect trust. QoS ensures quality services
in a route such as bandwidth, delay, and jitter. Usually the route is checked for
its QoS before data is transmitted through it. The proposed model uses delay only
to estimate a route’s QoS. The expected transmission count is used as a metric to
measure the quality of a route. To calculate direct trust, each node in the network
assigns a trust value to its neighbour according to the neighbour’s ability to authen-
tically forward packets. To calculate indirect trust, feedback from neighbours about
a node is used. Each node stores a trust table that contains the trust value of every
neighbour’s direct and indirect trust. When a source wants to send a message to
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the destination, using the stored routing table, it searches for the possible routes
that the message can be transmitted through. When a route is identified for data
transmission, its trust value is first calculated using direct and indirect trust of each
node in the route. The route is also measured for its delay QoS level. If the accu-
mulated trust value is high, and the delay QoS level is low, the route is chosen for
data transmission. When a node is identified as malicious in a route, it is isolated
from the network, thus making the route more secure.
To safeguard the QoS of data availability, a probability-based model in [151] adopts
the Dempster-Shafer theory (reasoning with uncertainty) that competently collects
recommendations from intermediate nodes and effectively discard malicious ones.
Trust values are assigned and stored in the intermediate nodes of a path, the recom-
mendations are prioritized based on the trust values of nodes in a path. Recommen-
dations from nodes with a higher trust value are prioritized over recommendations
from nodes with lower trust values. Recommendations from shorter distance nodes
are given more priority over longer distance nodes. The model also enhances the
trust values of nodes by measuring their ability to develop their trust, a node is
given the choice to whether or not it wishes to trust another node regardless of its
recommendation value.
To deal with uncertainty, a fuzzy recommendation based trust model is introduced in
[115]. Each node in the network monitors its neighbour’s packet forwarding patterns.
Nodes record the results of their neighbour monitoring patterns into a table that
contains the data forwarding information. Every time a node interacts with another
node in the network it rates the interaction as either a positive or a negative one.
Using the information recorded in the table, fuzzy direct trust is computed. Latest
interactions are more valid than past interactions, but both are used to measure
the trust value of a node. To build a trusted path, direct trust and feedback from
other nodes towards nodes they interacted with are both used to calculate the fuzzy
indirect trust with fuzzy properties.
Another ontology based trust model is presented in [102]. A Semantic Web Frame-
work is provided for nodes to help them make decisions regarding trusting other
nodes in the network. The semantic service includes a list of all the possible services
that may be needed by nodes. The model classifies nodes into 4 different groups
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as either private unknown helpers, public unknown helpers, trusted known helpers,
or OppNet reservists. The trust value is assigned to the whole group based on the
direct and indirect trust value of the group.
In [152] a Trust Based Spreading (TBS) is proposed to allow nodes to collaborate
with each other to filter spam messages by exchanging assessments to allow or block
the spreading of the message between nodes in a network when they meet each other
opportunistically. The system starts when a node receives a message, it classifies
the content of the message as legitimate or spam. The node then places legitimate
content in a whitelist, and spam content in a blacklist. When nodes meet each
other, they exchange their white and black lists whether they exchange content or
not. A threshold of required assessments must be met to confirm an assessment.
The authors in [116] took the activity of nodes in the network into consideration
when designing an OppNet trust system. An active node in the network has more
opportunities to meet with other nodes, hence has a higher chance of meeting the
destination. Direct trust is calculated using the activity parameter, an active node
is determined by the number of encounter rates with other nodes. To avoid having
highly active malicious nodes with a high trust value, indirect trust is measured
using the cooperation, honesty, and similarities parameters of nodes towards other
nodes in the network.
A public key distribution without a centralised public key infrastructure (PKI) model
based on trust is presented in [153]. To establish initial trust in a network, a Leverage
of Common Friends system is also introduced. The model is decentralised and uses
the Web of Trust principle. Nodes authenticate other nodes based on their confidence
level that the node indeed owns its public key. The confidence level increases when
nodes notice lots of occurrences of a node’s public key in the network as it would be
difficult for a malicious node to tie itself with the identity of a node that is already
known in the network. The more nodes a node meets with and the more friends a
node has in the network, the higher its trust value becomes and the more confidence
other nodes will have towards it.
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2.7.3 History-Based Trust Strategies
These techniques use a nodes history to build a trust system as in [117], where a
trust advisory framework is proposed to decrease the unreachability in the selfish
network using the four trust advisory filters (Encounter Frequency, Encounter Dura-
tion, Encounter Location-Based Behaviour Vectors and Behaviour Matrix Filters).
These filters are evaluated using a real-world data set where Epidemic protocol [24]
is used. Using these filters, one can provide evidence of potential similarity between
nodes and this can be used when we try to find the best path to the destination.
Encounter frequency (when devices are on the same radio range) is used to develop
trust between nodes and is based on the idea that nodes with similar interest fre-
quently meet and interact. This means the more they meet the more trustworthy
they are. The more time spent by the nodes, the greater the similarity between
them and more trustworthy they are likely to be. The behaviour vector filter (BV)
is based on the idea that similar people have a tendency to go to similar locations
so capturing the location preference of nodes is used as a filter base. The BV pre-
serves the vectors for the duration and frequency of capturing user behaviour. Some
modification of the vector into a matrix allows maintaining a single entity to achieve
a spatio-temporal representation of user behaviour. In this behaviour matrix, each
column represents a location and each row represents a single day. A Random Trust
filter (RT) is also used for comparison purposes. This randomly selects a T percent of
encountered users and adds them to the trust list. However, in [117] misbehaviour of
the nodes is not considered. The scheme introduced in [118] uses trusted authorities
to measure the trust value of nodes, the scheme is modelled using game theory. Ini-
tially, nodes record their history interactions with other nodes, and later send their
history records to the trusted authority (TA) which validates the trustworthiness of
nodes in the network by observing their history records. The TA rewards nodes with
good behaviour to encourage positive behaviour, and punishes misbehaving nodes to
minimize negative behaviour. A probabilistic misbehaviour detection scheme is used
where TAs could validate nodes or not, and where nodes could misbehave or not. A
reputation system is then created for nodes in the network where positive behaviour
increases a node’s reputation in the network, and a negative behaviour decreases a
node’s reputation in the network.
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2.8 Summary
In this chapter we provided a review of literature on routing, security and trust in
OppNets. We have presented the available protocols on OppNets and their classi-
fications. We demonstrated and evaluated OppNets routing protocols in terms of
complexity, scalability, and the limitation of node types using the ONE simulator.
Three different scenarios were designed to evaluate the routing performance of Opp-
Nets when network load increases, the number of nodes increases, and the type of
nodes are limited. Based on our results, the network load, network area, the num-
ber of nodes, and the varying types of nodes does impact the performance levels of
routing protocols in OppNets.
As seen in scenarios 1, as the load on the network increased, the performance of
the 6 protocols decreased. Based on these results, the 6 protocols were given a
medium rating in terms of dealing with complexity. From scenario 2, as the network
enlarges in area and number of nodes, Epidemic and PRoPHET performed better
than Spray and Wait in delivering messages to the destination, but at a very high
cost. Epidemic and PRoPHET were rated with medium scalability. Although Spray
and Wait did not achieve delivery rates as high as Epidemic or Prophet, the network
cost was low. We rated it with medium scalability as well. First Contact and Direct
Delivery achieved small delivery rates with high delivery delays, and a high cost for
First Contact. We rated them with low scalability. From scenario 3, we concluded
that trams carry and exchange information faster, and improve the connectivity in
OppNets due to its features such as a high speed interface and mobility speed.
In this chapter we also investigate the available security approaches in OppNets and
any techniques used to increase their security levels. In this chapter, we discussed
secure routing and trust management systems and strategies to increase security
levels in OppNets where social, reputation and history relationships play important
roles in the implementation of these trust strategies. We also discussed secure routing
techniques in OppNets and different defence mechanisms against various types of
attacks like Blackhole, Wormhole, Dropping, and Sybil attacks. Anti-localization
techniques of nodes have attracted the attention of researchers as many routing
protocols use the location of nodes as a base for their routing decisions. Selfishness
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was discussed in this paper where the node tries to obtain benefits from network
facilities and resources but refuses to cooperate with other nodes for reasons such
as limitation of resources. We have also discussed the impact of intrusion detection
systems on OppNets and provided an overview of trust in OppNets.
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Catabolism Attack and Anabolism
Defence
In this chapter, we present a novel attack and traceback mechanism against a special
type of packet dropping attack where the malicious nodes selectively drop some
packets (not all packets) and instead of them inject fake packets in order to maintain
the original total number of packets originated from the sender node. We call this
novel attack a Catabolism attack and we call our novel traceback mechanism against
this attack, Anabolism defence. We have called our attack Catabolism attack as we
have a “tear down” of the transmitted packets (dropping) and we have called our
defence mechanism Anabolism defence as we have a “build up” process for detecting
the attack and tracing back to the malicious nodes. Our detection and traceback
mechanism at this stage relies on the packet creation time (PCT) of each packet
and the contact time between nodes. There are two phases in our technique. The
first phase is to detect the fake packets, and the second phase is to traceback to the
malicious nodes. We have tested our detection and traceback mechanism using both
a destination based aproach as well as a node by node based approach. In the first
approach, destination node checks the received packets to detect the attack and then
traceback to the malicious nodes. In the node by node approach, each legitimate node
checks the received packets to detect the attack, prevent fake packets propagation
and then traceback to the malicious nodes.
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3.1 Introduction
Packet dropping attack is one of the most difficult to detect DoS attacks in Opp-
Nets since neither source nodes nor destination nodes have the knowledge of where
or when packets will be dropped. Selective packet dropping can significantly erode
the quality of service for applications and impact network performance. Applica-
tions that require reliable data transfer would force increased retransmissions result-
ing in decreased throughput. Packet dropping attacks can also impact on efficient
routing with malicious nodes forwarding incomplete or inaccurate routing informa-
tion. Packet dropping can degrade the performance of the network and may ob-
struct the propagation of sensitive data. It is a significant challenge to deal with
such an attack since the unreliable wireless communication and resource limitations
can result in communication failure and result in the wrong prediction about the
presence of a packet dropping attack. Moreover, a node’s resources, such as en-
ergy and bandwidth can be the real reasons behind packet dropping. A power
shortage or communication failure such as physical damage can make a node un-
available. It may be difficult to recognize whether packets were dropped due to a
security attack or for non security reasons. Dropping packets can lead to an in-
crease in the number of packet retransmissions, transfer time, response time and
network overhead. However, there is no doubt about the malicious behaviour if
the node drops some legitimate packets and then injects fake packets to replace
them. In this case the malicious node obviously has enough resources to do this.
We call this novel attack a Catabolism attack where the malicious node can se-
lectively drop some packets and instead of them inject new fake packets so it can
maintain the original total number of packets originated from the sender node. We
call our novel traceback mechanism against this attack an Anabolism defence. The
existing packet dropping defence mechanism, such as the multipath routing-based
mechanisms[6][154][81][7][8],reputation- based mechanism[9], data provenance-based
mechanisms[10], acknowledgement-based mechanisms [80][11][1], are inefficient as
in OppNets we have no end-to-end connections and usually have no alternative
paths from the sender to the destination or vice versa. Network coding based
mechanisms[2], are inefficient as well since the destination nodes should have a copy
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of all neighbours packets/messages so it can decode its message, which is difficult to
achieve in OppNets. Watchdog and pathrater mechanism[12][13][84][83][14][85], are
inefficient for detecting this type of attack as the detection idea is based on the cal-
culation of the total number of transmitted/received packets. Encryption techniques
[15][72][155] are inefficient as well, as we required the use of a secret key which is
difficult to manage in OppNets since we have no centralized management. In this
chapter, our Anabolism defence is time-based and relies on the packet creation time
(PCT) and the nodes contact time.
Contribution. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to identify
this type of attack and to propose a traceback mechanism. The main contributions
of this work are:
1. To identify a Catabolism attack where malicious nodes selectively drop some
packets (not all packets) and then inject fake packets instead.
2. To proposed time-based Anabolism defence where a destination node can check
all of the received packets and then accurately distinguish between the legiti-
mate and fake (injected) packets. It can also traceback and identify the mali-
cious nodes that triggered this attack.
3.2 Overview on Catabolism Attack and Anabolism De-
fence
In a Catabolism Attack, a malicious nodes can drop one or more packets (not all
the packets), and instead of them, inject fake packets. In Figure 3.1, we can see an
example of a Catabolism Attack where malicious node (t15) drops one packet and
then injects a new fake packet instead.
Our time-based traceback technique relies on the “Packet Creation Time” of each
packet and the “Nodes Contact Time”. There are two parts in our technique:
1. Detect fake packets: When a message reaches a destination or any legitimate
node, the legitimate node can compare the packet creation time of each received
packet. The legitimate node can then detect the fake packet with a different
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Figure 3.1: Catabolism attack where a malicious nodes (t15) drops and injects a new
packet
creation time, as all packets in the same message should have the same creation
time or be very close (with a difference of ∆t).
2. Traceback malicious nodes: The destination or legitimate node can use fake
packet creation time as a benchmark to compare it with the nodes contact time
in the packets path to find the malicious node.
3.2.1 Assumptions
In our approach we make the following two assumptions:
1. The sender node should automatically include a packet creation time in the
header of each packet sent.
2. The intermediate nodes automatically include the contact time with other
nodes when they hand them the packets to be delivered to the destination
node. Storage capacity in OppNets vary depending on the nodes. However,
such logs file to save this information does not need high capacity. In our ap-
proaches this information is included as part of the packet headers and therefore
there is a need to only store this information temporarily.
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3. To save energy and process time, malicious node drop some legitimate packets
and instead of them injecting fake packets without modifying the contents of
the packet including the packet creation time and nodes contact time.
4. The sender and the destination nodes are legitimate.
Based on these assumptions, the destination or the legitimate nodes will be able to
learn all the nodes crossed by the packets along with all the information, including
the packet creation time and nodes contact time. Figure 3.2 shows the message path
with the packet creation time and nodes contact times.
Figure 3.2: Packets Path with Packet Creation Time
3.2.2 Anabolism Defence (Time-based Approach)
In this approach of the Anabolism defence, destination or legitimate node will calcu-
late and detect the fake packets, and then traceback to identify the malicious nodes.
We have three phases in the approaches shown in algorithm 1. In phase one, we
identify the packets with the lowest packet creation time. We have used the lowest
PCT as a benchmark (correct PCT) for our calculations. However, any PCT dif-
ferent than the lowest one can be considered as a fake PCT and we can use it to
compare with the nodes’ contact time to traceback to the malicious node. When the
destination or the legitimate node receives all the packets including Packet Creation
Time (PCT ), Nodes Contact Time (NCT ), and the number of hops for each packet,
it will attempt to detect any fake packets by sorting the packet creation time of each
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received packet and then choosing the smallest value in the list. All packets should
have the same creation time or a very slight difference (∆t). When the malicious
node drops packets, it will inject fake packets instead of them at the current ma-
licious node time. Therefore, the fake time will always be higher than the original
packet creation time of legitimate packets. In phase two, we aim to detect any fake
packets. The algorithm will continuously check all packets to distinguish and count
all fake and true packets. We may find more than one fake packet creation time
depending on the number of malicious nodes in the packet’s path. If all packets have
the same creation time (± ∆t) then there will be no fake packets and no malicious
nodes. In phase three, we aim to detect any malicious nodes. Once we get the fake
packet creation times, we can then use it to traceback and find malicious nodes.
In this case, we will rely on the contact time between nodes as each node should
keep a record of the contact time with other nodes and include within the header of
each packet so the destination node will have a clear image about the packet’s path
and the nodes in that path. Once we learn the contact time between nodes, we can
then compare the fake packet creation time with the contact time of nodes and then
accurately detect the malicious nodes.
As mentioned earlier, in this attack, malicious nodes drop some packets and instead
of them, inject fake packets. Our algorithm is based on the assumption we have at
least one legitimate packet at the destination or the legitimate node which has the
lowest packet creation time. We can then rely on it and compare it with other packet
creation times to find fake packets and also find malicious nodes. However, if “all
received packets” are fake or the “same packet sequence ” is faked twice or more,
then our algorithm will compare it according to the lowest packet creation time to
find the fake packets in that message and then find the malicious nodes. However, in
this case one or more fake packets will be missed and categorized as legitimate and
we will miss the malicious nodes behind these fake packets. We can see this case in
Figures 3.3 and 3.4. In Figure 3.3, we have two malicious nodes in the same path
and each one drops/injects different packet sequences. Malicious node (t15) first
drops two packets and then sends all four packets to another malicious node (w14).
The second malicious node (w14) drops the last two packets and then sends all
four packets to the destination (c9) so it will receive four fake packets. In Figure 3.4,
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Algorithm 1 : Detecting fake packets and malicious nodes
1: READ: packetsCreationTime, nodesContactTime, Nodes.
2: Phase 1: Select lowest packet creation time
3: For all packets
4: Sort packetsCreationTime[i]
5: lowestPacketCreationTime = packetsCreationTime[0]
6: packetsAreLegitimate = true
7: Phase 2: Detect fake packet(s)
8: For all packets
9: if packetsCreationTime[i] = (lowestPacketCreationTime ± ∆t) then
10: legitimatePacketsCounter++
11: else
12: fakePacketsCounter++
13: packetsAreLegitimate = false
14: end if
15: if packetsAreLegitimate then
16: No fake packets and no malicious node, Exit
17: end if
18: Phase 3: Find malicious node(s)
19: For all Nodes
20: if nodesContactTime[j] 6 packetsCreationTime[i] AND nodesContactTime[j+1] >
packetsCreationTime[i] then
21: Malicious Node = Node[j + 1]
22: maliciousNodesCounter++
23: end if
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Figure 3.3: Different sequence packets dropping/injecting in 2 malicious nodes path
malicious node (t15) drops/injects the first two packets, and then the malicious node
(w14) drops/injects two packets in the same sequence (first two packets), and then
sends out four packets to the destination (c9). Node (c9) will not be able to detect
the fake packets of malicious node (t15) in either scenarios nor will it be able to
detect malicious node (t15). It can only detect the fake packets of malicious node
(w14), and it will recognize the fake packets of (t15) as legitimate packets. However,
there is a high probability we can detect the missed fake packets of malicious node
(t15) and then categorize (t15) as a malicious node in the next path, as we will see in
the simulation results. The only way to detect all malicious nodes is to have one or
more legitimate packets and one or more fake packet from each malicious node in the
destination or the legitimate node side. When we transmit a high number of packets
then the probability of having two or more malicious nodes dropping and injecting
the same packet sequence will be low as all events are independent. However, in the
case of colluding nodes this can occur with a high probability.
3.3 Mathematical Model
In order to calculate the probability of detecting the fake packets of all malicious
nodes in the packets’ path, let us assume,
• n be the total number of hops;
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Figure 3.4: Same sequence packets dropping/injecting in 2 malicious nodes path
• m be the number of malicious hops;
• k be the number of packets;
• p be the probability that a packet be changed at a malicious hop;
• α be the probability of at least one packet surviving all malicious hops (i.e.,
Probability of accurate detection).
• Aj be the event that exactly j packets survived all malicious hops, with A =
∪k−1j=1Aj, Aj ∩ A` = ∅, for j 6= `, j, ` ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} (note that the index is
only up to k − 1 as we cannot have all packets survive all malicious hops);
• Bj be the event that, given j packets, at least one of them is attacked in each
malicious hop; and
• B at least one of the k packets is attacked in each malicious hop.
3.3.1 Detection of Fake Packets
The probability of a packet unchanged at a malicious node is given by (1− p), for p
the probability of a packet changed at the malicious node. Now, the probability of
a packet unchanged in a path with m malicious node(s) is given by:
(1− p)m (3.1)
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Therefore, the probability of a packet being changed in a path with m malicious
nodes is given by:
1− (1− p)m (3.2)
Now, the probability of having j packets unchanged but the rest of the k packets
changed in a path with m malicious nodes is given by:
[(1− p)m]j [1− (1− p)m]k−j . (3.3)
Notice that there are
(
k
j
)
combinations of obtaining j objects out of k. Hence the
overall probability of exactly j out of the k packets unchanged in a path with m
malicious nodes is given by:(
k
j
)
[(1− p)m]j [1− (1− p)m]k−j (3.4)
Now, let α be the probability of at least one packet surviving all malicious hops,
which is equal to 1− the probability of all packets changed. We have that:
α = 1− [ 1− (1− p)m]k (3.5)
Observe that to increase α, whilst p and m are held constant, one can increase k,
the number of packets. In Figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, we can see the probability of at
least one packet surviving all malicious hops in a path with 2, 5 and 20 malicious
hops. We can achieve a high probability of receiving legitimate packets α when the
number of malicious nodes is low in the packet’s path, then it starts to drop with
an increase in the malicious nodes. We can observe the value of α is affected by the
number of malicious hops, because when we have two malicious hops the probability
of receiving legitimate packets will be high even if the value of p is high. This is
because we only have two hops in that path. The value of α decreases when the
number of malicious nodes increases.
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Figure 3.5: Probability of at least one packet surviving all malicious hops in a path with 2
malicious nodes
Figure 3.6: Probability of at least one packet surviving all malicious hops in a path with 5
malicious nodes
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Figure 3.7: Probability of at least one packet surviving all malicious hops in a path with
20 malicious nodes
3.3.1.1 Optimization of the Number of Packets
Our algorithm relies on the probability of receiving at least one unchanged packet at
the destination/legitimate node (“α”) so we can use the packet creation time of that
unchanged packet for detecting the fake packets. We need to keep this probability α
as high as possible by optimizing the number of packets k sent in each transaction
with reference to the packet probability p. As in equation 3.5, the probability of
having at least one packet surviving all malicious hops, i.e. α is given as:
α = 1− [1− (1− p)m]k
Hence,
1− α = [1− (1− p)m]k ,
and therefore
log(1− α) = k log [1− (1− p)m] ,
which implies that
k =
log(1− α)
log [1− (1− p)m] .
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Figures 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 show the relationship between the number of packets and
the probability of at least one packet surviving all malicious hops in different path
lengths. When the number of malicious nodes increases, the probability of packet
changes p in a path with malicious nodes will increase as well. In this case, we will
be required to send a large number of packets k so we can achieve a high probability
(0.85 - 0.95) of receiving at least one legitimate packet α in order to achieve a high
accuracy of detecting fake packets.
Figure 3.8: Number of packets needed to achieve α = (0.85,0.90,0.95) in a path with 2
malicious nodes
3.3.2 Malicious Node Detection
To detect malicious nodes, we require two conditions to be satisfied. The two con-
ditions are:
1. At least one legitimate packet is received, and
2. At least one fake packet from each malicious node is received.
Given p, the probability of a packet surviving at a malicious hop is q = 1− p.
Now, let IP be the probability that a packet will survive all malicious hops, i.e.
IP = qm (3.6)
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Figure 3.9: Number of packets needed to achieve α = (0.85,0.90,0.95) in a path with 5
malicious nodes
Hence, the probability that a packet will be attacked at one or more of the hops, IQ,
is given by:
IQ = 1− IP (3.7)
The probability of Aj, that is, exactly j out of k packets survived all malicious hops,
is:
Pr(Aj) =
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j (3.8)
We now calculate Pr(B ∩A). As Aj, for j ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1} are distinct sets, we have
that:
Pr(B ∩ A) = Pr
(
B ∩
(
k−1⋃
j=1
Aj
))
=
k−1∑
j=1
Pr(B ∩ Aj)
By Bayesian,
Pr(B ∩ Aj) = Pr(B|Aj) Pr(Aj)
Note that when exactly j packets survived all malicious hops, it means that for the
rest of the k − j packets, they must all be attacked by at least one of the malicious
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Figure 3.10: Number of packets needed to achieve α = (0.85,0.90,0.95) in a path with 20
malicious nodes
hops. Hence,
Pr(B|Aj) = Pr(Bk−j|Aj)
First, the probability that with k − j packets, at least one of them will be attacked
at each malicious hop is given by:
Pr(Bk−j) = [1− qk−j]m (3.9)
However, this includes the event that at least one of the k − j packets survived all
malicious hops but not all k−j packets. We use Ck−j to denote such an event. Thus,
we have:
Pr(Ck−j) =
k−j−1∑
`=1
(
k − j
`
)
IP` IQk−j−` (3.10)
Therefore,
Pr(Bk−j|Aj) = Pr(Bk−j) [1− Pr(Ck−j)] =
[1− qk−j]m
[
1−
k−j−1∑
`=1
(
k − j
`
)
IP` IQk−j−`
] (3.11)
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and we get:
Pr(B ∩ A) =
k−1∑
j=1
Pr(Bk−j|Aj) Pr(Aj) =
k−1∑
j=1
{[
[1− qk−j]m
(
1−
k−j−1∑
`=1
(
k − j
`
)
IP` IQk−j−`
)](
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j
}
. (3.12)
Notice that Pr(B ∩A) includes the case when the same packet is corrupted in more
than one malicious hop. However, if k >> m, the probability of such an occurrence
is negligible. Figures 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 shows the probability of detecting malicious
nodes in paths with 2, 5 and 20 malicious nodes. When we have a small number of
malicious nodes, the probability of detecting them will be high as we have a good
chance of receiving legitimate packets as well as one or more fake packet from each
malicious node. With the increasing number of malicious nodes, we will have less
chance to receive legitimate packets and fake packets from each malicious node, which
means the probability begins to decrease. The probability of detecting malicious
nodes is also affected by the number of packets sent. When the number of transmitted
packet is high (such as 1000), there is a higher probability of achieving the required
sufficient condition of receiving at least one legitimate packet and one fake packet at
a legitimate node. This leads to a very high (almost 1) detection probability being
achieved.
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Figure 3.11: Probability of detecting malicious nodes in a path with 2 malicious nodes
Figure 3.12: Probability of detecting malicious nodes in a path with 5 malicious nodes
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Figure 3.13: Probability of detecting malicious nodes in a path with 20 malicious nodes
Figures 3.14, 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 show the best number of packets k to be sent so
we can achieve high probability of detecting malicious nodes “Pr” in different paths
with 2, 4, 6 and 8 malicious nodes in each path. We consider the probability that
a packet will be attacked p and changing between 0.1 to 0.5, as we rely on the two
events mentioned earlier in this section. When we increase the number of packets,
the probability of detecting malicious nodes will be very close to 1.
3.4 Simulation Settings
To test our algorithm, we implemented a scenario in the ONE simulator [70]. The
simulation was defined to last for 1 hour, with 0.5 seconds of update intervals. Blue-
tooth was chosen for connectivity with a transmit range of 10 meters, and transmit
speeds of 1000 kbps. There were 35 active nodes composed of cars, trams and pedes-
trians. Pedestrians and cars have up to 50 MB of RAM for storage. Pedestrians
move at random speeds between 1 and 1.5 m/s, cars drive only on roads and move
at speeds between 10 − 50 km/h, with wait times of 0 − 120 seconds. MapBased-
Movement is used for pedestrians and cars, with a network area of 4500m2×3400m2.
Nodes move randomly on roads and walkways with a movement warm-up for 10 sec-
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Figure 3.14: Probability of accurate detecting of malicious nodes with 2 malicious nodes
in a path
onds. There are 3 groups of trams, with 2 trams in each group. MapRouteMovement
is used for trams to follow a constructed tram line. Trams drive at speeds of 7− 10
m/s with a wait time of 10− 30 seconds at each configured stop. In addition to the
Bluetooth interface, a group of trams used the high speed interface with a transmit
range of 1000 meters and a transmit speed of 10mbps. Messages are generated every
1 to 5 seconds per node, with message sizes between 50kb and 100kb, and a message
time to live of 5 hours. We used the simulator’s output as a dataset, and randomly
corrupted the dataset based on the number of malicious nodes. We then fed the
corrupted dataset to our algorithm. Two programs were written using C++. The
first program (total of 353 lines) read the dataset and then corrupted it by making
legitimate nodes malicious by changing the packet creation time for randomly cho-
sen packets and nodes. The second program (total of 503 lines) implemented the
algorithm, and began by taking as input the output dataset generated by program
1. The second program was run to get the algorithm results of the metrics calcula-
tions. We ran the simulator for an average of 30 times to represent each point on
our graphs.
90
Chapter 3 Catabolism Attack and Anabolism Defence
Figure 3.15: Probability of accurate detecting of malicious nodes with 4 malicious nodes
in a path
3.4.1 Simulation Results and Analysis
We have used four metrics for evaluating our algorithm,
1. Fake packet detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of fake packets
detected to the total number of actual fake packets.
2. False negative rate: The percentage of fake packets have been incorrectly clas-
sified as a legitimate packet.
3. Malicious node detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of detected
malicious nodes to the total number of actual malicious nodes.
4. Network traffic reduction: The ratio of the total number of fake packets de-
tected in the destination nodes side to the total number of the fake packets
detected in the node by node side.
3.4.1.1 Destination-based Approach
In this approach, our detection and traceback mechanism is destination based. Only
destination node run the algorithm to detect the attack and then traceback the
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Figure 3.16: Probability of accurate detecting of malicious nodes with 6 malicious nodes
in a path
malicious nodes. In this case nodes resources can be saved. We have assumed the
source and destination nodes are not malicious as the source node always sends
packets with the same creation time. The destination node should be legitimate
so it can run the algorithm and do the calculations as in a Catabolism attack, the
malicious node drops some of the packets, and instead of them injects fake packets
with the current malicious node time. Dropping and injecting may take place in
one or more nodes along packets path. In our calculations, we have assumed we
have at least one legitimate packet (with lowest creation time) so we can use it as a
benchmark comparison.
In Figure 3.18, we can observe the packet detection accuracy of our algorithm with
different OppNets protocols (Epidemic [24], PRoPHET [59], Spray and Wait [25],
MaxProp [66] and First Contact (FC) [36]). We see that we can achieve a detection
accuracy of 96% for Epidemic, 95% for PRoPHET, 92% for Spray and Wait, 90%
for MaxProp and 88% for First Contact when the percentage of malicious nodes
is less than 5%. This is because there is a good chance for destinations to receive
legitimate packets, especially when source nodes transmit large number of packets.
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Figure 3.17: Probability of accurate detecting of malicious nodes with 8 malicious nodes
in a path
When the number of malicious nodes increases, the accuracy starts to decrease as
fake packets may be missed if “all received packets” are fake or the “same packet
sequence ” is faked twice or more, as illustrated in Figure 3.3 and 3.4. However,
our algorithm results show the packet detection accuracy does not drop below 70%
(First Contact (FC) [36]), even when 100% of intermediate nodes act as malicious
nodes. This is due to the low probability of having two or more malicious nodes
dropping and injecting the same packet sequence along the same path. In addition,
the probability of receiving all packets as fake is also low, especially when the sender
sends a large number of packets.
Epidemic [24] and PRoPHET [59] achieved the highest detection accuracy, because
both of them replicate multiple copies of a message in the network. In this case,
nodes can have a good participation of receiving and transmitting the packets in
the network and then our algorithm can have a good chance to detect the malicious
nodes and achieve a good accuracy. Spray and Wait [25] achieved a moderate level
of detection accuracy, as in this protocol the source node sprays a predefined number
of copies to the network, and then the nodes perform direct delivery to the destina-
tion. MaxProp [66] is even lower, as MaxProp has a prioritization schema for both
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the schedule of packets transmitted and dropped due to the assumption of limited
storage and bandwidth and the use of broadcasted acknowledgments to update the
encountered nodes about the delivered messages. First Contact algorithm (FC) [36],
achieved the lowest detection accuracy as the message is forwarded to the next hop
randomly. The message stays in the buffer and gets forwarded when the node car-
rying it encounters the first node it meets even when it has zero knowledge about
it.
Figure 3.18: Fake packet detection accuracy as the number of malicious nodes increases
Next we studied the impact of the mobility on the detection accuracy. Figure 3.19,
shows our detection accuracy based on the mobility types. We have used the Epi-
demic protocol with different mobility types (Trams, cars and pedestrians). Trams
achieved very good accuracy (between 77% - 100%) due to their features such as a
high speed interface and mobility speed. Cars achieve better accuracy (between 75%
- 97%) than pedestrians (between 70% - 92%) because cars have high speed compared
to the pedestrians. This enabled them to achieve a better message distribution.
As we can recall from Figure 3.3, we may categorize fake packets as legitimate when
we have more than one malicious node in the same path where each malicious node
fakes a different sequence of packets. This results in having all the received packets
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Figure 3.19: Fake packet detection accuracy based on the mobility of nodes
at the destination as fake packets. In Figure 3.20, we can see a zero false negative
rate for our algorithm when we have less than 2% malicious nodes. This is because
of the small number of malicious nodes and the probability of having more than
one malicious node sending to each other will be very low. The false negative rate
starts to increase slightly until it reaches a maximum of 23%, when the number of
malicious nodes increase, as the probability of having more than one malicious node
in the same packet path will increase.
In order to compare our approach with other approaches, we have chosen the ac-
knowledgement - based mechanisms [1] and the network coding-based mechanism
[2]. As comparison metrics, we have measured the malicious node detection ratio. In
Figure 3.21, we can see our algorithm achieved a node detection accuracy of 100%
when the percentage of malicious nodes are less than 15%. This is because there
is a good chance for destinations to receive legitimate packets and at least one fake
packet from each malicious node. When the number of malicious nodes increases,
the accuracy slightly starts to drop as a destination node may not receive legiti-
mate packets from source node and/or fake packets from malicious nodes may be
missed when two or more malicious nodes drop and inject packets into the same
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Figure 3.20: False negative rate as the number of malicious nodes increases
packet sequence in the same path, as illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. However,
our algorithm results show the nodes detection accuracy does not drop below 93%,
even when 100% of intermediate nodes act as malicious nodes. This is due to the
low probability of having two or more malicious nodes dropping and injecting in the
same packet sequence in the same path. In addition, the probability of receiving
all packets as fake is also low, especially when the sender sends a large number of
packets. However, in Figure 3.21, we can see other approaches perform very poorly
especially when the number of malicious nodes increase to 100% of the intermediate
nodes. In acknowledgement [1] and network coding [2] based mechanisms, destina-
tion nodes need to send the acknowledgments value to the source node through a
legitimate path which is difficult/impossible if the number of malicious nodes reach
100%. Malicious nodes can swap the destination acknowledgment values so it can go
undetected, moreover this destination-based mechanism can only detect a malicious
path (not the malicious nodes) and has high false positive rate.
To increase the security level we need to run the Anabolism defense algorithm in every
node despite the fact that we may have increased overhead or delay. Furthermore,
OppNets by design are delay tolerant networks. In the event that the network is
severely resource constrained, we can revert to destination-based detection. However,
this will decrease the security level of the network.
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Figure 3.21: Nodes detection accuracy as the number of malicious nodes increases
3.4.1.2 Node by Node-based Approach
In this approach, our detection and traceback mechanism is node-by-node-based.
Any legitimate node can run the algorithm to detect the attack and then traceback
to the malicious nodes. It is true that OppNets in some instances can be energy
constrained. This is our motivation for proposing the destination node approaches as
we do not required our algorithm to be run in each node, hence saving node resources.
However, to achieve an increased security level we need to run the algorithms in-
network (on all nodes) despite the fact that we may be resource constrained. In
destination based method, the cost is fixed O(1); however, in node based methods
the cost is dependent on the number of nodes in the network and will be O(n). We
have also assumed the source nodes are not malicious as the source node always
sends packets with the same creation time. Recall, in a Catabolism attack, the
malicious node drops some of the packets, and instead of them injects fake packets
with the current malicious node time. Dropping and injecting will occur on one
or more nodes along the packet’s path. In our calculations, we have assumed we
have at least one legitimate packet (with lowest creation time) so we can use it as a
benchmark comparison.
In Figure 3.22, we can see the packet detection accuracy of our algorithm in different
OppNets protocols (Epidemic [24], PRoPHET [59], Spray and Wait [25], MaxProp
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[66] and First Contact (FC) [36]) can achieve a detection accuracy of (97% for Epi-
demic, 96% for PRoPHET, 93% for Spray and Wait, 91% for MaxProp and 89%
for First Contact) when the percentage of malicious nodes is less than 5%. This is
because there is a good chance for the nodes to receive legitimate packets, especially
when source nodes transmit large number of packets. When the number of malicious
nodes increases, the accuracy slightly starts to drop as fake packets may be missed
when “all received packets” are fake or the “same packet sequence ” is faked twice
or more, as illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. However, our algorithm results show
the packet detection accuracy does not drop below 70% (First Contact (FC) [36]),
even when 100% of intermediate nodes act as malicious nodes. This is due to the
low probability of having two or more malicious nodes dropping and injecting in the
same packet sequence in the same path. In addition, the probability of receiving
all packets as fake is also low, especially when the sender sends a large number of
packets. In node by node defence we always achieved better packet detection accu-
racy than destination nodes defence as fake packets will not propagate through the
network till it reaches the destination. Any legitimate node can stop fake packet
propagation, in contrast, destination defence can detect fake packets only through
destination node.
Epidemic [24] and PRoPHET [59] achieved highest detection accuracy, because both
of them replicate multiple copies of a message in the network. In this case nodes
will have good participation in the network and then our algorithm can achieve good
accuracy. Spray and Wait [25] is lower in terms of detection accuracy as in this
protocol the source node sprays a predefined number of copies to the network, and
then nodes do direct delivery to the destination. MaxProp [66] is even lower, as
MaxProb has a prioritization schema for both the schedule of packets transmitted
and dropped due to the assumption of limited storage and bandwidth and the use of
broadcasted acknowledgments to update the encountered nodes about the delivered
messages. First Contact algorithm (FC) [36], achieved lowest detection accuracy as
the message is forwarded to the next hop randomly. The message stays in the buffer
and gets forwarded when the node carrying it encounters the first node it meets even
when it has zero knowledge about it.
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Figure 3.22: Fake packet detection accuracy as the number of malicious nodes increases
Figure 3.23, shows our detection accuracy based on the mobility types. We have
used Epidemic protocol with different mobility types (Trams, Cars and Pedestrian).
Trams achieved very good accuracy (between 79% - 100%) due to its features such
as a high speed interface and mobility speed. Cars achieve better accuracy (between
77% - 97%) than pedestrians (between 71% - 92%) because, cars have high speed
compared to the pedestrians. This results in achieving a better message distribution.
Figure 3.23: Fake packet detection accuracy based on the mobility of nodes
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Figure 3.24 shows the networks traffic reduction in node by node based defence
technique compare to the destination-based defence technique. Overall we have
achieved good traffic reduction as each legitimate node can detect fake packets and
malicious nodes and then stop fake packet propagation through the network.
Figure 3.24: Network Traffic Reduction
As we can see in Figure 3.3, we may categorize fake packets as legitimate when we
have more than one malicious node sending to each other in the same packets path
where each malicious node fakes a different sequence of packets. This results in
having all the received packets at the legitimate node as fake. In Figure 3.25, we can
see a zero false negative rate for our algorithm when we have less than 2% malicious
nodes. This is because of the small number of malicious nodes and the probability
of receiving all packets as fake will be very low. The false negative rate starts to
increase slightly till it reaches a maximum of 22%, and the number of malicious
nodes also increase as the probability of receiving all packets as fake also rises.
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Figure 3.25: False negative rate as the number of malicious nodes increases
In order to compare our approach with other works focusing on the same subject,
we have chosen the acknowledgement-based mechanisms [1] and the network coding-
based mechanism [2]. As comparison metrics, we have measured the node detection
ratio. In Figure 3.26, we can see our algorithm achieved a node detection accuracy
of 100% when the percentage of malicious nodes are less than 16%. This is because
there is a good chance for the legitimate node to receive legitimate packets and at
least one fake packet from each malicious node. When the number of malicious nodes
increases, the accuracy slightly starts to drop as the legitimate node may not receive
legitimate packets from source node and/or fake packets from malicious nodes may
be missed when two or more malicious nodes drop and inject packets into the same
packet sequence in the same path, as illustrated in Figures 3.3 and 3.4. However,
our algorithm results show the nodes detection accuracy does not drop below 92%,
even when 100% of intermediate nodes act as malicious nodes. This is due to the
low probability of having two or more malicious nodes dropping and injecting in the
same packet sequence in the same path. In addition, the probability of receiving
all packets as fake is also low, especially when the sender sends a large number of
packets. In the same Figure 3.26, we can see other approaches perform very poor
especially when the number of malicious nodes increase to 100% of the intermediate
nodes. In acknowledgement [1] and network coding [2] based mechanisms, destina-
tion nodes need to send the acknowledgment values to the source node through a
legitimate path which is difficult/impossible if the number of malicious nodes reach
100%. Malicious nodes can swap the destination acknowledgment values so it can go
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undetected, moreover this destination-based mechanism can detect malicious path
(not the malicious nodes) and has a high false positive rate.
Figure 3.26: Nodes detection accuracy, our approach with Epidemic vs ACK and network
coding techniques
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a novel attack and traceback mechanism against a
special type of packet dropping attack where the malicious nodes selectively drop
some packets (not all the packets) and instead of them inject fake packets so it can
maintain the original total number of packets that originated from the sender node.
We call this novel attack a Catabolism attack and we call our novel traceback mech-
anism against this attack Anabolism defence. Our proposed detection and traceback
mechanism is time-based and relies on the packet creation time (PCT) of each packet
and the contact time between nodes. There are two phases in our technique. The
first phase is to detect the fake packets, and the second phase is to find the mali-
cious nodes. We have tested our detection and traceback mechanism using both a
destination-based approach as well as a node-by-node-based approach. In the first
approach, destination nodes check the received packets to detect the attack and then
traceback the malicious nodes. In the node by node approach, each legitimate node
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checks the received packets to detect the attack, prevent fake packets propagation
and then traceback the malicious nodes. In terms of node detection accuracy, we have
compared our approach with one of the acknowledgement-based approaches [1] and
one of the network coding-based approaches [2] which are well known approaches in
the literature. Simulation results show node-by-node detection and traceback mech-
anism achieve higher detection accuracy than the destination node with significant
network traffic reduction. Other approaches perform very poorly especially when the
number of malicious nodes increase to 100% of the intermediate nodes. However,
the current approaches are based on the assumption that the malicious nodes have
the ability of dropping legitimate packets and instead of them inject fake packets
but has no ability to modify the packets contents including the packet creation time.
This assumption is not always realistic as the malicious node may have the ability to
write the time that it wants to be, so the injected packets will look like a legitimate
packets. Smart malicious nodes can write other times so they can point to another
legitimate nodes in the network to appear as malicious. It is possible for malicious
nodes to collude with each other with one malicious node dropping packets only while
another malicious node injects packets only. However, this kind of a “collusion” at-
tack and the nodes involved will always be detected by both the Merkle based and
Hash-chain based techniques. In the next chapter, Merkle tree techniques will be
used to deal with this security lack. Any legitimate nodes in the packets path can
detect the attack, stop fake packets propagation and then traceback the malicious
nodes.
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Anabolism Defence - Merkle Tree
Approach
In this chapter, we present a Merkle tree - based defence mechanism against Catabolism
Attacks. We also present a node by node traceback mechanism. In this approach,
each legitimate node can detect the attack and then traceback to the malicious nodes.
Simulation results indicate that we can achieve a very high accuracy and mitigate the
propagation of fake packets in the network. In this defence techniques we have two
phases. The first phase is to detect the attack, and the second phase is to find the
malicious nodes. We have compared our approach with one of the acknowledgement-
based approaches [1] and one of the network coding-based approaches [2] which are
well-known approaches in the literature. Simulation results show this robust mech-
anism achieves a very high accuracy and detection rate.
4.1 Introduction
As we mentioned in chapter 3, Catabolism attack is a combined packet dropping
and packet injection attack where malicious nodes selectively drop some packets and
instead of them inject fake packets in order to maintain the original total number of
packets originated from the sender node. The approaches in chapter 3 rely on the
packets creation time and nodes contact time with the assumption that the mali-
cious node(s) has no ability to modify the packet’s contents, including the packet’s
creation time and node’s contact times. This assumption is not always realistic as
104
Chapter 4 Anabolism Defence - Merkle Tree Approach
the malicious node may have the ability to write the time that it wants to ensure
that the injected packets appear to be legitimate packets. Smart malicious nodes
can also write incorrect node contact times in order to make legitimate nodes in the
network to appear malicious. One of the weaknesses of the PCT method is that
it is only effective if the attacker is weak (i.e., does not have the ability to modify
the packet contents). To address this weakness, we have proposed the use of the
Merkle-based or hash chain-based methodes. In this chapter, Merkle tree techniques
will be used to deal with these security issue. Based on the proposed method, we
will be able to detect the attack, stop fake packets propagation and then traceback
to the malicious nodes.
Contribution. The main contributions of this work are:
1. To identify a solid and powerful node by node detection and defence mechanism
using Merkle trees where the legitimate nodes can check all of the received
packets and then accurately detect the attack even when the malicious nodes
change the entire content of the packets.
2. To traceback and identify the malicious node(s) that triggered the Catabolism
attack.
4.2 Overview on the Merkle Tree Approach Mechanism
In the Merkle tree - based approach each legitimate node can run the algorithm to
detect the attack and traceback malicious nodes directly. Propagation of fake packets
through the network is prevented as the legitimate nodes can detect and drop fake
packets and directly classify a node as malicious.
4.2.1 Assumptions
In our approach we make the following two assumptions:
1. The sender node constructs a Merkle (or hash) tree to calculate the merkle
root value and then include it within each packet.
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2. Malicious nodes have the ability of dropping some legitimate packets and then
instead of them inject new fake packets with the ability of modifying entire
contents of packets including the merkle root value.
3. The sender and the destination nodes are legitimate.
In our defence approach we aim to not only detect the attack but also to identify
the malicious nodes that are the source(s) of the attack. In order to achieve this we
construct and use a Merkle tree. We provide the details of our defence and detection
method in the following section.
4.2.2 Merkle Based Defence and Traceback Method
As noted earlier, malicious nodes can drop one or more packets (but not all the
packets), and inject fake packet’s with recalculated parameters such as packets cre-
ation times, node’s contact times and hash values. As an example, Figure 4.1 shows
the packet’s path of message 1 ( c8 → t16 → t15 → w14 → c9), where node t15
drops one packet at time T= 860.2 and then injects a fake packet instead. In our
defence and traceback method our aim is to detect the packet injection and identify
the source of the injection.
Figure 4.1: Packet Dropping/Injecting at Malicious Node (t15)
The basis for our method is the construction of a Merkle tree. A merkle tree can be
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defined as a tree in which every leaf node is labelled with the hash of the labels of
its child nodes. To construct a Merkle tree in OppNets we adopt the following steps.
Given a set of packets to transmit, the source node calculates a secure hash for each
packet and then builds a Merkle tree using the resulting hashes to get a Merkle root
value for the message, as in Figure 4.2 where “H07” is the root of the message. The
source node will then inject the Merkle root value in each packet as shown in the
Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.2: Merkle tree, “H07” is the root value
Figure 4.3: Packets with Merkle root value “H07”
Our detection method (algorithm 2), is based on a node by node defence techniques.
It has three phases;
In phase one, the legitimate node calculates a secure hash for each received packet
to generate tree leaves, where:
H0 = h(P0),
H1 = h(P1),
H2 = h(P2),
H3 = h(P3), and so on.
In phase two, the legitimate node builds the tree by hashing the XOR value of the
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first leaf (H0) and the second leaf (H1), and continues to hash every two leaves in
their order from left to right until level one hashes are generated as follows:
H01 = h(H0 ⊕H1),
H23 = h(H2 ⊕H3),
H45 = h(H4 ⊕H5),
H67 = h(H6 ⊕H7), and so on.
Level two will be built based on level one values as;
H03 = h(H01 ⊕H23),
H47 = h(H45 ⊕H67).
The root value will be calculated based on level two values, as;
H07 = h(H03 ⊕H47).
At any level, if there is an odd number of hashes then we will hash the XOR value
of the last hash with itself.
In phase three, our algorithm compares the equality of the root values. If the new
recalculated root value equals the existing value that is already injected by the source
node in each packet header, then there is no attack, hence no malicious node. If the
two roots do not equal each other, then an attack has occurred and we can directly
classify the previous node as malicious.
As mentioned earlier, malicious nodes can drop some packets and instead of them
inject fake packets with new recalculated parameters or leaving some parameters
unchanged. Malicious nodes can leave the root value unchanged or even recalculate
a new root value and inject it with the new fake packets. For legitimate nodes to
be able to detect the attack and then traceback to the malicious nodes, we need to
achieve one of two sufficient conditions. These are:
i Legitimate nodes should receive at least one fake packet from any malicious node,
and at least one legitimate packet (Figure 4.4(a)) or
ii At least one fake packet from two or more malicious nodes (Figure 4.4(b)).
Under both these conditions when a legitimate node builds a new Merkle tree to
get the root value it will not match with the existing root values. In this case,
a legitimate node will classify the previous node as malicious directly. In case we
have two or more malicious nodes sending to each other as in Figure 4.5, then the
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Algorithm 2 - Detecting fake packets and malicious nodes
1: READ: packets
2: n = numberOfPackets
3: Phase 1: Hashing each packet
4: For all packets
5: hi = h(Pi)
6: Phase 2: Build tree and compute Merkle root
7: For all hashes in each level
8: if numberOfhashes = even then
9: hij = h(hi ⊕ hi+1)
10: else
11: if !lastHash then
12: hij = h(hi ⊕ hi+1)
13: else
14: hij = h(hi ⊕ hi)
15: end if
16: if level = last then
17: rootValue = hij
18: end if
19: end if
20: Phase 3: Compare Merkle root values
21: For all packets
22: READ: rootV alue′(i)
23: if rootValue = rootV alue′(i) then
24: No attack, No malicious nodes, Exit
25: else
26: Attack detected
27: Previous node is malicious
28: maliciousNodesCounter++
29: end if
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legitimate node will classify only one of them as malicious, that is the previous
node (w14) and we will miss other malicious nodes (t15) as we do not have a clear
trace from each malicious nodes and we cannot distinguish between the correct and
the fake Merkle root value. However, as our algorithm is based on node by node
detection, we will have a high probability to detect the malicious nodes in another
path especially when the percentage of the malicious nodes is not high.
Figure 4.4: Fake packets conditions that we need to achieve
Figure 4.5: Two malicious nodes sending to each other in one message path
4.3 Mathematical Model
The aim of the mathematical model is to derive a formula for the probability of
achieving the sufficient condition leading to malicious node detection. The sufficient
condition is: receiving at least 1 fake packet from any malicious node, and receiving
at least 1 legitimate packet or at least 1 fake packet from a different malicious node.
We first introduce the notations used.
• n be total number of hops;
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• m be the number of malicious hops, where m < n;
• k be the number of packets;
• p the probability that a packet be attacked at a malicious hop; and
• Aj be the event that exactly j packets survived all malicious hops, where j <
k.
Let β be the probability that there exists at least one fake packet. Obviously,
β = 1− there exists no fake packets
Given p, the probability of a packet surviving a malicious hop is q = 1 − p. Let IP
be the probability that a packet will survive all malicious hops, i.e.
IP = qm.
The probability of having all k packets not fake is
IPk = qmk,
and thus:
β = 1− qmk =⇒ 1− β = qmk.
This means that
log(1− β) = mk log q =⇒ k = log(1− β)
m log q
=
log(1− β)
m log(1− p) .
Now, the probability that a packet be attacked at one or more of the hops, IQ, is
given by:
IQ = 1− IP
The probability of Aj, that is, exactly j out of k packets survived all malicious hops,
is:
Pr(Aj) =
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j
As we wish to have at least one packet surviving all malicious hops, and at least one
packet that does not, (i.e., at most k − 1 packets survives all malicious hops), the
probability of such an event is:
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k−1∑
j=1
Pr(Aj) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j
Now, the probability that none of the k packets survived all m malicious hops, i.e.,
all k packets are fake, is given as: IQk.
The probability of all k fake packets were attacked at one particular malicious hop is
(1/m)k. As there are m malicious hops, the probability that all k fake packets were
attacked at the same malicious hop is 1
mk−1 . Hence, the probability that at least two
of the fake packets were attacked at two different malicious hops is given by:
1− 1
mk−1
.
Therefore, the probability of none of the k packets survived all m malicious hops and
that at least two of the fake packets were attacked at two different malicious hops is
given by:
IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
.
In summary, the probability that there is at least 1 fake packet from any malicious
node, and that there are at least 1 legitimate packet or at least 1 fake packet from
a different malicious node, is given by:
k−1∑
j=1
Pr(Aj) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j + IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
,
which is really just one minus the probability of none survived, and that all k fake
packets were attacked at the same malicious node.
Hence, the probability is given by:
1− IQ
k
mk−1
− IPK .
Notice that
1 =
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j = IP0IQk +
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j + IPkIQ0.
As
IQk = IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
+
IQk
mk−1
,
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we have that
1 = IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
+
IQk
mk−1
+
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j + IPk.
The probability that there is at least 1 fake packet from any malicious node, and
that there are at least 1 legitimate packet or at least 1 fake packet from a different
malicious node, is given by:
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j + IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
= 1− IQ
k
mk−1
− IPK .
Figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8 show the probability of receiving at least one fake packet
(β) in paths with 1, 2 and 5 malicious nodes. When we have a large number of
malicious nodes, the probability of detecting the attack or the malicious nodes will
be high as we have a good chance of receiving at least one fake packet and at least
one legitimate packet or another fake packet from a different malicious node. The
probability of detecting malicious nodes is also affected by the number of packets
sent. When the number of packets sent increases, the probability of receiving fake
packets will increase and then enable us to achieve a high detecting probability.
Figure 4.6: Probability of receiving at least one fake packet (β) in a path with 1 malicious
nodes
Figures 4.9, 4.10 and 4.11 show the relationship between the number of packets and
the probability of at least one packet being changed (β) across paths with different
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Figure 4.7: Probability of receiving at least one fake packet (β) in a path with 2 malicious
nodes
number of malicious nodes. When the probability p of a packet being changed by a
malicious nodes is low, we need to send a large number of packets k so we can achieve
a high probability (0.85 - 0.95) of receiving at least one fake packet in order to achieve
a high accuracy of detecting a malicious node. When the number of malicious nodes
is high along the packet path, we do not need to send a high number of packets as
we can have a good chance of receiving fake packets from the malicious nodes in the
packet’s path.
4.4 Simulation Settings
To test our algorithm, we implemented a scenario in the ONE simulator [70] using
the Epidemic, PRoPHET, Spray and Wait MaxProp and First Contact protocols.
The simulation was defined to last for 1 hour, with 0.5 seconds of update intervals.
Bluetooth was chosen for connectivity with a transmit range of 10 meters for node
radio devices, and transmit speed’s of 1000 kbps. There are 35 active nodes composed
of cars, trams and pedestrians. Pedestrians and cars have up to 50 MB of RAM for
storage. Pedestrians move at random speeds between 1 and 1.5 m/s, cars drive only
on roads and move at speeds between 10 − 50 km/h, with wait times of 0 − 120
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Figure 4.8: Probability of receiving at least one fake packet (β) in a path with 5 malicious
nodes
seconds. MapBasedMovement is used for pedestrians and cars, with a network area
of 4500m2×3400m2. Nodes move randomly on roads and walkways with a movement
warm-up for 10 seconds. There are 3 groups of trams, with 2 trams in each group.
MapRouteMovement is used for trams to follow a constructed tram line. Trams drive
at speeds of 7− 10 m/s with a wait time of 10− 30 seconds at each configured stop.
In addition to the Bluetooth interface, a group of trams use the high speed interface
with a transmit range of 1000 meters and a transmit speed of 10mbps. Messages are
generated every 1 to 5 seconds per node, with message sizes between 50kb and 100kb,
and a message time to live of 5 hours. We used the simulator’s output as a dataset,
and randomly corrupted the dataset based on the number of malicious nodes. We
then fed the corrupted dataset to our algorithm. We also ran the simulator for
an average of 30 times to represent each point on our graphs. Two programs were
written using C++. The first program (total of 353 lines) read the dataset file
and then corrupted it by making legitimate nodes malicious by changing the packet
creation time for randomly chosen packets and nodes. The second program (total
of 816 lines) implements the algorithm, and begins by taking as input the output
dataset file generated by program 1. The second program is run to get the algorithm
results of the metrics calculations.
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Figure 4.9: Number of packets needed to achieve β = (0.85,0.90,0.95) in a path with 1
malicious nodes
4.4.1 Simulation Results and Analysis
The metrics used for evaluating our algorithm were:
1. Malicious node detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of detected
malicious nodes to the total number of actual malicious nodes.
2. False negative rate: The percentage of malicious nodes that have been incor-
rectly classified as a legitimate nodes.
In our scenario, we have assumed the source nodes are not malicious as these nodes
will generate the messages and then hand them to the neighbour nodes. Neighbour
nodes can be malicious or legitimate. However, when the legitimate nodes run the
algorithm, they should be able to accurately distinguish between a malicious and a
legitimate sender. In the catabolism attack, the malicious node drops some of the
packets, and instead of them injects fake packets. Dropping and injecting can occur
over one or more nodes along packets’ path.
In Figure 4.12, we can observe that our algorithm achieves a node detection accuracy
of 100% when the percentage of malicious nodes is less than 10%. This is because
there is a good chance for a legitimate node to detect the difference between the
existing Merkle root value and the new recalculated value as well as the probability
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Figure 4.10: Number of packets needed to achieve β = (0.85,0.90,0.95) in a path with 2
malicious nodes
of having more than one malicious node sending to each other in the same path
will be low. When the number of malicious nodes increases, the accuracy slightly
starts to drop as we may have two or more malicious nodes sending to each other
as illustrated in Figures 4.5. However, our algorithm results show the malicious
nodes detection accuracy does not drop below 91% for Epidemic protocol, 90% for
PRoPHET protocol, 89% for Spray and Wait protocol, 88% for MaxProp protocol
and 87% for First Contact protocol, even when 100% of intermediate nodes act as
malicious nodes. This is due to the sufficient number of short paths where we can
detect the malicious nodes directly without malicious nodes coming in to contact
with other malicious nodes.
Epidemic [24] and PRoPHET [59] achieved the highest detection accuracy because
both of them replicate multiple copies of a message in the network. In this case, nodes
will have good participation in the network and our algorithm has more opportunity
to detect them. Spray and Wait [25] is lower in terms of detection accuracy as in
this protocol the source node sprays a predefined number of copies to the network,
and then nodes do direct delivery to the destination. MaxProp [66] is even lower, as
MaxProb has a prioritization schema for both the schedule of packets transmitted
and dropped due to the assumption of limited storage and bandwidth and the use of
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Figure 4.11: Number of packets needed to achieve β = (0.85,0.90,0.95) in a path with 5
malicious nodes
broadcasted acknowledgments to update the encountered nodes about the delivered
messages. First Contact algorithm (FC) [36], achieves the lowest detection accuracy
as the message is forwarded to the next hop randomly. The message stays in the
buffer and gets forwarded when the node carrying it encounters the first node it
meets even when it has zero knowledge about it.
Figure 4.12: Node detection accuracy for different OppNets protocols
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Figure 4.13, shows our detection accuracy based on the mobility types. We have
used Epidemic protocol with different mobility types (Trams, Cars and Pedestrians).
Trams achieved very good accuracy (between 93% - 100%) due to its features such
as a high speed interface and mobility speed. Cars achieve better accuracy (between
88% - 99%) than pedestrians (between 70% - 98%), because cars have a higher
mobility speed compared to pedestrians, this results in achieving a better message
distribution.
Figure 4.13: Node detection accuracy based on the mobility of nodes
In order to compare our approach with other works focusing on the same subject,
we have chosen the acknowledgement-based mechanisms [1] and the network coding-
based mechanism [2]. As comparison metrics, we have measured the node detection
accuracy.
In Figures 4.14, 4.15, 4.16, 4.17 and 4.18 we can see other approaches perform very
poorly especially when the number of malicious nodes increases to 100% of the inter-
mediate nodes. In acknowledgement [1] and network coding [2] based mechanisms
destination nodes need to send an acknowledgment value to the source node through
a legitimate path which is difficult/impossible if the number of malicious nodes reach
100%. Malicious nodes can modify the destination acknowledgments values so it can
go undetected. Moreover this destination based mechanism can only detect a mali-
cious path (not the malicious nodes) and has a high false positive rate.
119
Chapter 4 Anabolism Defence - Merkle Tree Approach
Figure 4.14: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach (Epidemic)
vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
Figure 4.15: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach
(PRoPHET) vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
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Figure 4.16: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach (Spray and
Wait) vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
Figure 4.17: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach (MaxProp)
vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
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Figure 4.18: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach (First Con-
tact) vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
As we can observe from Figure 4.5, we may miss some malicious nodes (t15) when
we have more than one malicious node sending to each other as we have no clear
trace from each malicious node and we cannot distinguish between the correct and
the fake Merkle root value.
In Figure 4.19, we can see a zero false negative rate for our algorithm when we have
less than 15% malicious nodes. This is because of the small number of malicious
nodes and the probability of having more than one malicious nodes sending to each
other will be very low. The false negative rate starts to increase slightly till it reaches
a maximum of 8%, when the number of malicious nodes increase, as the probability
of having more than one malicious node in the same packet’s path will increase.
As we mentioned in our simulation setting section, we run the stimulation for 1
hour. Figure 4.20 shows the nodes detection accuracy percentage during simulation
time (1 hour) with different percentage of malicious nodes. We can achieve 100%
detection accuracy at the end of simulation when the percentage of the malicious
nodes is less than 10%. The detection accuracy slightly starts to drop when the
percentage of malicious nodes increase in the networks. However, this accuracy does
not drop below 91% even when 100% of the intermediate nodes act as malicious.
The reason behind this is the assumption that the source and destination nodes are
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Figure 4.19: False negative rate as the number of malicious nodes increases
legitimate so they can run our algorithm. In any stage, when we have a two-hop
path the legitimate node or destination node can clearly classify the intermediate
node whether it is legitimate or malicious. This is why at the end of simulation we
will have clear image about the legitimacy of the network nodes and then get a very
high detection accuracy.
Figure 4.20: Nodes detection accuracy percentage vs. Simulation time
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4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we present a Merkle tree-based defence mechanism against the
Catabolism Attack. Our detection and traceback mechanism in this method is node
by node based, where each legitimate node can detect the attack and then traceback
to the malicious nodes. Fake packets propagation in the network is mitigated. This
mechanism also has a very high accuracy and relies on the construction of the Merkle
tree. There are two phases in our technique. The first phase is to detect the attack,
and the second phase is to traceback the malicious nodes. We have compared our
approach with one of the acknowledgement-based approaches and one of the network
coding-based approaches which are well known approaches in the literature. Simu-
lation results show that this mechanism achieves a very high accuracy and detection
rate. However, in Merkle tree techniques, legitimate nodes need more process time
to hash all the packets and then construct Merkle tree. For example, if we have a
message with 4 packets we will need 7 hashes to build the tree in order to obtain the
root value. In the next chapter, hash chain techniques will be used to deal with this
issue. Legitimate nodes will need only one hash for each packet to build the chain.
Any legitimate nodes in the packets’ path can detect the attack, stop fake packets’
propagation and then traceback the malicious nodes.
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In this chapter, we present a hash chain based defence mechanism against Catabolism
Attacks. We also present a node by node traceback mechanism. In this approach,
each legitimate node can detect the attack and then traceback to the malicious nodes.
Simulation results indicate that we can achieve a very high accuracy and mitigate
the propagation of the fake packets in the network. In this defence technique we
have two phases. The first phase is to detect the attack, and the second phase is to
find the malicious nodes. Our hash chain-based technique addresses the processing
overhead with Merkle trees by reducing the processing needed to build the hash
chain. We have compared our approach with one of the acknowledgement-based
approaches [1] and one of the network coding-based approaches [2] which are well
known approaches in the literature. Simulation results show this robust mechanism
achieves a very high accuracy and detection rate.
5.1 Introduction
As we mentioned in chapter 3, in a Catabolism attack, malicious nodes selectively
drop some packets and instead of them inject new fake packets in order to maintain
the original total number of packets originated from the sender node.
In chapter 4, Merkle tree techniques are used to enable any legitimate node on the
packets’ path to detect the attack, mitigate the propagation of the fake packets and
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then traceback to the malicious nodes. However, in Merkle tree techniques, nodes
need more processing time as they need to hash all the packets and then construct
a Merkle tree. For example, if we have a message with 4 packets then we will need
7 hashes to build the tree and then get the root value. In this chapter hash chain
techniques will be used to deal with this issue. Nodes will need less processing time
as they will need only 4 hashes for the same message of 4 packets. Moreover any
legitimate nodes on the packet’s path can detect the attack, mitigate the propagation
of the fake packets and then traceback to the malicious nodes.
Contribution. The main contributions of this work are:
1. To identify an efficient and low cost node by node detection and defence mech-
anism using hash chain technique where the legitimate nodes can check all
of the received packets and then accurately detect the attack even when the
malicious nodes change the entire content of the packets.
2. To traceback and identify the malicious nodes that triggered the attack.
5.2 Overview on the Hash Chain Approach Mechanism
In the hash chain approach, each legitimate node can run the algorithm to detect
the attack and traceback the malicious nodes. Propagation of fake packets through
the network is prevented as the legitimate nodes can detect and drop fake packets
and directly classify node as malicious. Our detection technique is very powerful
and accurate. It is relies on the hash chain mechanism. There are two parts in our
technique:
1. Detect the attack: When the packets reach any legitimate node, the node can
recalculate the hash chain and compare it with the existing chain values that
are already included by the sender in each packet.
2. Traceback malicious nodes: Based on the outcome of the first stage, the legit-
imate nodes can traceback and find the malicious node.
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5.2.1 Assumptions
In our approach we make the following two assumptions:
1. The sender node should use the hash chain technique to calculate the hash
chain values and then include them with each packet.
2. Malicious nodes have the ability of dropping some legitimate packets and then
injecting new fake packets instead with the ability of modifying entire contents
of packets including the hash chain values.
3. The sender and the destination nodes are legitimate.
5.2.2 Attack and Defence Scenario
In a Catabolism attack, malicious nodes can drop one or more packets (not all the
packets), and instead of them, inject fake packets. Dropping and injecting can be
done by one or more malicious nodes along the packets’ path. The legitimate nodes
check to detect the attack, and then traceback to the malicious nodes. Figure 5.1
shows the packets’ path of message 1 ( c8 → t16 → t15 → w14 → c9), where node
t15 drops one packet at time T= 860.2 and then injects a fake packet instead.
Figure 5.1: Packet Dropping/Injecting at Malicious Node (t15)
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Figure 5.2: Packets with hash chain
In our defence technique, we require the sender node to calculate a hash chain based
on the packet’s content and then inject the hash value in to the packet’s header.
Figure 5.2 shows the construction of the packets with the hash chain values, where
the hash chain values are calculated as below:
h1 = h(P1 ⊕ hn ⊕ Pn ⊕ h2 ⊕ P2)
h2 = h(P2 ⊕ h1 ⊕ P1 ⊕ h3 ⊕ P3)
h3 = h(P3 ⊕ h2 ⊕ P2 ⊕ h4 ⊕ P4)
hn = h(Pn ⊕ h(n−1) ⊕ P(n−1) ⊕ h1 ⊕ P1)
In general for i <> 1, n:
hi = h(Pi ⊕ h(i−1) ⊕ P(i−1) ⊕ h(i+1) ⊕ P(i+1))
Malicious nodes can drop some packets and inject fake packets with existing or
recalculated values including the hash chain values. However, when the legitimate
nodes recalculate the hash chain again, it will not match the fake or existing one.
Legitimate nodes have their own recalculation techniques. They will use the existing
hash values rather than calculate totally new hashes.
For example, if a malicious node drops/injects packet two (P2) it will either leave
the hash value h2 unchanged or recalculate and inject new h2.
In the case of leaving h2 unchanged, the legitimate node will calculate and verify the
hash values as follows:
i . h1 = existing (legitimate) P1 ⊕ existing (unchanged)hn ⊕ existing (legitimate)
Pn ⊕ existing (unchanged)h2 ⊕ existing (fake) P2; this will result in a new h1
which does not equal the existing h1. Therefore, the legitimate node will classify
P1 as the start of the chain break.
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ii . h2 = existing (fake) P2 ⊕ existing (unchanged)h1 ⊕ existing (legitimate) P1 ⊕
existing (unchanged)h3 ⊕ existing (legitimate) P3; this will result in a new h2,
which is not equal to the existing h2. Therefore, the legitimate node will classify
P2 as a part of chain break.
iii . h3 = existing (legitimate) P3 ⊕ existing (unchanged)h2 ⊕ existing (fake) P2 ⊕
existing (unchanged)h4 ⊕ existing (legitimate) P4; this will result in a new h3,
which is not equal to the existing h3. Therefore, the legitimate node will classify
P3 as the end of the chain break.
iv . hn = existing (legitimate) Pn ⊕ existing (unchanged)h(n−1) ⊕ existing (legiti-
mate) P(n−1) ⊕ existing (unchanged)h1 ⊕ existing (legitimate) P1; this will result
in a new hn, which is equal to the existing hn. Therefore, the legitimate node
will classify Pn as a normal packet.
In the case of a new recalculated value of h2, the legitimate node will calculate the
hash values as follows:
i . h1 = existing (legitimate) P1 ⊕ existing (unchanged)hn ⊕ existing (legitimate)
Pn ⊕ existing (recalculated)h2 ⊕ existing (fake) P2; this will result in a new h1,
which is not equal to the existing h1. Therefore, the legitimate node will classify
P1 as the start of the chain break.
ii . h2 = existing (fake) P2 ⊕ existing (unchanged)h1 ⊕ existing (legitimate) P1 ⊕
existing (unchanged)h3 ⊕ existing (legitimate) P3; this will result in a new h2,
which is equal to the existing h2 as malicious node already recalculated h2 using
same manner. Therefore, the legitimate node will classify P2 as a normal packet.
iii . h3 = existing (legitimate) P3 ⊕ existing (recalculated)h2 ⊕ existing (fake) P2
⊕ existing (unchanged)h4 ⊕ existing (legitimate) P4; this will result in a new h3,
which is not equal to the existing h3. Therefore, the legitimate node will classify
P3 as the end of the chain break.
iv . hn = existing (legitimate) Pn ⊕ existing (unchanged)h(n−1) ⊕ existing (legiti-
mate) P(n−1) ⊕ existing (unchanged)h1 ⊕ existing (legitimate) P1; this will result
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in a new hn, which is equal to the existing hn. Therefore, the legitimate node
will classify Pn as a normal packet.
In our hash chain based defence technique, we can classify a previous node as mali-
cious as long as we receive its packets with one or more chain breaks. However, we
may miss some malicious nodes if we have two or more malicious nodes send to each
other as in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Path with two malicious nodes sending to each other
In our defence, we used hash chain technique where the sender node should use
a secure hash algorithm “SHA-1” for the hashing. Sender node includes the hash
chain value in each packet as in Figure 5.2. Our technique (algorithm 3) is based on
a node by node defence so when all the packets reach other legitimate nodes, these
nodes start calculating and comparing the hash chain for each packet again based on
the existing chain values. Legitimate node will then check whether this hash chain
values are equal to the existing values in each packets. If all values are equal then,
the sender node is legitimate and we confirm the absence of an attack. If the values
are not equal, then we have a break chain and the sending node will be classified as
a malicious node.
Once legitimate nodes detect differences in the hash chain values then it will classify
the previous node as malicious directly. In case we have two or more malicious nodes
sending to each other, then we will classify only one of them as malicious, i.e., the
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Algorithm 3 - Anabolism defence
1: READ: numberOfPacket
2: numberOfPacket = n
3: For all packets
4: READ: hi
5: if i = 1 then
6: h′i = h(P1 ⊕ hn ⊕ Pn ⊕ h2 ⊕ P2)
7: Go to 14
8: end if
9: if i = n then
10: h′i = h(Pn ⊕ h(n−1) ⊕ P(n−1) ⊕ h1 ⊕ P1)
11: Go to 14
12: end if
13: h′i = h(Pi ⊕ h(i−1) ⊕ P(i−1) ⊕ h(i+1) ⊕ P(i+1))
14: if h′i = hi then
15: No chain break
16: No malicious nodes, Exit
17: else
18: Chain break
19: Previous node is malicious
20: maliciousNodesCounter++
21: end if
131
Chapter 5 Anabolism Defence - Hash Chain Approach
previous node and we may miss other malicious nodes as we have no clear trace from
each malicious node. However, as our algorithm is based on node by node detection,
we will always have high probability to detect the malicious nodes in another path(s)
especially when the percentage of the malicious nodes is not high. In our simulation,
we always have enough paths to detect the malicious nodes.
5.3 Mathematical Model
The aim of the mathematical model is to derive a formula for the probability of
achieving the sufficient condition leading to malicious node detection. The sufficient
condition is: receiving at least 1 fake packet from any malicious node, and receiving
at least 1 legitimate packet or at least 1 fake packet from a different malicious node.
We first introduce the notation used.
• n be total number of hops;
• m be the number of malicious hops, where m < n;
• k be the number of packets;
• p the probability that a packet be attacked at a malicious hop; and
• Aj be the event that exactly j packets survived all malicious hops, where j <
k.
Let β be the probability that there exists at least one fake packet. Obviously,
β = 1− there exists no fake packets
Given p, the probability of a packet surviving a malicious hop is q = 1 − p. Let IP
be the probability that a packet will survive all malicious hops, i.e.
IP = qm.
The probability of having all k packets not fake is
IPk = qmk,
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and thus:
β = 1− qmk =⇒ 1− β = qmk.
This means that
log(1− β) = mk log q =⇒ k = log(1− β)
m log q
=
log(1− β)
m log(1− p) .
Now, the probability that a packet be attacked at one or more of the hops, IQ, is
given by:
IQ = 1− IP
The probability of Aj, that is, exactly j out of k packets survived all malicious hops,
is:
Pr(Aj) =
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j
As we wish to have at least one packet surviving all malicious hops, and at least one
packet that does not, (i.e., at most k − 1 packets survives all malicious hops), the
probability of such an event is:
k−1∑
j=1
Pr(Aj) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j
Now, the probability that none of the k packets survived all m malicious hops, i.e.,
all k packets are fake, is given as: IQk.
The probability of all k fake packets were attacked at one particular malicious hop is
(1/m)k. As there are m malicious hops, the probability that all k fake packets were
attacked at the same malicious hop is 1
mk−1 . Hence, the probability that at least two
of the fake packets were attacked at two different malicious hops is given by:
1− 1
mk−1
.
Therefore, the probability of none of the k packets survived all m malicious hops and
that at least two of the fake packets were attacked at two different malicious hops is
given by:
IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
.
In summary, the probability that there is at least 1 fake packet from any malicious
node, and that there are at least 1 legitimate packet or at least 1 fake packet from
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a different malicious node, is given by:
k−1∑
j=1
Pr(Aj) =
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j + IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
,
which is really just one minus the probability of none survived, and that all k fake
packets were attacked at the same malicious node.
Hence, the probability is given by:
1− IQ
k
mk−1
− IPK .
Notice that
1 =
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j = IP0IQk +
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j + IPkIQ0.
As
IQk = IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
+
IQk
mk−1
,
we have that
1 = IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
+
IQk
mk−1
+
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j + IPk.
The probability that there is at least 1 fake packet from any malicious node, and
that there are at least 1 legitimate packet or at least 1 fake packet from a different
malicious node, is given by:
k−1∑
j=1
(
k
j
)
IPj IQk−j + IQk
(
1− 1
mk−1
)
= 1− IQ
k
mk−1
− IPK .
Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 show the probability of receiving at least one fake packet
(β) in paths with 1, 2 and 5 malicious nodes. When we have a large number of
malicious nodes, the probability of detecting the attack or the malicious nodes will
be high as we have a good chance of receiving at least one fake packet’s and at least
one legitimate packet or another fake packet from a different malicious node. The
probability of detecting malicious nodes is also affected by the number of packets
sent. When the number of packets sent increases, the probability of receiving fake
packets will increase and then enable us to achieve a high detecting probability.
Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 show the relationship between the number of packets and
the probability of at least one packet being changed (β) across paths with different
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Figure 5.4: Probability of receiving at least one fake packet (β) in a path with 1 malicious
nodes
Figure 5.5: Probability of receiving at least one fake packet (β) in a path with 2 malicious
nodes
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Figure 5.6: Probability of receiving at least one fake packet (β) in a path with 5 malicious
nodes
number of malicious nodes. When the probability p of a packet being changed by
a malicious nodes is low, we need to send a large number of packets k so we can
achieve a high probability (0.85 - 0.95) of receiving at least one fake packet in order
to achieve a high accuracy of detecting a malicious nodes. When the number of
malicious nodes is high in the packet path, we do not need to send a high number of
packets as we can have a good chance of receiving fake packets from any malicious
nodes in the packets path.
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Figure 5.7: Number of packets needed to achieve β = (0.85,0.90,0.95) in a path with 1
malicious nodes
Figure 5.8: Number of packets needed to achieve β = (0.85,0.90,0.95) in a path with 2
malicious nodes
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Figure 5.9: Number of packets needed to achieve β = (0.85,0.90,0.95) in a path with 5
malicious nodes
5.4 Simulation Settings
To test our algorithm, we implemented a scenario in the ONE simulator [70] using
the Epidemic, PRoPHET, Spray and Wait MaxProp and First Contact protocols.
The simulation was defined to last for 1 hour, with 0.5 seconds of update intervals.
Bluetooth was chosen for connectivity with a transmit range of 10 meters for node
radio devices, and transmit speeds of 1000 kbps. There are 35 active nodes composed
of cars, trams and pedestrians. Pedestrians and cars have up to 50 MB of RAM for
storage. Pedestrians move at random speeds between 1 and 1.5 m/s, cars drive only
on roads and move at speeds between 10 − 50 km/h, with wait times of 0 − 120
seconds. MapBasedMovement is used for pedestrians and cars, with a network area
of 4500m2×3400m2. Nodes move randomly on roads and walkways with a movement
warm-up for 10 seconds. There are 3 groups of trams, with 2 trams in each group.
MapRouteMovement is used for trams to follow a constructed tram line. Trams drive
at speeds of 7− 10 m/s with a wait time of 10− 30 seconds at each configured stop.
In addition to the Bluetooth interface, a group of trams use the high speed interface
with a transmit range of 1000 meters and a transmit speed of 10mbps. Messages are
generated every 1 to 5 seconds per node, with message sizes between 50kb and 100kb,
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and a message time to live of 5 hours. We used the simulator’s output as a dataset,
and randomly corrupted the dataset based on the number of malicious nodes. We
then fed the corrupted dataset to our algorithm. We also ran the simulator for
an average of 30 times to represent each point on our graphs. Two programs were
written using C++. The first program (total of 353 lines) read the dataset file
and then corrupted it by making legitimate nodes malicious by changing the packet
creation time for randomly chosen packets and nodes. The second program (total
of 816 lines) implements the algorithm, and begins by taking as input the output
dataset file generated by program 1. The second program is run to get the algorithm
results of the metrics calculations.
5.4.1 Simulation Results and Analysis
We have used two metrics for evaluating our algorithm,
1. Malicious node detection accuracy: The ratio of the total number of detected
malicious nodes to the total number of actual malicious nodes.
2. False negative rate: The percentage of malicious nodes that have been incor-
rectly classified as legitimate nodes.
In our scenario, we have assumed the source nodes are not malicious as these nodes
will generate the messages and then hand them to the neighbour nodes. Neighbour
nodes can be malicious or legitimate. However, when the legitimate nodes run the
algorithm, it will accurately distinguish between the malicious and the legitimate
sender.
In Figure 5.10, we can see our algorithm achieved a node detection accuracy of 100%
when the percentage of malicious nodes is less than 10%. This is because there
is a good chance for a legitimate node to detect hash chain breaks as well as the
probability of having more than one malicious node sending to each other in the
same packets path will be low. When the number of malicious nodes increases, the
accuracy slightly starts to drop as we may have two or more malicious nodes sending
to each other as illustrated in Figures 5.3. However, our algorithm results show
that the Node detection accuracy does not drop below 91% for Epidemic protocol,
90% for PRoPHET protocol, 89% for Spray and Wait protocol, 88% for MaxProp
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protocol and 87% for First Contact protocol, even when 100% of intermediate nodes
act as malicious nodes. This is due to the enough short paths where we can detect
the malicious nodes directly.
Epidemic [24] and PRoPHET [59] achieved the highest detection accuracy, because
both of them replicate multiple copies of a message in the network. In this case,
nodes will have good participation in the network and then our algorithm can detect
them. Spray and Wait [25] is the lower in terms of detection accuracy, as in this
protocol the source node sprays a predefined number of copies to the network, and
then nodes do direct delivery to the destination. MaxProp [66] is even lower, as
MaxProp has a prioritization schema for both the schedule of packets transmitted
and dropped due to the assumption of limited storage and bandwidth and the use of
broadcasted acknowledgments to update the encountered nodes about the delivered
messages. First Contact algorithm (FC) [36], achieved the lowest detection accuracy
as the message is forwarded to the next hop randomly. The message stays in the
buffer and gets forwarded when the node carrying it encounters the first node it
meets even when it has zero knowledge about it.
Figure 5.10: Nodes detection accuracy for different OppNets protocols
Figure 5.11, shows our detection accuracy based on the mobility types. We have
used Epidemic protocol with different mobility types (Trams, Cars and Pedestrians).
Trams achieved very good accuracy (between 93% - 100%) due to their features
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such as high speed interface and mobility speed. Cars achieved better accuracy
(between 88% - 99%) than pedestrians (between 70% - 98%) because, cars have a
good opportunity to distribute messages due to their speed feature.
Figure 5.11: Nodes detection accuracy based on the mobility of nodes
In order to compare our approach with other works focusing on the same subject,
we have chosen the acknowledgement-based mechanisms [1] and the network coding-
based mechanism [2]. As comparison metrics, we have measured the node detection
accuracy. In Figures 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 and 5.16 , we can see other approaches per-
form very poorly especially when the number of malicious nodes increase to 100% of
the intermediate nodes. In acknowledgement [1] and network coding [2] based mech-
anisms destination node needs to send acknowledgment values to the source node
through a legitimate path which is difficult/impossible if the number of malicious
nodes reach 100%. Also, malicious nodes can swap the destination acknowledgment
values so it can go undetected. Moreover this destination-based mechanism can
detect malicious paths (not the malicious nodes) and has a high false positive rate.
As we can see in Figure 5.3, we may miss some malicious nodes (t15) when we have
more than one malicious node sending to each other in the same packet’s path as we
have no clear trace from each malicious node.
In Figure 5.17, we can see a zero false negative rate for our algorithm when we have
less than 15% malicious nodes. This is because of the small number of malicious
nodes and the probability of having more than one malicious nodes sending to each
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Figure 5.12: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach (Epidemic)
vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
Figure 5.13: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach
(PRoPHET) vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
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Figure 5.14: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach (Spray and
Wait) vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
Figure 5.15: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach (MaxProp)
vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
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Figure 5.16: Comparison of malicious node detection accuracy: Our approach (First Con-
tact) vs. ACK [1] vs. Network coding techniques [2]
other will be very low. The false negative rate starts to increase slightly till it reaches
a maximum of 8%, when the number of malicious nodes increase, as the probability
of having more than one malicious nodes in the same packets path will increase.
As we mentioned in our simulation setting section, we run the stimulation for 1
hour. Figure 5.18 shows the nodes detection accuracy percentage during simulation
time (1 hour) with different percentage of malicious nodes. We can achieve 100%
detection accuracy at the end of simulation when the percentage of the malicious
Figure 5.17: False negative rate as the number of malicious nodes increases
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nodes is less than 10%. The detection accuracy slightly starts to drop when the
percentage of malicious nodes increase in the networks. However, this accuracy does
not drop below 91% even when 100% of the intermediate nodes act as malicious.
The reason behind this is the assumption of the source and destination nodes as
legitimate so they can run our algorithm. In any stage, when we have a two hop
path the legitimate node or destination node can clearly classify the intermediate
node whether it is legitimate or malicious. This is why at the end of the simulation
we will have a clear image about the legitimacy of the network nodes and observe a
very high detection accuracy.
Figure 5.18: Nodes detection accuracy percentage vs. Simulation time
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we present a hash chain-based defence mechanism against the Catabolism
Attack. Our detection and traceback mechanism at this stage is node by node based,
where each legitimate node can detect the attack and then traceback to the mali-
cious nodes. The propagation of the fake packets in the network has been mitigated.
This technique has a very high accuracy and relies on the construction of the hash
chains. There are two phases in our technique. The first phase is to detect the
attack, and the second phase is to traceback to the malicious nodes. Legitimate
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nodes spend less processing time for the hash chain technique when compared to the
processing time needed to build Merkle trees. We have compared our approach with
one of the acknowledgement based approaches and one of the network coding based
approaches which are well known approaches in the literature. Any legitimate nodes
in the packet’s path can detect the attack, mitigate the fake packets propagation
and then traceback to the malicious nodes. Simulation results show this mecha-
nism achieves a very high accuracy and detection rate. In our proposed methods,
the time-based approach has the lowest cost but cannot provide security guarantees
with strong adversaries. Our Merkle based method will incur the highest cost due to
cost of the construction of the Merkle tree making our Hash chain based approach
the best suited for resource-constrained networks as it is able to achieve an equivalent
accuracy level to the Merkle based method but with a reduced cost. We also have
the option in severely resource-constrained networks of employing destination-based
detection, which can further lower cost.
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Conclusion and Future Works
This chapter summarizes the main contributions of this thesis “Defence and Trace-
back Mechanisms in Opportunistic Wireless Networks”, provides an overall conclu-
sion and points out the directions for further research.
6.1 Summary of Thesis
Opportunistic networks or OppNets refer to a number of wireless nodes opportunisti-
cally communicating with each other in a form of “Store-Carry-Forward”. This occurs
when they come into contact with each other without proper network infrastructure.
OppNets use wireless technologies, such as IEEE 802.11, WiMAX, Bluetooth and
other short range radio communication. In OppNets, there is no end-to-end con-
nection between the source and the destination nodes and the nodes usually have
high mobility, low density, limited power, short radio range, and are often subject
to different kinds of attacks by malicious nodes. Due to these characteristics and
features, OppNets are subject to serious security challenges. OppNets strongly de-
pend on human interaction, therefore the success of securing such networks is based
on trust between people. OppNets aim to establish reliable networks where there is
no end-to-end connection between the source and destination node. The nodes in
OppNets usually have high mobility, low density, limited power, short radio range,
and are often subject to different kinds of attacks by malicious nodes. Due to these
characteristics, OppNets have gained significant research attention due to the secu-
rity and privacy challenges that have emerged. OppNets have emerged from delay
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tolerant networks (DTNs) where connectivity is intermittent. The nodes are often
disconnected from each other and use Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, or any other wireless con-
nectivity to exchange and forward data in an opportunistic hop by hop manner. In
OppNets there is no end-to-end path between a sender and a destination, so the
opportunity for forwarding of messages are usually limited, with possibly higher er-
ror rates and longer delays. Unlike DTNs, the routing algorithm in OppNets must
be opportunistic. In DTNs, when a message is to be sent, an existing end to end
route is first investigated; if none is found, the message is then sent opportunistically.
However, in OppNets, the message is always sent opportunistically, and an existing
end to end path is never required.
In this thesis, we commenced by providing a broad description about the early re-
search and history of opportunistic networks and then an overview of the available
OppNets routing protocols and their classification. An evaluation study on six rout-
ing protocols (Epidemic, PRoPHET, MaxProp, Spray and Wait, Direct Delivery
and First Contact) was presented to understand their performance in terms of com-
plexity, and scalability. Detailed simulation results show that as the load on the
network increases, the performance of protocols decrease in terms of delivery delay
and network overhead. As for scalability, simulation results show that Epidemic and
PRoPHET achieved high delivery rates, but at a very high cost while Spray and
Wait achieved lower delivery rates, but with a low cost. First Contact and Direct
Delivery achieved low delivery rates with high delivery delays. Results also vary
depending on the buffer size, contact times, and speed.
We discussed secure routing and trust management systems and strategies to increase
security levels in OppNets where social, reputation and history relationships play
important roles in the implementations of these trust strategies. We also discussed
secure routing techniques in OppNets and different defence mechanisms against var-
ious types of attacks like Blackhole, Wormhole, Dropping, and Sybil attacks. Anti-
localization techniques of nodes have attracted the attention of researchers as many
routing protocols use the location of nodes as a base for their routing decisions.
Selfishness was discussed in this thesis where the node tries to obtain benefits from
network facilities and resources but refuses to cooperate with other nodes for rea-
sons such as limitation of resources. We have also discussed the impact of intrusion
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detection systems on OppNets and provided an overview of trust in OppNets.
However, the main contribution of this thesis is to present a novel attack and trace-
back mechanism against a special type of packet dropping attack where the malicious
nodes selectively drop some packets and instead of them inject fake packets so it can
maintain the original total number of packets originated from the sender node. We
call this novel attack a Catabolism attack and we call our traceback mechanisms
against this attack the Anabolism defence.
In this thesis we have proposed and contributed three approaches
• Time-based approach: In this approach legitimate nodes check all the received
packets to distinguish between the fake and legitimate and then traceback the
malicious nodes. Our approach in this method relies on the packets creation
time of each packet and the contact time between nodes. With this technique
we can achieve a high accuracy and we can mitigate the fake packets’ propa-
gation in the networks.
• Merkle tree approach: In the Merkle tree technique any legitimate node can
check the received packets to detect the equality of the Merkle root values and
then traceback to the malicious nodes. With this technique we can achieve a
very high accuracy and we can mitigate the fake packets’ propagation in the
networks.
• Hash chain approach: In the the hash chain technique any legitimate node can
check the received packets to detect the hash chain break and then traceback to
the malicious nodes. With this technique we can achieve a very high detection
accuracy and we can mitigate the fake packets’ propagation in the networks.
In addition we can reduce the processing overhead associated with the Merkle
tree technique.
The PCT and nodes contact time approach achieve a very high accuracy, detection
rate and good networks traffic reduction. However, this approach is based on the
assumption that a malicious node has the ability of dropping legitimate packets
and then injecting fake packets instead of them but has no ability to modify the
packet’s contents including the packet’s creation time. This assumption is not always
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realistic as the malicious node may have the ability to (re)write the time in order
for the injected packets to look like a legitimate packet. Smart malicious nodes can
also write times to point to legitimate nodes in the network in order to appear as
malicious.
The Merkle tree approach achieves a very high accuracy and detection rate with no
security lacks as the legitimate nodes can detect the attack even when one or more
malicious nodes have changed the entire content of the packets. However, in this
approach nodes need more processing time to construct the Merkle tree.
The hash chain approach addresses the processing time issue. It achieves a very
high accuracy and detection rate with no security lacks as the legitimate nodes can
detect the attack in few process time even when the malicious nodes change the
entire content of the packets .
6.2 Discussion
Packet dropping attack is one of the major security threats in OppNets. It can be
classified as a denial of service attack (DoS) where the malicious node drops all or
some of the packets. This attack is one of the most difficult DoS attacks to detect
since neither source node nor the destination node has the knowledge of where or
when the packet will be dropped. Packet dropping can degrade the performance of
the network and may obstruct the propagation of sensitive data. It is a significant
challenge to deal with such an attack since the unreliable wireless communication and
resource limitations can result in communication failure and result in the wrong pre-
diction about the presence of a packet dropping attack. Moreover, a node’s resources,
such as energy and bandwidth can be the real reasons behind packet dropping. A
power shortage or communication failure such as physical damage can make a node
unavailable. It may be difficult to recognize whether packets were dropped due to a
security attack or for non-security reasons. Dropping packets can lead to an increase
in the number of packet retransmissions, transfer time, response time and network
overhead. However, there is no doubt about the malicious behaviour if the node
drops some legitimate packets and then injects fake packets to replace them so it can
maintain the total number of the packets originated from the sender. In this case
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the malicious node obviously has enough resources to do this attack.
Therefore, the objective of the research was to present this attack and to present our
detection and traceback mechanism against it.
We have started with a basic capability of the malicious nodes where it can only drop
some legitimate packets and instead of them inject new fake packets. In our defence
techniques we have started with the destination node based techniques and then
node by node based techniques. Node by node technique achieved better accuracy
and detection rate with good network traffic reductions.
Smart malicious nodes not only can drop some legitimate packets and instead of
them inject fake packets, they can also change the entire content of the packets,
including packets creation time and nodes contact times. Our defence against this
scenarios was the use of hash chain or Merkle tree techniques where we can detect
any packets dropping or modification and then traceback to the malicious nodes.
6.3 Future Work
In this section, the possible research and experimental studies which could be carried
out in the future are highlighted.
• Combining all the mechanisms (time, Merkle and hash chain-based) into one
resilience mechanism will be one of the directions for future work.
• Developing a new secure mechanism for detecting attacks where all packets
are dropped in OppNets is a real challenge, especially when there is no end
to end connection, no centralized management and no clear line of defence in
opportunistic networks.
• Building solid trust strategies in opportunistic networks where the direct and
indirect (reputation) information can be used to detect packet dropping attacks
and to provide secure routing in opportunistic networks.
• Designing a new secure routing protocol in opportunistic networks that com-
bines and embeds all these defence techniques to cover the Catabolism attack
as well as all packets dropping attack is one of the future works. This would
151
Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Works
be an ultimate all in one solution where the protocol manages routing in op-
portunistic networks and provide security features during the routing process.
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